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The cognitive mechanisms which underlie the formation of confabulations 
remain a matter of debate. In the present programme of studies predictors of 
the presence and clinical course of confabulations, and affective biases in the 
content of confabulations, were examined. 
 
24 confabulating brain injured amnesic patients, 11 non-confabulating brain 
injured amnesic controls and 6 healthy participants were assessed on 
confabulation, temporal context confusion (TCC), insight and mood measures. 
Confabulating participants were followed up for 9 months.  
 
In partial replication of previous findings (Schnider, 2008), TCC scores were 
raised in confabulating patients compared with healthy individuals. However, 
TCC was not good at discriminating between confabulating and other brain 
injured patients. Current results are consistent with the argument that TCC may 
be sensitive, but not specific to confabulation (Gilboa, 2010). 
 
A combination of poor insight and somewhat elated mood state predicted the 
presence of confabulations in the current sample sensitively and specifically. 
Initial elated mood score also predicted the clinical course of episodic 
confabulation. The present results indicated that elated mood and level of 
awareness into difficulties and well-being may influence ‘core’ mechanisms 
underlying confabulation (Gilboa, 2010).  
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True and false memories reported by patients were rated for affective content. 
Although many of them were evaluated as ‘neutral’, more confabulatory 
memories were labeled as either pleasant or unpleasant, than ‘true’ memories.  
Location of lesion in terms of whether focal ventro-medial frontal pathology was 
present or absent, had no effect on this affective bias. The affective state may 
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1.1. DESCRIPTION OF CONFABULATION 
 
1.1.1. Definition  
 
Confabulations are false memories, either because they are entirely or partially 
incorrect (for example, the event recalled is correct but the details of where or 
when it happened are incorrect), or because they consist of real memories 
jumbled up and retrieved out of context (Kopelman, 2010). The content of 
confabulated memories is usually autobiographical and unintentional; the 
patient is usually unaware of their condition (Burgess and Shallice, 1996). 
Confabulations often compel the person to act upon them (Schnider, 2001). 
Confabulation is a very debilitating condition: the person may self-discharge 
from hospital against medical advice, and social support networks are often 
further strained as relatives suffer unjustified paranoid accusations, and struggle 




Several classifications have been suggested (Berlyne, 1972; Feinberg and 
Roane, 1997; Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002). Early classifications distinguished 
between ‘momentary’ confabulations (plausible confabulations based on reality) 
and ‘fantastic’ confabulations (without basis in reality, often with a grandiose 
theme) (Berlyne, 1972). The most widely used classification distinguishes 
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between ‘provoked’ versus ‘spontaneous’ confabulations (Kopelman, 1999). 
Provoked confabulations arise in response to a challenge (e.g. prompted by 
orientation or memory tests); whereas spontaneous confabulations arise in the 
absence of any external trigger and the person often acts upon them (for 
example a hospital in-patient may search anxiously for their uniform thinking 
erroneously they are on army manoeuvres).  
 
More recently Schnider’s novel classification distinguished behaviourally 
spontaneous confabulations from three other types of confabulation (Schnider, 
2008):  
- intrusions:  described as ‘simple provoked confabulations’ 
- momentary: plausible, semantic or autobiographical false verbal 
statements which may arise spontaneously during conversation or 
be directly provoked by questions 
- fantastic: confabulations with no basis in reality; sometimes 
difficult to distinguish from elaborate momentary confabulations. 
 
According to Schnider, behaviourally spontaneous confabulations appear 
without external trigger and in this way they differ both from false recognition 
during memory tests and from provoked confabulations, both of which arise in 
response to a cue. In addition, while provoked confabulations are associated 
with a variety of lesions and can happen even in healthy people, spontaneous 
confabulations are only associated with lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
or anterior limbic areas connected with the OFC (Schnider, 2003). Behaviourally 
spontaneous confabulations are also different from fantastic and from 
momentary confabulations in that neither momentary nor fantastic 
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confabulations direct behaviour. Other authors have argued that there is no 
clear distinction between spontaneous and provoked confabulations: moreover, 
these often co-occur in the same patient (Gilboa et al., 2006; DeLuca, 2009). 
 
Features of behaviourally spontaneous confabulation 
 
According to Schnider, the main characteristic of behaviourally spontaneous 
confabulations is that the person believes strongly in their confabulations and 
feels compelled to act on them. “For the patients, confabulations are the honest 
narrative of their perceived reality, rather than invented stories” (Schnider, 
2003). In most cases the person is simply re-enacting an old habit (Schnider, 
2008; compare Dalla Barba and Boisse, 2010). 
 
Confabulations can be traced back to true events (Schnider, 2003). Other 
themes, such as fantastic and semantic have been reported in patients with this 
syndrome, and reduplicative misidentification is often present, but these are not 
consistent features of spontaneous confabulations (Schnider, 2008; Kapur and 
Coughlan, 1980). 
 
The syndrome is also characterised by amnesia and disorientation. However, 
some confabulators have demonstrated normal memory function; orientation to 
person (i.e. one’s own identity) often resumes once the patient is out of the 
confusional state (Schnider, 2008). 
 
Confabulating patients lack insight into their false memories, but may have 
limited awareness of other memory difficulties.  
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1.1.3. Differential diagnoses 
 
Differential diagnosis of confabulation has led to intense controversy. Some 
authors distinguish between false recall and confabulation (Schacter et al., 
1998; Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002). False recall usually refers to non-personal 
information studied post-insult, whereas confabulations usually refer to pre-
injury autobiographical knowledge; although confabulations about semantic 
material or general knowledge have also been observed (Dalla Barba et al., 
1999); Kopelman et al., 1997).  
 
The differential diagnosis between confabulations and delusions remains 
unresolved. Some authors think confabulations are best understood as 
disorders of memory, whereas delusions are viewed as disorders of thought 
(DeLuca, 2000, 2009; Kopelman, 2010). Other authors suggest they share 
underlying cognitive deficits; (Johnson and Raye, 2000; Turner and Coltheart, 
2010; Fotopoulou, 2010). Spontaneous confabulations are often not amenable 
to change; on this basis it has been proposed recently that they are best viewed 
as delusions, and therefore only provoked confabulations qualify as genuine 
confabulations (Coltheart and Turner, 2009). Conversely some authors have 
proposed that only spontaneous confabulation constitutes the specific 
neurological syndrome observed in clinical populations; in this way they have 
argued it differs from provoked memory lapses, which can occur in the general 
population (Kopelman, 1999; Schnider, 2008). 
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The aetiology of confabulation is varied; the syndrome has been observed 
following anterior communicating artery aneurysm, tumours, encephalitis, 
traumatic head injury and Korsakoff syndrome (Schnider, 2008). In addition, 
confabulations have been observed in the context of schizophrenia (Nathaniel-
James and Frith, 1996), degenerative disease (Dalla Barba et al., 1999), and 
confusional states (Kopelman et al., 1997; Box et al., 1999). However, 
spontaneous confabulatory errors are often distinguished from lapses arising 
from confusional states (DeLuca, 2000; Schnider, 2008).  
 
1.1.4. Brain pathology 
 
Most authors view the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as the critical area 
associated with spontaneous confabulation (Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002). 
Schnider (2008) has argued that the critical area is specifically the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) or areas directly linked to it. Medial ventro-caudal (Broadman Area 
25 (BA25)) and basal forebrain have also recently been associated with 
‘confabulatory type errors’ (Turner et al., 2008b). The medial rostral prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) (BA 9/10) has been found to be critical for remembering self-
generated material (Turner et al., 2008b). Evidence derived from PET scan 
investigations also pointed to BA13 and BA10 as crucial areas for monitoring 
outcome, an essential mechanism underlying confabulation (Schnider, 2008; 





1.2. EARLY EXPLANATIONS AND THEORETICAL MODELS OF 
CONFABULATION 
 
Many models have attempted to explain the underlying psychological 
mechanisms that are critical in the appearance of confabulations. At present at 
least three types of hypotheses are being followed: 1. the ‘temporality’ 
hypothesis, 2. the ‘strategic retrieval’ hypothesis, and 3. the ‘motivational’ 
accounts (Kopelman, 2010).  
 
Current models of cognitive mechanisms underlying confabulations have their 
basis on early explanations. The following cognitive mechanisms were identified 
in early models as critical factors underlying confabulation, either separately or 
combined: memory deficit; chronological disturbance; ‘gap-filling’; impaired 




Early models proposed that confabulations were a function of a basic amnesic 
deficit coupled with a distorted sense of time. This explained why confabulators 
often think past events are occurring in the present. For example Korsakoff 
(1889, cited in Kopelman, 1999; Schnider, 2008) observed that confabulations 
were often based on the person’s past events and prompted the patient to act 
upon them. He explained confabulations as a source monitoring deficit. He 
believed recent memory traces were weaker than those of remote memories, 
which made the latter easier to retrieve. Without a way of telling whether the 
memory belonged to the past or to the present, old memories were taken for 
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new ones (Schnider, 2008; Kopelman, 2010). The early models were based 
purely on clinical observation, but the ‘distorted temporality’ hypothesis was 
later developed by several authors, who have provided more detailed 
explanations based on well-controlled experiments (Schnider, 2008). 
Temporality models make specific claims regarding both the appearance and 
the course of confabulations and are reviewed below in relation to this study’s 
investigations into potential predictors of a) the presence and b) the clinical 




Other early authors (e.g. Korsakoff, Kraepelin and Tiling) noted that in order for 
confabulations to appear there must be a monitoring deficit that allows incorrect 
memories to be outputted as correct (DeLuca, 2009; Schnider 2008). These 
early models, which focused on ‘dysexecutive’ deficits underlying confabulation, 
were also developed later into more detailed explanations: the ‘strategic 
retrieval’ hypotheses (Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Gilboa and Moscovitch, 
2002). These models are primarily concerned with deficits in either memory 
specification, formation and/or verification processes that give rise to 
confabulations. These models provide a comprehensive explanation regarding 
a) the appearance, b) the clinical course and c) the content of confabulations 
and are discussed below regarding these three issues examined by the three 







Several early authors had noted certain personality traits or characteristics 
seemed to make some people more prone to confabulations than others. For 
example Van der Horst believed confabulations were motivated by the person’s 
wishes (cited in Berlyne, 1972). Berlyne believed that in the absence of the real 
memories being available, ‘fantastic’ confabulations were produced based on 
fantasies with strong affect (Berlyne, 1972). Pick proposed that suggestibility as 
a consequence of trauma would create a predisposition to fill memory gaps with 
plausible information (cited in Berlyne, 1972; Schnider, 2008). In 1938 Williams 
and Rupp proposed that confabulation was a function of several factors: 
memory deficit, lack of insight and a particular personality pattern, which 
included a tendency towards introversion. This personality pattern exacerbated 
suggestibility (cited in Berlyne, 1972). Yet a different explanation was suggested 
by Zangwill in 1953, who proposed that confabulation was part of a maladaptive 
response to illness: a kind of denial. Confabulation acted as defence 
mechanism against a potential ‘catastrophic reaction’ (cited in Berlyne, 1972). 
 
The third type of current models, the ‘motivational’ hypotheses have derived 
from the above early explanations, and are concerned primarily with emotional 
factors underlying the appearance of confabulations (Fotopoulou, 2008). They 
are “complementary” to the ‘temporality’ and ‘strategic retrieval’ models: they do 
not make claims about the appearance of confabulations per se; instead they 
attempt to explain the emotional factors that influence the content of 
confabulations. Well-controlled experiments suggest that the content of 
confabulations may be driven by personal meanings, goals or wishes. These 
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models are reviewed below in relation to the present investigation into the 
affective content of confabulations. 
 
Early hypotheses based on personality factors were not without criticism. In 
1961 Talland rejected these explanations. He proposed that only plausible 
autobiographical false memories qualified as confabulations, since more 
fantastic fabrications could be attributed to delusion (cited in Schnider, 2008). 
Talland (1965) noted that the source of these confabulations were past personal 
autobiographical events.  He also observed that in confabulations, typically, a 
memory of a past event was represented as a present event, but he did not 
consider this as the main cause of confabulations. Instead he viewed disturbed 
temporality as secondary to an amnesic disturbance. Personal dispositions or 
characteristics would then determine the presence, rate and quality of 
confabulations. Talland proposed the following characteristics of confabulation 
(cited in Burgess and Shallice, 1996): 
- they are a coherent account concerning the patient; 
- they are false statements; 
- they have autobiographical content; 
- this content is reconstructed, recombined and modified according 
to mechanisms of normal remembering; 
- the person lacks awareness of the distortions; 
- confabulations are unintentional and do not act as compensation 







More recently several authors have suggested that executive dysfunction could 
explain confabulation independently of amnesia (Kopelman, 1987; Kapur and 
Coughlan, 1980; Benson et al., 1996). Two patients underwent a 
neuropsychological assessment before and after they recovered from 
confabulation. At re-test both patients showed improvement on executive tests 
in parallel with decreased confabulations, but their amnesia scores remained 
unchanged at the severe level of function. The authors concluded that frontal 
control dysfunction, and not amnesia, was the critical deficit associated with 
confabulations (Kapur and Coughlan, 1980; Benson et al., 1996). However, this 
hypothesis has been criticised (DeLuca, 2009). For example, behavioural 
experiments indicated that executive dysfunction did not distinguish between 
spontaneous confabulators and other amnesic patients, nor did it parallel 
recovery from confabulation (Schnider, 2003). In addition, confabulation has 
been described in the absence of executive dysfunction (Burgess and Shallice, 
1996; Johnson et al., 1997; Dalla Barba et al., 1999). 
 
Reduced awareness of false memories  
 
Limited insight into confabulations has been observed by many authors, but has 
seldom been measured formally (Tiling, Williams and Rupp, cited in Schnider, 
2008). Early authors believed confabulations were conscious efforts to fill gaps 
in memory when the patient was too embarrassed to admit they could not 
answer orientation or memory questions (Tiling, Bonhoeffer, Kalberlah, Pick and 
Moll, cited in Schnider, 2008). However, more recently it has been 
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acknowledged that confabulating patients lack awareness into their memory 
deficits and therefore confabulations are unintentional and may be unconscious 
(Talland, 1965; Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Schnider, 2008; Gilboa, 2010; 
compare Dalla Barba, 2009). Other authors viewed confabulations as either 
denial of deficits or an unconscious defence mechanism against a potential 
catastrophic reaction, were they to realise the full extent of their predicament 
(Zangwill, cited in Berlyne, 1972; Flament, cited in Schnider, 2008).  
 
Limited insight is a theme that runs through most theoretical models of 
confabulation, and yet the relationship between insight and confabulation has 
seldom been explicitly studied (Talland, 1965; Burgess and Shallice, 1996; 
(Schnider, 2008). The present programme of studies aimed to examine the 
relationship between insight and the presence and clinical course of 
confabulation. 
 
1.3. CURRENT MAIN THEORIES OF CONFABULATION 
 
1.3.1. Temporality models  
 
Korsakoff, Tiling, Van der Horst and Talland had noticed disturbed temporality 
or chronology as a salient peculiarity of confabulation (Schnider, 2008; 
Kopelman, 2010; Talland, 1965). Two models have derived from early 
temporality explanations: a ‘disturbed temporal consciousness’ model and a 





1.3.1.1. Disturbed temporal consciousness  
 
Disturbed ‘temporal consciousness’ is one of the current explanations for the 
appearance of confabulations (Dalla Barba et al., 1999). This model proposes 
the following explanation for confabulations. Confabulators may be aware of a 
personal past, present and future which is distorted. Temporal consciousness is 
strongest for well established knowledge. Consequently, when memory traces 
are weak, temporal consciousness is framed by more stable memories: 
semantic knowledge. Therefore, when prompted, confabulators are likely to 
answer with memories or plans corresponding to well rehearsed memories or 
habits (Dalla Barba, 2009; Dalla Barba and Boisse, 2010). 
 
Dalla Barba’s model is unique in that it is the only explanation that proposes 
fully conscious mechanisms of confabulation. He criticises other models for 
putting forward explanations based on unconscious mechanisms which are not 
scientifically verifiable (Dalla Barba, 2009). However this model has been 
criticised for being based on observations rather than on rigorous scientific data 
(Schnider, 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, Dalla Barba’s Confabulation Interview is the only established 
protocol for exploring confabulations across episodic, semantic, personal, non-
personal domains (Dalla Barba, 1993a). This protocol was used in the present 





1.3.1.2. Temporal context confusion  
 
The distorted temporality characteristic of confabulators is the focus of one of 
the most influential models to date: the Temporal Context Confusion Model 
(TCC) (Ptak and Schnider, 1999). Schnider believed confabulators often had a 
distorted sense of time independent of memory deficits (Schnider, 2008, p230). 
His model refers specifically to ‘behaviourally spontaneous confabulations’ 
(Schnider, 2008). These are false memories that occur in the absence of an 
external trigger and that direct behaviour. This model influenced the present 
investigations into potential predictors of a) the appearance, and b) the clinical 
course of confabulation. Therefore it is reviewed in detail next. 
 
1.3.1.3. Clinical evidence for temporal context confusion 
 
Schnider’s model was developed from a series of elegant experiments 
employing a temporal context confusion task (TCC). A small group of 
behaviourally spontaneous confabulators failed this TCC task. The TCC task is 
described in detail in chapter 2 of this thesis, but essentially it consists of two 
runs of a continuous recognition task (run 1 and run 2). The first run measures 
straight forward storage and recognition. In the second run, however, items that 
in the previous run were targets become distracters and vice versa. As a result 
the targets in the second run suffer intense interference from former targets, 




In a series of investigations behaviourally spontaneous confabulators performed 
as well as amnesic controls in the first run of the TCC task, whereas they 
consistently failed the second part. Schnider & Ptak (Schnider and Ptak, 1999) 
initially concluded from these results that spontaneous confabulators were 
unable to suppress memories that were currently incorrect. However this 
explanation did not accommodate processes such as day-dreaming or 
creativity. Therefore this deficit was later reformulated as an inability to ‘filter’ 
incoming information that pertains to ongoing reality (Schnider, 2008, pp. 267-
272). 
 
Schnider followed up 8 confabulators who performed the TCC task again after 3 
years (Schnider et al., 2000a). All the patients who had stopped confabulating 
performed normally on the TCC task. No other cognitive measures paralleled 
the course of confabulation. Therefore Schnider concluded TCC was necessary 
and sufficient to explain the presence and clinical course of confabulation 
(Schnider et al., 2000a). 
 
Based on this model, Schnider made some treatment suggestions. He 
discouraged challenging confabulations directly. Confabulators are so 
convinced of the false statements’ veracity that their denial often leads to anger 
and anxiety (Schnider, 2003). No controlled trials exist, but Schnider has had 
some success with dopamine antagonists risperidone and quetiapine, 
depending on the patient. He recommends trying short doses of neuroleptics in 
the first instance (Schnider, 2008, p.251). 
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Over time significant limitations of the TCC task have been described. Schnider 
himself described a confirmed confabulator who performed normally on the 
TCC task. This was attributed to the patient having adopted a conservative 
response criterion as a strategy in order to cope with the confusion caused by 
the TCC task (Schnider, 2008, p.251). Another patient did not confabulate 
despite abnormal TCC performance. Schnider suggested that perhaps this 
person’s preserved memory function had overridden the effects of TCC, thereby 
stopping confabulation (Schnider, 2008, p.251). Gilboa et al. (2006) also found 
that a group of patients who had suffered anterior communicating artery 
aneurysm (ACoA) did poorly on this task, despite being free from 
confabulations. This indicates that although TCC may be sensitive to 
confabulation, it is not specific to the syndrome. Instead, TCC may be specific 
to pathology that affects the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMFC) (Gilboa, 
2010). 
 
Despite criticism, Schnider’s results with this task have been replicated either 
totally or partially (Schnider and Ptak, 1999; Schnider et al., 2000a; Turner et 
al., 2010; Gilboa et al., 2006). Therefore this task was used in the present study 
to explore the value of TCC in predicting a) the appearance and b) recovery 
from confabulation. 
 
1.3.1.4. Imaging evidence for temporality models 
 
Further reformulation of Schnider’s model came from neuroimaging studies. 
Schnider et al. (2000b) scanned a healthy sample while carrying out a more 
difficult version of the TCC task. Results showed brain activation during the 
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critical part of the task (run 2) corresponded to the posterior medial orbitofrontal 
cortex (BA13).  
 
Evoked potentials and cortical activation maps showed a striking difference in 
frontal brain activation between distracters in run 2 and other stimuli. At 200-300 
milliseconds after stimuli presentation, processing of distracters in run 2 skipped 
a stage of cortical synchronisation. This early activity occurred even before 
encoding took place (at 400-600 ms) (Schnider et al., 2002).  
 
One explanation put forward was that activated memories go through a 
preconscious ‘filtering’ stage. If memories are not currently relevant, the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) inhibits cortical synchronisation. In this way memories 
are tagged as either being currently relevant or not, and go on to influence 
behaviour accordingly (Schnider, 2003, 2008, p.269). 
 
Why should confabulators be so convinced of their false memories even in the 
face of contradictory evidence? Schnider speculated that confabulations 
represent a behavioural extinction deficit. He noted that primates with ablations 
of the OFC had trouble extinguishing responses that are no longer required. 
Therefore he proposed that perhaps confabulators had difficulty extinguishing 
memories that are no longer relevant to their current situation.  
 
PET experiments in which healthy participants performed decision-making tasks 
showed that extinction trials underwent different processing to other trials at 
200-300ms. The areas involved were BA10 and BA13. One explanation was 
that the OFC acted as an “outcome monitoring system” signalling the non-
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occurrence of a predicted event through cortical activation. Absence of this 
signal would lead to a false sense that predictions had been met. In the case of 
confabulators, it would provide certainty that the event recalled was correct 
(Schnider, 2008, p.291).  
 
1.3.1.5. Summary of temporality models 
 
In summary, temporal models focus on a strikingly distorted sense of time which 
is characteristic of confabulations. Clinical experiments suggested temporal 
context confusion (TCC) was the critical disorder that predicted both the 
appearance and recovery from confabulation. Imaging experiments suggested 
the OFC was responsible for early inhibition of cortical synchronisation of 
memories that are not currently relevant. Schnider proposed that confabulations 
appear when this early ‘filtering’ or ‘extinction’ process is faulty.  
 
Schnider’s TCC task has been used in the present study in order to examine his 
claims that TCC predicts both the appearance and the clinical course of 
confabulation. 
 
Aspects of this model do not seem incompatible with some features of strategic 
retrieval models, which are reviewed next. The basic deficit in confabulation 
proposed by Schnider is one of faulty monitoring during memory reconstruction 
(Schnider, 2008, p.270). Indeed Schnider’s ‘filtering’ mechanism is not 
dissimilar to other filtering processes reviewed below ((Gilboa, 2010); compare 
Burgess’ notion of ‘gateway’ sited in BA10 (Burgess et al., 2007a, 2007c). In 
addition the OFC as an “outcome monitoring system” is not dissimilar to the 
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idea that the OFC is involved in “matching events to internal predictions” 
(Turner et al., 2008b). However despite some commonalities, specific 
hypotheses arising from either model may lead to opposing predictions. 
 
1.3.2. Strategic Retrieval Models 
 
Early authors (e.g. Korsakoff, Kraepelin and Tiling) explained confabulations as 
a combination of amnesia deficits and a monitoring deficit (DeLuca, 2009; 
Schnider 2008). Kapur and Benson had highlighted the role of executive 
dysfunction on confabulation (Kapur and Coughlan, 1980; Benson et al., 1996). 
The following explanations of confabulation hinge on the dysfunction of specific 
control mechanisms that operate during normal recollection. 
 
1.3.2.1. Memory reconstruction processes 
 
Several authors see memory as a series of constructive processes, and as 
such, open to errors during memory reconstruction (Schacter et al., 1998; 
Moscovitch and Melo, 1997). Cognitive mechanisms proposed by these models 
apply both to normal and abnormal memory. Two key processes of successful 
memory retrieval have been proposed: 
1. different elements of the information to be retrieved must be ‘bound’ 
together in order to produce a coherent memory. Dysfunction of this 
process leads to source memory deficits, where events are recollected 
without important details, e.g. timing or location in which the event 
occurred. 
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2. similar events must be distinguished from the specific memory to be 
retrieved. If this didn’t happen, only the ‘gist’ of an event would be 
remembered. 
 
Control mechanisms underlying memory reconstruction 
 
Confabulation (of any type) arises as a consequence of dysfunction of one or 
more executive processes involved in memory reconstruction (Moscovitch and 
Winocur, 2002; Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Kopelman, 1999). These can be 
related either to the search strategy or to the monitoring of the retrieved 
information (Moscovitch and Melo, 1997). Three main strategic retrieval 
processes are described: ‘descriptor’, ‘editing’, and ‘mediating’ processes 
(Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Burgess and McNeil, 1999; Gilboa and 
Moscovitch, 2002).  
 
1. ‘Descriptor’ or cue specification processes are responsible for generating 
internal cues to guide information retrieval. Normally ‘generic memories’ 
are used as default “starting value templates” to speed up the process of 
memory reconstruction (Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Moscovitch and 
Winocur, 2002). They are subsequently refined and modified as they 
undergo verification (Moscovitch and Melo, 1997). However, in the 
absence of adequate specifications to guide recollection, these generic 
“input templates” are erroneously reported as the target memory 
(Burgess and Shallice, 1996). The absence of descriptor cues could also 
result in exaggerated ‘cueing’ effects in recollection; this would be the 
case, for example, of a patient who mistakenly reported she was a 
 31
member of staff in the hospital in which she was a patient (Kopelman et 
al., 1997). 
2. ‘Editing’ or monitoring mechanisms are responsible for verification, 
accuracy checking and comparison of retrieved memories (Burgess and 
Shallice, 1996; Moscovitch and Winocur, 2002). Malfunction of these 
verification processes would mean that retrieval of erroneous material 
would go unchecked.  
3. ‘Mediator’ processes are problem-solving processes, not necessarily 
specific to memory. If retrieval of a false memory is detected, mediating 
processes would prevent its erroneous output and redirect the search. 
Fantastic confabulations are caused by malfunction of ‘mediator’ 
processes which fail to check the general plausibility of the material 
remembered. 
 
One criticism of the above model is that the monitoring processes proposed are 
not specific to confabulation – they apply to true memories too; furthermore, 
they do not distinguish between different types of confabulation (Schnider, 
2008, pp.227-228). Further critique argues that these models rely on non-
observable processes that make verification of these theories difficult (Dalla 
Barba, 2009). For example there is lack of evidence of the physiological basis of 
the monitoring processes described by these models (Schnider, 2008), p.228). 
Some of the models have been developed without reference to clinical data 
(Schnider, 2001). Finally, they do not explain the confusion that usually 




1.3.2.2. Cognitive mechanisms underlying confabulation  
 
A recent model has structured the above processes in a different way and 
extended the above model. Gilboa and colleagues (Moscovitch and Melo, 1997; 
Gilboa, 2010) proposed that three types of cognitive mechanisms underlie 
confabulation: 1. ‘core’ processes, which are essential for the appearance and 
course of confabulations, and are specific to this syndrome; 2. ‘constitutional’ 
processes, which may be necessary but are not specific to confabulations; and 
3. ‘associated’ features, which are not critical for the appearance of 
confabulations, but may influence their content. Three types of ‘core’ processes 
are reviewed below, followed by a summary of ‘constitutional’ processes and 




Three ‘core’ mechanisms are described; the first two are different types of 
monitoring processes: (i) a “Preconscious Feeling of Rightness (FOR)”; (ii) 
Conscious Monitoring mechanisms; and (iii) Control processes. 
 
(i) “Preconscious Feeling of Rightness (FOR)” mechanisms appear to be 
heuristic decision-making processes that verify retrieved memory traces and tag 
them accordingly, very early in the process of retrieval. When these processes 
break down, false memories may be accepted as correct. In addition false 
memories that are autobiographical in nature may direct behaviour, because 
they are held with great conviction. This may be because autobiographical 
information is both very well established and salient to each individual.  
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(ii) Conscious Monitoring mechanisms are more thorough verification 
processes, which take place later in the process of retrieval (Gilboa, 2010; 
Burgess and Shallice, 1996). Memories are verified against retrieval cues, and 
contrasted with available information. If these mechanisms function correctly 
they may overhaul FOR processes and prevent confabulations. Breakdown of 
conscious monitoring mechanisms may result in fantastic or inconsistent 
confabulations.  
 
(iii) Control processes allow us to consider the consequences of reporting the 
retrieved material, and help us decide whether to report it or not. For example if 
the cost of reporting a memory is too great should it turn out to be false, the 
person may decide to withhold it. Even if the other two core mechanisms are 
faulty, Control processes may stop a confabulation from being reported. For this 





Constitutional processes are described as those that are usually associated 
with confabulation, but are not unique to confabulation. Deficits in these 
processes may be necessary for the appearance of confabulation, but they are 
not sufficient. For example a memory deficit seems to always accompany 
confabulation but it is not specific to this syndrome. Search initiation and cue 
specification deficits may also contribute to the appearance of confabulation, 
but can also appear in its absence. In contrast with Schnider (2008), these 
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authors claim that temporal context confusion (TCC) may be sensitive but not 
specific to the presence of confabulation. Failure in this task has been 
associated with particular brain pathology in the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, 
rather than with confabulation per se (Gilboa et al., 2006).  
 
From the above reviews it seems that although temporality and strategic 
retrieval models share common features, some specific hypotheses may lead to 
opposing predictions for the current data. Thus if, on the one hand, TCC is 
specific to confabulation, then only confabulating patients should fail the TCC 
task. If on the other hand, TCC is not specific to confabulation, then it is 
expected that failure on this task will be observed in non-confabulating controls 
too. Both explanations are discussed in relation to present investigations into 
the predictors of the presence and clinical course of confabulation. These 
questions are addressed in the cross-sectional and longitudinal investigations 




Associated features may be present in connection with confabulations but are 
often absent, therefore they are not considered constitutional to the syndrome. 
They typically determine the content of confabulation and form part of normal 
reconstructive function. For example many confabulations have a self-serving 
bias (see Fotopoulou, 2010 for a review), but this may not be a universal bias 
(Metcalf et al., 2010). Confabulations often represent ‘generic’ well rehearsed 
memories (Burgess and McNeil, 1999; Dab et al., 1999; Metcalf et al., 2010). 
These seem to be exacerbations of normal recollection errors and appear in 
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many contexts. Perseveration has also been observed in confabulators, 
especially in semantic memory (Kopelman et al., 1997), but this seems to be 
associated with frontal pathology in general. Associated features are discussed 
in relation to the current investigation into the affective content of confabulations 
in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
1.3.2.3. Imaging evidence in support of strategic retrieval models 
 
Strategic retrieval models are based on imaging and behavioural experimental 
data in support of both monitoring mechanisms and Control processes. Imaging 
data showed patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMFC) lesions 
skipped an early positive modulation that was present in controls at 240ms 
post-stimulus (Gilboa, 2010). This appears to be consistent with Schnider’s 
imaging data reviewed above that showed an early deactivation (Schnider et al., 
2002). Furthermore, Gilboa’s patients also lacked a positive modulation that 
controls showed at a later stage: 350ms post-stimulus. Gilboa (2010) argued 
that these two results would support the theory that two distinct monitoring 
mechanisms are critical for the appearance of confabulation: i) early “Feeling of 
Rightness” (FOR) and ii) late and more in-depth monitoring processes. 
 
1.3.2.4. Clinical evidence in support of strategic retrieval models 
 
Behavioural experiments showed that confabulators seem to report false 
memories even when the need for cue specification and creating a search 
strategy are minimised (Gilboa et al., 2006). One confabulating patient made far 
more errors than controls, despite showing a general conservative response 
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criterion on a free report memory task (she only reported information if she was 
at least 75% sure it was true, (Gilboa, 2010). These results indicate that 
confabulation is not merely the consequence of a general bias or a response 
inhibition deficit, but a very specific monitoring deficit (compare Turner et al., 
2008a). Confabulations were also associated with an indiscriminate sense of 
confidence in their veracity, even when they were highly implausible (Gilboa et 
al., 2006). These findings are consistent with a specific deficit in “Preconscious 
Feeling of Rightness” (FOR) as a critical mechanism in the appearance of 
confabulation.  
 
Evidence for the role of Control processes in confabulation comes from a single 
case experiment where the confabulating participant was free to withhold 
answers during the course of free report (rather than structured interview, 
(Gilboa, 2010). This patient seemed unable to stop generating answers, even 
after she had reported the correct answer. This is consistent with the critical role 
of Control mechanisms in the appearance of confabulations. 
 
Furthermore, using tasks sensitive to confabulation, Gilboa (2010) found 
delusional patients presented a distinct pattern of response to that of 
confabulators. In contrast with confabulators, delusional patients showed poor 
control function, good monitoring ability and a liberal response bias. They 






1.3.2.5. Summary of strategic retrieval models 
 
In summary, strategic retrieval models explain confabulation as a dysfunction of 
monitoring mechanisms that operate during normal memory reconstruction. 
They do not discriminate between different types of confabulation. ‘Core’ 
cognitive processes that are critical and specific to the appearance of 
confabulations include: (i) an early ‘Feeling of Rightness’ about a memory; (ii) a 
more in-depth Monitoring process; and (iii) Control mechanisms that allow the 
individual to decide whether to report a memory or not, irrespective of its 
perceived veracity. All three must be impaired for confabulations to appear. 
‘Constitutional’ processes may be necessary, but they are neither specific to nor 
sufficient for the appearance of confabulations. Memory deficits and temporal 
context confusion fall into this category. ‘Associated’ features have been 
observed during confabulation, but they are often absent. These may affect the 
content of confabulation, for example making it predominantly self-serving, or 
generic (i.e. devoid of detail). 
 
Strategic retrieval models provide the most comprehensive explanation of 
confabulations. Consequently they are discussed in relation to the main 
questions of the present study in the following chapters. They share a common 
base with motivational models. Both types of models explain confabulations as 
distortions of normal memory reconstructive mechanisms. However, 
motivational models make specific predictions about the content of 




1.3.3. Motivational models 
 
Explanations based purely on cognitive deficits such as memory, monitoring, 
etc. neglect answering the question of why a particular memory happens to be 
selected for output over any others (Fotopoulou, 2009). Yet existing evidence 
indicates the content of confabulations is not simply random, a good proportion 
of the themes can be traced back to particular preoccupations or 
autobiographical events of the individual (Burgess and McNeil, 1999; Schnider, 
2008), so how do some themes get selected over others? Previous theoretical 
models have addressed the mechanics of the appearance and course of 
confabulation; motivational explanations address specifically the question of 
what determines the content of confabulation. 
 
Precursors of motivational explanations have proposed several determinants of 
the content of confabulation. Williams and Rupp (1938, cited in Schnider, 2008) 
introduced personality traits in the definition of confabulation. They proposed 
confabulation was a function of several factors: memory deficit, lack of insight 
and a particular personality pattern, which included a tendency towards 
introversion (Schnider, 2008).  
 
Flament (1957, cited in Schnider, 2008) explained confabulations in function of 
unconscious ‘compensation’ mechanisms: either to compensate for memory 
deficits or to provide a more rewarding situation than the reality they 
experienced as a consequence of the trauma (Schnider, 2008). 
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Talland (1965) considered confabulations as secondary to amnesic deficits. He 
proposed that personal dispositions or characteristics determined the presence, 
rate and quality of confabs. He observed that some confabulations presented 
the past in a more positive light than the present. 
 
Recent motivational accounts of confabulations, like most theoretical models, 
explain confabulations in function of faulty memory and control mechanisms. In 
addition to this, and more importantly, they propose confabulations are driven 
by personal goals or self-images. The authors argue these same motivational 
influences moderate memory formation in healthy individuals; however in 
confabulations these tendencies have an exaggerated influence on recollection, 
due to breakdown of memory and executive functioning (Fotopoulou and 
Conway, 2004; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Fotopoulou, 2009; Metcalf 
et al., 2010). 
 
1.3.3.1. The Self-Memory System (SMS) 
 
Memory processes may not operate in isolation; instead memory and control 
processes may interact with identity formation processes. The resulting 
interacting network is referred to as the “self-memory system (SMS)” (Conway, 
1997; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Autobiographical memories are 
viewed as transitory mental constructions generated from an underlying 
knowledge base. Constant patterns of activation would arise over the 
knowledge database we hold; these would be monitored and inhibited by 
control processes as required. Control processes would be modulated by active 
goals generated by the working self. The two components of the SMS: the 
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autobiographical knowledge base and the working self, are briefly described 
below. This is followed by an account of how damage to these components can 
result in confabulations.  
 
The Autobiographical memory store 
 
The autobiographical knowledge database is said to be organised around 
lifetime periods (i.e.: “when I lived with X”, etc), general events (i.e.: repeated 
events or routines, e.g.: how to ride a bicycle), and event-specific knowledge 
(Conway, 1997; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Knowledge stored as 
lifetime periods provides cues that can be used to recall a given set of general 
events, and knowledge stored as general events indexes event-specific 
knowledge. A specific autobiographical memory is described as a stable pattern 
of activation over these knowledge structures. The construction of 
autobiographical memories is said to be constrained by strategic retrieval and 
monitoring control processes, and these in turn are modulated by goals 
generated by the working self; this is reviewed below (Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000).  
 
The Working Self 
 
The working self is described as a collection of self-schemas, or representations 
of the self, that modulate cognition and behaviour (Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005). The self-image is constantly being updated; a 
number of possible representations of the self are either adopted or rejected at 
any given time.  
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Tensions or discrepancies between different self-representations (‘actual self’, 
‘ideal self’, ‘ought-to-be self’) cause emotional distress. Consequently a set of 
goals and plans are generated to reduce distress by increasing coherence 
between self-concepts. Thus, achievement of ‘self-goals’ is associated with 
positive emotion. In this way the goals of the working self are described as a 
subset of working memory control processes that bias memory retrieval; for 
example, they may increase accessibility of memories which support important 
goals and self-images; memories that contradict them may be assigned low 
accessibility (Conway, 2005).  
 
The ‘self-goals’ and highly changeable self-representations are constrained by 
long-standing autobiographical memories; these lend stability and plausibility to 
self-concepts and goals (Conway and Tacchi, 1996; Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). Therefore, the role of the working self may be two-fold: (i) to 
‘ground’ goals in reality by basing them on accurate memories, and (ii)  
simultaneously making available knowledge and memories that support current 
self-concepts and show some positive progress towards current goals. In other 
words the working self fulfils the need for coherence both with external reality 
and with internal personal images and wishes (Conway, 2005).  
 
Inconsistency between self-goals and knowledge base would indicate a 
breakdown in normal functioning. If the reciprocal constrains between 
autobiographical knowledge and working self are removed, potentially, 
autobiographical knowledge could be constructed to support goals and plans 
without reference to reality. This could lead to confabulation and other 
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neurological pathologies (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 1997). 
Clinical evidence for this model of confabulation is briefly reviewed below. 
 
1.3.3.2. Evidence of self-referent content in confabulations 
 
Most authors acknowledge the prominence of personal content in 
confabulations (Dalla Barba and Boisse, 2010; Metcalf et al., 2010; Gilboa et 
al., 2006; Kopelman, 1999). Memory and dysexecutive deficits can distort both 
the search and evaluation of autobiographical memories in such way that 
personal goals may have an exaggerated influence on memory reconstruction 
(Metcalf et al., 2010; Burgess and McNeil, 1999; Gilboa et al., 2006). The 
resulting memories then would show disproportionate self-referent and possibly 
self-enhancing biases (Fotopoulou, 2009). The strong and selective influence of 
personal schema on recall was illustrated by a prose recall experiment 
(Fotopoulou et al., 2008a). In this investigation confabulating patients showed a 
selective bias when they recalled self-referent prose. This bias was absent from 
their recall of non-self-referent information. This discovery has potential 
implications for treatment; for example, information expressed in the 3rd person 
may be recalled more accurately by patients than information in the 1st person 
(Fotopoulou et al., 2008a; Fotopoulou, 2009).  
 
1.3.3.3. Evidence of self-coherence in the content of confabulations 
 
Furthermore most confabulations reported in the literature appear to refer to 
frequently repeated habits or ‘generic’ personal memories (Dalla Barba and 
Boisse, 2010; Metcalf et al., 2010; Burgess and McNeil, 1999). For example 
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Burgess and McNeil (1999) reported a confabulating patient, a former shop-
owner, who kept trying to leave hospital in order to carry out a stock count. The 
authors argued this activity would have featured predominantly in his life prior to 
admission to hospital; retrieval of these highly rehearsed memories is likely to 
be automatic and would have gone unmonitored due to executive dysfunction 
(Burgess and McNeil, 1999; Metcalf et al., 2010; Gilboa et al., 2006). In addition 
to poor monitoring, confabulating patients present with severe disruption of 
autobiographical memory function. As a consequence of these deficits they may 
not be able to select the appropriate life-time period to guide recollection. In this 
context they may misinterpret past memories or current cues according to the 
goals and expectations of a particular life-time period (Fotopoulou and Conway, 
2004). In addition, patients have been observed to minimize the deficits caused 
by their neurological condition and explain them as premorbid features. This 
could indicate an exaggerated bias to maintain an account of themselves that is 
coherent with their past self-image (Fotopoulou, 2009). 
 
1.3.3.4. Evidence for self-enhancement in the content of confabulations 
 
Confabulating patients report more pleasant confabulations than non-
confabulating controls, as rated by independent judges (Fotopoulou et al., 2004, 
2008b). Typically they have been observed to inflate their abilities in the face of 
their current deficits, or to embellish their past (Fotopoulou et al., 2007a). For 
example a confabulating patient may replace past disappointing family 
interactions in his/her life with more pleasant confabulated memories about 
successful close relationships (Conway and Tacchi, 1996). Further evidence of 
the self-enhancing nature of confabulations comes from an experiment where 
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the emotional nature of the information to be remembered was manipulated 
(Fotopoulou et al., 2007b). Confabulating patients were given incorrect 
information about themselves. They were more likely to adopt the false 
autobiographical memories as true when these were positive than when they 
were negative (Fotopoulou et al., 2007b). Another experiment showed that 
confabulating patients’ recall of negative self-referent information was distorted 
in a way that showed them in a better light (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a).  
 
Biases towards pleasant content have been widely observed in confabulations; 
however, they are not universal (Gilboa, 2010; Metcalf et al., 2010; Fotopoulou, 
2010). Therefore the emotional content of confabulations is unlikely to be 
caused by generalised affective dysregulation. In addition, confabulations with a 
somewhat unpleasant theme, such as being in a prison, or at a relative’s 
funeral, have been consistently reported (Schnider, 2008; Metcalf et al., 2010). 
Their negative emotional valence may reflect islands of awareness of deficits or 
unpleasant past events. Related to this, patients often dramatise the 
circumstances of their condition (Fotopoulou et al., 2008b). This can be 
interpreted as a form of ‘idealising’ their identity (Fotopoulou, 2009). Thus even 
emotionally negative confabulations may have a self-serving purpose 
(Fotopoulou, 2010). 
 
It has been argued that the self-enhancing nature of confabulations has a 
specific function: it may act as an adaptive ‘defence’ mechanism that preserves 
patients’ well-being and sense of self against a changing and often ‘dire’ 
personal situation (Fotopoulou, 2009). The pleasantness of confabulations was 
found to be associated to severity of depressed mood. In other words, the 
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higher the score on the depressed mood scale, the more pleasant was the 
content of the patient’s confabulations (Fotopoulou et al., 2008b). Elsewhere 
elderly patients have shown the same self-enhancing biases in autobiographical 
recollection. Since both older adults and confabulating patients suffer memory 
and executive functioning decline, it is argued that the exaggerated self-
coherence and self-enhancement tendencies in these populations result from 
deficits in executive memory processes, and related failure to adequately 
control the influence of the working self on autobiographical memory 
(Fotopoulou, 2009, 2010). 
 
1.3.3.5. Summary of motivational models 
 
In summary, motivational accounts propose that the content of confabulations is 
modulated by healthy autobiographical memory and identity formation 
processes. Healthy autobiographical memories typically satisfy two constrains: 
1. they are consistent with personal plans, goals, and self-images, and 2. they 
correspond to past experiences and ongoing reality. Biases observed in the 
content of confabulations may represent difficulties managing the two 
constrains due to severe memory and monitoring deficits. Resulting memories 
may be coherent with current or past self-concepts, which may or may not 
correspond to ongoing reality. Confabulations may have a self-serving bias and 
may be disproportionately positive. This bias may protect an individual’s 




Motivational theorists have used independent ratings on the content of true and 
false memories in order to make specific predictions about emotional biases of 
confabulations. The same methodology has been employed in the present 
investigation. This and implications of results from the present investigation into 
emotional biases in the content of confabulations are discussed in chapter 5 of 
this thesis. 
 
Finally, having reviewed the main theories, in the next section key aspects of 
the above models and relevant evidence are drawn together to inform the 
questions investigated in the present programme of studies. 
 
1.4. STUDY RATIONALE  
 
Temporal Context Confusion (TCC) has been put forward as the only critical 
feature that predicts both the appearance of and recovery from confabulations 
(Schnider 2008; Schnider et al., 2000a). This claim has been countered with 
evidence that indicates TCC may be sensitive to the presence of confabulation, 
but it is not specific to this disorder. For example in one study performance on 
the TCC task did not differ between confabulating and non-confabulating 
participants who had suffered anterior communicating artery aneurysm (Gilboa 
et al., 2006). In summary existing literature shows that there is conflicting 
evidence regarding which cognitive mechanisms predict the presence and 
clinical course of confabulation. Therefore one of the aims of the present study 
was to establish whether TCC predicted both the appearance and clinical 
course of confabulation better than any other potential predictors. 
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In addition to cognitive deficits, several authors have observed that 
confabulating individuals lacked insight into their condition (Weinstein and 
Kahn, 1950; Schnider, 2008). Lack of insight is also considered an integral 
characteristic of the syndrome of confabulation in some of the theoretical 
models reviewed above (e.g. Burgess and Shallice, 1996). Furthermore 
evidence suggests that recovery from confabulation may be accompanied by 
increased awareness of amnesia and confabulation (Feinberg and Roane, 
1997; Mercer et al., 1977). However insight has not been measured formally in 
previous studies. Therefore, another aim of the present study was to examine 
the relative predictive value of level of insight in the appearance and clinical 
course of confabulations.  
 
Furthermore, it is clear from the above review that most authors acknowledge 
confabulations are modulated by mood and/or emotional factors. Pleasant 
confabulations may be associated with severity of depressed mood; they may 
play a ‘protective’ function against suffering a catastrophic reaction (Fotopoulou 
et al., 2008b). On the other hand, hypomania has been observed to be present 
alongside confabulation in several cases described in the literature (Schnider, 
2008). Moreover hypomania has been found to increase the number of false 
positives reported in a recognition memory task similar to the TCC task. 
Furthermore, when this mood disorder was treated with beta-blockers, the 
number of false positives decreased (Corwin et al., 1990). Taken together these 
findings suggest that depressed and/or elated mood may modulate the 
appearance and clinical course of confabulations. However, mood has rarely 
been measured formally in previous studies. Therefore another aim of this study 
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was to examine the relative predictive value of depressed and elated mood in 
the appearance and clinical course of confabulations. 
 
Related to this there appears to be some controversy regarding the nature of 
the affective biases in the content of confabulations. The majority of 
confabulations reported are pleasant. However, this bias may not be universal 
(Fotopoulou, 2010; Metcalf et al., 2010). For example, confabulations with 
unpleasant content have been frequently observed (Schnider, 2008). Recent 
studies have shown that the majority of confabulations reported are in fact 
emotionally neutral (Metcalf et al., 2010; Dalla Barba and Boisse, 2010). 
Moreover, most investigations into emotional biases of confabulations have 
been carried out with single cases or small samples. Therefore another aim of 
this study was to examine the affective bias of the content of confabulations in a 
large sample. 
 
In summary, the aims of the present programme of studies were threefold: 
1. to investigate the relative contribution of TCC, mood and insight in 
predicting the presence of confabulation (study 1 in chapter 3); 
2. to investigate the relative contribution of TCC, mood and insight in 
predicting the clinical course of confabulation (study 2 in chapter 4); and 
3. to examine the affective bias in the content of confabulations, and the  
relation of this affective bias to current mood state (study 3 in chapter 5). 
 
The following chapters describe three studies carried out in order to address 
each of the above aims and the methodology used. Resulting findings are 
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The present study had the following 3 aims: 
 
1. to investigate the relative contribution of TCC, mood and insight in 
predicting the presence of confabulation; 
2. to explore the relative contribution of TCC, mood and insight in 
predicting the clinical course of confabulation; and 
3. to examine the affective bias in the content of confabulations, and 
the relation of this affective bias to current mood state. 
 
Three studies were carried out in order to achieve these 3 aims. The design for 
each study is presented below. This is followed by sample power calculations.  
 
2.1.1. Study 1 – Cross-sectional investigations 
 
In this study the relative contribution of TCC, mood and insight in predicting1 the 
presence of confabulation was explored. First, in order to establish which of 
these measures discriminated between confabulating and non-confabulating 
patients 2 groups of brain injured amnesic individuals: those with and without 
                                                 
1
 Please note: throughout study 1 – cross-sectional investigations: the term ‘predictor’ is used in 
its statistical sense, usually in order to refer to concurrent associates. 
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confabulations, were compared in terms of mood, TCC, awareness of difficulties 
and background cognitive measures. Both brain injured groups were also 
compared to a healthy control group on the TCC and mood measures to 
determine whether the scores of the patients on these measures where in the 
normal range. Second, the concurrent association between TCC, mood, insight 
and the presence of confabulation was examined. Third, the sensitivity and 
specificity of the best model of predictors (or concurrent associates) of the 
presence of confabulation were examined. 
 
2.1.2. Study 2 – Longitudinal investigations 
 
In this study the relative contribution of TCC, mood and insight in predicting the 
clinical course of confabulation was explored. A group of confabulating brain 
injured participants were followed over approximately 9 months.  Participants 
were assessed within a month of being referred to the study, then 3 months 
later, and again 6 months later. First, changes in confabulation, TCC and 
background cognitive measures were examined. Second, the relative 
contribution of initial levels of TCC, mood and insight in predicting change in 
confabulation was examined. 
 
2.1.3. Study 3 – Affective valence of confabulations  
 
This study investigated whether confabulations had affective content, and 
whether this affective content (or valence) was associated with mood state. The 
content of confabulations produced by the experimental group was rated by 
independent judges and examined in relation to a) the ‘real’ facts that 
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confabulations had replaced and b) true memories reported by participants. 
These emotional ratings were correlated with self-rated mood state. Finally, 
differences in the pattern of affective content between those participants who 
had focal pathology in the ventromedial or orbitofrontal cortex and those who 
did not were examined.  
 
2.1.4. Sample power calculations 
 
The present power calculations were derived in order to ascertain the number of 
participants needed in order to detect a significant difference in performance on 
the TCC task between confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured 
amnesic participants. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the two power calculations carried out for this programme of 
studies. An initial calculation (based on previous TCC means from confabulating 
and non-confabulating participants (Schnider et al., 1996) indicated that a 
sample with 6 patients in each group would provide a power of 0.80 at an alpha 
of 0.015 (2-tailed). However, scientific rigour indicated that out of 6, at least 2 
were likely to be outliers, thus potentially spoiling the results. Therefore, 
following the advice of the statisticians consulted, it was initially proposed to use 




Table 2.1. Power calculations. Calculation 1 was based on data from previous 
studies. Calculation 2 was based on combined data from: a) a preliminary 
experimental sample from the current study, and b) control data from a previous 
study. 
 
 Calculation 1 Calculation 2 
Alpha (2-sided) 0.015 0.001 
Power  0.80 0.97 
Mean1 (SD1) 0.67 (0.38) 0.63 (0.40) 
Mean2 (SD2) 0.13 (0.09) 0.13 (0.09) 
Sample size per group N1 = 6 
N2 = 6 
N1 = 24 
N2 = 12 
Original sample sizes N1= 5 confabulators 
N2= 9 amnesics 
N1 = 10 confabulators 
N2= 9 amnesics 
Source (Schnider et al., 1996) N1 : Current study 
N2 : (Schnider et al., 1996) 
Software NQuery 4.0 http://calculators.stat.ucla.edu/po
wercalc (accessed 28.06.2006) 
 
 
A second calculation was carried out with a combination of preliminary data 
from 10 confabulating patients recruited for the present study and controls’ 
means from the above mentioned study (Schnider et al., 1996). This calculation 
indicated that a sample with 24 patients in the experimental group and 12 in the 




2.2.1. Inclusion criteria 
 
For all patients:  In order to be included in the study patients had to have a 
primary diagnosis of single incident, non-congenital, non-progressive brain 
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injury of any type. Participants were recruited as early as possible post-
diagnosis. 
 
For confabulating patients:  patients were recruited to this group if they showed 
evidence of substantial confabulatory behaviour, indicated by having to meet all 
3 of the following criteria: 
1. evidence of observable confabulatory behaviour as recorded in their 
medical notes, plus 
2. evidence of observable non-trivial confabulation during initial interview 
with investigator, plus 
3. patient gave 8 or more confabulatory answers to the Episodic Memory 
subtest of the Dalla Barba's Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993a). 
 
For non-confabulating patients: 
1. no evidence of confabulatory behaviour observed by the clinical team at 
the time of referral to the study; 
2. absence of confabulatory behaviour over and above that of the general 
population observed by the investigator on initial interview (Burgess and 
Shallice, 1996); 
3. patient gave less than 5 confabulatory answers to the Episodic Memory 
subtest of the Dalla Barba's (1993a) Confabulation Battery; 
4. patient was matched as closely as possible to the experimental group on 
the following measures in order of priority: 
a. delayed verbal and visual memory functioning (measured with 
WMS-III: Logical Memory 2 and Visual Reproduction 2) (Schnider 
et al., 1996); 
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b. the severity of cognitive impairment following their neurological 
deficits, indicated by their score on the Mini Mental State 
Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975); 
c. age; 
d. time elapsed between diagnosis and referral to the study. 
 
Following previous investigations (Schnider et al., 1996), the non-confabulating 
group was matched to the confabulating group primarily on memory. 
 
For healthy participants: adults with no known psychopathology at the time of 
recruitment, were recruited to this group. They were matched to the 
experimental group on age and level of education (Schnider et al., 1996). 
 
2.2.2. Exclusion criteria 
 
Participants with primary diagnoses in ICD10 other than organic mental 
disorders were excluded. This was identified via inspection of medical notes. 
 
Also excluded were patients who were in confusional states, as indicated by a 
score below 15 on the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975).  
 
People with severe cognitive, behavioural or language dysfunction that would 
prevent participation in the study were excluded. This was identified either via 




In addition, the presence of confabulations for past autobiographic memories 
could only be verified with the help of an informant who knew the patient well. 
Therefore if no such person could be found the participant was excluded from 
the study. 
 
2.2.3. Recruitment sites 
 
Patients were recruited mainly from in-patient, but also from out-patient clinics 
of the following hospitals: Edgware Hospital Brain Injury Rehabilitation Unit 
(BIRU), South London and the Maudsley Trust (SLAM), Guy’s and St Thomas’ 
Trust hospitals, and Blackheath Brain Injury Rehabilitation Unit. In order to 
recruit healthy controls, relatives or carers of brain injured individuals were 




Confabulating patients: A total of 46 confabulating patients were approached. 
Three of these refused to participate in the study. Two patients started the study 
but did not complete the follow-ups. One patient was excluded because their 
severe confusion prevented meaningful conversation. Another patient was 
suffering a major mental health illness at the time of recruitment and was also 
excluded. Five patients were excluded because no informant was available to 
verify their confabulations. Another 10 patients were interviewed and excluded 
because they did not meet the criteria for evidence of confabulatory behaviour 




Non-confabulating patients: 23 non-confabulating brain injured controls were 
approached. Two of these refused to participate in this study. Another 2 did not 
complete the follow-ups. One patient was excluded because no informer was 
available to verify their memories. A further 7 patients were excluded because 
they did not meet the criteria for matching them to the experimental group set 
above. This left 11 non-confabulating brain injured patients in the control group; 
they were matched to confabulators for levels of amnesia. 
 
Healthy participants: 6 healthy participants were approached and recruited.  
 
2.2.5. Participant’s demographic and injury characteristics 
 
The final sample included 24 confabulating brain injured patients, 11 non-
confabulating amnesic patients and 6 healthy participants. Demographic 




Differences between the 3 groups of participants on matching variables were 
examined. For this purpose chi-square and independent measures one-way 
ANOVA with group membership as the between subjects factor were used. 
Table 2.2 shows gender composition, age and level of education for the 3 
groups. The healthy control group contained more female participants than the 
other 2 groups. The non-confabulating group was considerably younger than 
the other 2 groups, and this difference approached statistical significance. 
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Healthy controls had been in formal education for slightly longer than the other 
2 groups. However none of these differences reached statistical significance. 
 
Table 2.2. Demographic characteristics. Mean (SD), range and significance of 
differences on gender composition, age and years of formal education between 3 
groups: 24 brain injured confabulating patients, 11 brain injured amnesic non-
confabulating patients and 6 healthy controls. 
 Group N Mean (SD) Range F/χ2 (df) 
gender 
% male 
confabulating 24 83% - 4.44(2)ns 
Non-confabulating 11 91% -  
healthy 6 50% -  
age confabulating 24 51.53(10.24) 32.2-70.1 3.10(2,38)‡ 
Non-confabulating 11 41.87(13.27) 20.9-60.7  
healthy 6 51.17(8.52) 44.0-63.0  
education confabulating 24 12.12(2.80) 6-18 0.66(2,38)ns 
Non-confabulating 11 12.09(2.81) 8-18  
healthy 6 13.50(2.17) 10-16  
ns=not significant; ‡p<0.07 
 
 
Injury characteristics and background cognitive measures  
 
Next confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured amnesic groups were 
characterised in terms of their diagnosis, and background cognitive measures 
used to match the 2 groups. 
 
Table 2.3 shows the varied underlying pathologies that confabulating and non-
confabulating patients had suffered. The majority of patients in both groups had 
sustained either hypoxic brain damage or traumatic brain injury. Hypoxia in 
most cases followed cardiac arrest (9/12); other causes of hypoxia included 
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epilepsy and acute renal failure. Traumatic brain injury in the current sample 
was caused primarily by road traffic accidents (6/12); other causes included falls 
and assault. In terms of premorbid history in the sample overall, 6 participants 
had a recorded history of substance abuse (primarily alcohol). All participants 
were free from active severe mental health illness at the time of recruitment. 
Clinical brain scans were available for 21 participants. They showed that 10 
patients had suffered focal damage involving the ventro-medial frontal cortex 
(VMFC); 3 had sustained focal damage which did not extend to the VMFC; and 
8 patients had suffered generalised atrophy. 
 
Table 2.3. Diagnosis. Diagnoses of 24 confabulating brain injured participants and 11 





Hypoxic brain damage 10 (42%) 2 (18%) 
Traumatic brain injury 6 (25%) 6 (55%) 
Subarachnoid haemorrhage 4 (17%) 1 (9%) 
Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Cerebral infection 1 (4%) 1 (9%) 
Tumour 1 (4%) 1 (9%) 
 
 
Length of post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) data was available for 10 confabulating 
and 10 non-confabulating participants. Table 2.4 shows that both groups had 
suffered severe brain damage (Sohlberg and Mateer, 2001, p.34).  
 
The mean interval between diagnosis of the neurological condition and 
recruitment to this study was shorter for the confabulating group than for the 
non-confabulating group; in other words confabulating participants were 
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recruited earlier than non-confabulating controls after their diagnosis. This 
difference just failed to reach statistical significance. For a comparison between 
the experimental and the control group on mood measures, please see chapter 
3 in this thesis. 
 
Table 2.4. Injury characteristics. Length of post-traumatic amnesia and interval 
between diagnosis and recruitment to the study for 24 brain injured confabulating 
patients and 11 brain injured amnesic non-confabulating controls. 
 Group N Mean (SD) Range t(df) 
 
PTA (days) confabulating 10 30.4 (28.4) 0-90 1.13(18)ns 
Non-confabulating 10 48.3 (41.4) 0-140  
Post-injury interval 
(months) 
confabulating 24 6.1 (3.7) 1.6-15.9 1.95(33)‡ 
Non-confabulating 11 11.4 (11.6) 3.9-42.6  
ns=not significant; ‡p<0.07 
 
 
Table 2.5 shows means, standard deviations, range, percentiles and t-test 
results of confabulating and non-confabulating patients on background cognitive 
measures used to match the 2 groups. No significant differences between the 
groups were found on any of these measures. MMSE scores showed both 
groups had sustained moderate to severe cognitive impairment, and their 
performance on the WMS-III showed their anterograde memory was very poor 
(below the 5th percentile). Of note, two WMS-III data points are missing. These 
participants’ memory function was assessed initially with the Rivermead 
Behavioural Test, as it was deemed by their responsible clinicians they would 
not be able to perform meaningfully in the WMS-III. Their scores on the RBMT 
fell below the ‘screening score’, indicating similar impairment on memory 
function to the rest of the sample. In addition one person refused to complete 
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the delayed Visual Reproduction subtest. These scores have been omitted 
throughout this thesis.  
 
 
Table 2.5. Matching variables. Means, standard deviations, range, percentiles and t-
test results of brain injured amnesic confabulating and non-confabulating patients on 
background cognitive measures used to match the 2 groups. 






MMSE raw score confabulating 24 20.1(3.8) 15-30 - 0.73(33)ns 
Non-confabulating 11 19.2(2.9) 15-23 -  
Delayed Logical Memory 
scaled score (WMS-III) 
confabulating 22 2.4(2.1) 1-8 1st  0.42(31)ns 
Non-confabulating 11 2.7(2.0) 1-7 1st   
Delayed Visual 
Reproduction scaled score 
(WMS-III) 
confabulating 21 4.1(1.6) 2-8 2nd  0.08(30)ns 
Non-confabulating 11 







In this investigation measures were used for 3 purposes: 1. experimental tasks 
were used in order to answer the study’s questions; 2. screening measures 
were used to include participants in the study and to allocate them to either the 
experimental or the control groups; and 3. background cognitive tests were 
used to describe the clinical sample. These three types of measures are 
described below in turn. In addition, basic demographic and education data was 
collected via interview.  
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2.3.1. Experimental Measures chosen in order to answer the study’s 
questions:  
 
Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993a) 
 
Rationale & description: This semi-structured interview was selected because it 
elicits confabulation across a number of domains: personal semantic (e.g.: “why 
are you in hospital?”), personal episodic (e.g.: “what did you eat for dinner 
yesterday?”), orientation (e.g.: “what year are we?”), and general knowledge 
(e.g.: “when did World War I start?”). The interview also includes 2 sections with 
questions that most people are unable to answer (e.g.: “what was Marilyn 
Monroe’s father’s job”), to which some patients feel compelled to give 
confabulatory answers (they are known as the ‘don’t know’ sections for personal 
and non-personal information). Interview questions were updated from the 
original Italian to the current UK sample and are shown in Appendix 2.1 
(Kopelman et al., 1997).  
 
Scoring: Dalla Barba (1993b) scoring rules were used for the orientation 
section. No other instructions exist for other sections. Therefore the following 
system was used: answers were given a point if they contained false 
information as verified by the informant. Incorrect information that was 
presented as a guess was given half a point in order to capture confabulators’ 
exaggerated willingness to guess (Mercer et al., 1977; Kopelman et al., 1997). 
Correct information did not attract any points. 
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Comments: This interview was used for several purposes: in study 1 number of 
confabulations within the episodic section was used as one of the criteria for 
allocating participants to groups. In study 2 both a) the number of 
confabulations produced across the whole interview, and b) number of 
confabulations within the episodic section were used as dependent variables, in 
order to investigate predictors of change in confabulation. In study 3 the content 
of participants’ answers to the personal semantic and episodic sections were 
used in order to explore affective content in confabulations. 
 
Temporal Context Confusion (TCC) task (Schnider et al., 2000a) 
 
Rationale: This task was used by Schnider, who found that TCC was the best 
predictor of the presence and clinical course of confabulation. Therefore it was 
used as an independent variable in studies 1 and 2 in order to examine the 
relative contribution of TCC to the prediction of the presence and clinical course 
of confabulation. 
 
Description: This is an untimed continuous recognition task administered in two 
parts, 20 minutes apart from each other2: run 1 and run 2. Run 1 measures pure 
recognition ability for designs. Run 2 taps the ability to screen out well 
rehearsed, yet irrelevant material during recognition. The crucial difference 
between the two runs is that run 1 could arguably be completed relying on 
familiarity alone, whilst run 2 requires much more fine grained memory 
                                                 
2 the original interval between runs was 60 minutes (Schnider et al., 2000a). However the 
authors obtained the same results with intervals as short as 5 minutes Schnider and Ptak, 1999. 
In order to reduce the chances of participants becoming fatigued, we used a 20 minute interval, 
which is recommended in most standard memory tests 
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discrimination. The added difficulty in run 2 is borne out by the descriptions of 
the two runs below. 
 
1. Run 1: 120 drawings of everyday objects and animals from Snodgrass 
JG & Vanderwart M (1980) were presented on a mackintosh laptop. 
Eight of the drawings were repeated 6 times (targets); the rest appeared 
only once (distracters). For each drawing presented participants 
indicated whether they had seen it already in this run or not. The 
experimenter then pressed the relevant computer key, and the next 
drawing appeared on screen immediately after.  
2. Run 2: 20 minutes later, the same 120 stimuli were presented, but this 
time 8 of the stimuli which had been distracters in the previous run 
became targets and were repeated 6 times. At the same time the targets 
from run 1 became distracters in run 2. For each stimulus participants 
indicated whether they had seen precisely that same drawing already in 
this particular run, or not, irrespective of whether they had seen it in the 
previous run. The critical difficulty in this second run came from the 
intense interference from former targets. Schnider found that amnesic 
patients were able to overcome this interference, whilst confabulators 
could not. Thus this second run putatively dissociates between 
confabulating and non-confabulating amnesic participants (Schnider et 
al., 1996). 
 
Scoring: TCC was calculated with the following formula: (FP2/H2)-(FP1/H1) 
where: FP1 or FP2=number of falsely recognized stimuli (false positives) in run1 
or 2 and H1 or H2= number of correctly recognized items (hits) in run 1or 2.  
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Norms/properties: There are no norms available. However the mean and 
standard deviation of the performance on this task by 10 healthy participants 
were available from the authors (x‾ =0.11 (SD 0.10), max=0.28) (Schnider et al., 
1996). The authors recommended obtaining our own norms (A. Schnider, pers. 
comm.). The present 6 healthy controls obtained similarly low scores on this 
task (x‾ =0.06 (SD 0.11); maximum score =0.16)  
 
Comments: The second run in this task could potentially lead to the production 
of a large number of responses which are guesses. Therefore this task may be 
subject to the effects of response bias3. Schnider and colleagues argued that 
the TCC formula controls sufficiently for effects of response bias, because false 
positives are expressed as a proportion of hits. However to date response 
biases in this task have not been formally investigated. In a later publication 
Schnider claimed to have isolated the effects of pure memory in TCC from 
those of response bias using measures derived from signal detection theory 
(Schnider, 2008, p.240). However he did not give details of such calculations.  
 
Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (ASRM) –mania subscale (Altman et al., 
1997) 
 
Rationale: This self-rated questionnaire was used to measure level of elated 
mood in the present sample. The self-rated modality was chosen over other 
                                                 
3 Response bias is the tendency to give either mainly ‘yes’ replies or mainly ‘no’ replies to the 
question: ‘have you seen this item before?’ during a recognition memory task. The tendency to 
give mainly ‘yes’ replies is referred to as ‘liberal response bias’ and the tendency to give ‘no’ 
replies is referred to as ‘conservative response bias’. 
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clinician-rated scales because while potentially less accurate, it nevertheless 
provides a more direct insight into participants’ own view of their mood. 
 
Properties: This scale is significantly correlated with Mania Rating Scale and 
with the Clinician-Administered Rating Scale for Mania. Test re-test reliability is 
reported as significant. Scores greater than 5 have 85.5% sensitivity and 87.3% 
specificity of detecting hypomania (Altman et al., 1997).  
 
Comments: the raw score of this measure was used as an independent variable 
in studies 1 and 2, in order to predict presence and clinical course of 
confabulation respectively. 
 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS), (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983)  
 
Rationale: this self-rating scale was used for measuring levels of anxiety and 
depressed mood in our sample. This was chosen over other scales (e.g. Becks 
or Hamilton depression scales) because the HADS is tailored to people with 
physical problems, so that symptoms like fatigue do not raise the depressed 
mood score. In addition, norms for the HADS have recently been described 
specifically for the brain injury population (Dawkins et al., 2006). 
 
Norms: a raw score of 10 or higher indicates presence of clinical depression 
(Dawkins et al., 2006; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983).  
 
Properties: internal consistency is significant (correlations range between +0.60 
and +0.30, p<0.02 for the depression subscale). The measure is reliable: using 
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the recommended cut-off point for classifying presence versus absence of 
depression results in only 1% false positives and 1% false negatives. Ratings 
on this measure correlate significantly with psychiatric ratings of depression 
severity (rxy=0.70, p<0.001). In addition scores obtained with the anxiety and 
depression subscales are unrelated (rxy= 0.08, p>0.05). This indicates that 
each scale measures a specific aspect of mood (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983).  
 
Considerations: The depression scale raw score was used as an independent 
variable in studies 1 and 2, in order to predict presence and clinical course of 
confabulation respectively. 
 
Insight interview (Appendix 2.2):  
 
Rationale & description: Appendix 2.2 shows the instrument that was devised in 
order to measure awareness of: a) memory and b) well-being and 
independence in participants.  
 
A ready-made instrument that measured both these aspects was not readily 
available. For example several insight scales for the brain injured population 
were considered, but these did not measure awareness of current mood 
(Patient Competency Rating Scale (Prigatano and Fordyce, 1986); Impaired 
Self Awareness and Denial of Disability scales (Prigatano and Klonoff, 1998); 
awareness interview (Anderson and Tranel, 1989); self-awareness of deficits 
interview (Fleming et al., 1996)).  
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Several scales considered measured insight for mood in the psychiatric 
population, but these did not measure brain injury deficits (insight scale 
(Markova and Berrios, 1992); insight and treatment attitudes questionnaire 
(McEvoy et al., 1989); schedule for assessing the three components of insight 
(David, 1990)). 
 
For this reason a semi-structured interview was devised in order to answer the 
study’s questions. This semi-structured interview consists of 7 questions that 
tap: awareness of neurological condition; awareness of cognitive sequelae and 
awareness of general well-being. 
 
Scoring: Patients’ answers were scored according to how well they 
corresponded with reality, as verified by clinicians and relatives. A correct 
answer attracted a score of 0; an incorrect answer attracted a score of 2; an 
answer that indicated partial insight attracted a score of 1. Interview questions 
and scoring principles are given in Appendix 2.2. 
 
Comments: The raw score of this measure was used as an independent 
variable in studies 1 and 2, in order to predict presence and clinical course of 
confabulation respectively. The measure used in this study has not been 
formally tested for its psychometric properties. It was developed on the basis of 
clinical experience of the poor insight that is often seen in those with 
confabulation. It was agreed that if the measure was found to have predictive 
value, then this would suggest it would be worth examining the measure’s 
properties in more detail at a later stage. However the development of a new 
measure of insight and examination of its psychometric properties were not 
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within the remit of this thesis. The main danger of this approach is that a false 
negative is obtained, i.e. that the new measure fails to identify an association 
between insight and confabulation that would have been found if a measure 
with better psychometric properties had been used. 
 
2.3.2. Screening measures chosen in order to allocate participants to 
different groups  
 
Dalla Barba confabulation battery - episodic section  
 
Description/ rationale: this is a subscale of the Dalla Barba confabulation battery 
described above. This measure was chosen as one of the criteria for allocating 
participants to the confabulating or non-confabulating group. 
 
Comments for confabulating participants: There are no accepted norms for this 
measure. Studies available at the time of writing this study’s proposal indicated 
confabulators produced most false statements in the episodic section (Dalla 
Barba, 1993b). For example a participant produced 47% confabulations in the 
episodic section (i.e.: 7 out of the 15 questions in this section) (Dalla Barba, 
1993a). Another participant gave 8 confabulatory answers to the episodic 
section alone (Kopelman et al., 1997). In view of this a cut-off of 8 
confabulations in the episodic section was used as one of the criteria for 
including patients in the confabulating group.  
 
Comments for non-confabulating participants: Recruitment of non-confabulating 
brain injured participants was based primarily on reports from clinicians 
 70
indicating absence of confabulations. Despite lack of observed confabulations, 
some of these patients gave confabulatory answers to some items of this 
battery. These were mainly minor or trivial detail inaccuracies (e.g.: reporting 
what one had eaten at lunch instead of supper time the day before in hospital). 
Burgess & Shallice (1996) found that healthy participants made up to 5 
confabulatory errors in 14 questions about personal episodic events. In order to 
provide sufficient differentiation between the present study’s groups, a cut-off of 
less than 5 confabulatory responses in the episodic section the Dalla Barba 
interview was adopted for the non-confabulating group.  
 
Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein et al., 1975) 
 
Rationale: This measure was chosen in order to exclude from the study 
participants who were in confusional states, or had very severe generalized 
cognitive impairment. This measure was also used to match the current study’s 
2 patient groups according to severity of cognitive deficits following their 
neurological condition.  
 
Description: This is a brief screening test to measure severity of confusion or 
cognitive decline. It taps orientation, memory, dysphasia, apraxia, and executive 
function.  
 
Properties: The MMSE has high test-retest reliability (rxy=0.83). Concurrent 
validity was also high when correlated with WAIS-Verbal and Performance IQ 
(rxy=0.78, p<0.0001 and rxy=0.67, p<0.001 respectively) (Folstein et al., 1975).  
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Scoring: Folstein et al (1975) scoring guidelines were followed. A cut-off point 
was specified (a score of 15 or below) in order to exclude people in confusional 
states, or with severe generalized cognitive impairment (note that a group who 
had been diagnosed with dementia obtained a mean score of 9.6 (SD 5.8) on 
this measure) (Folstein et al., 1975). 
 
Wechsler Memory Scale–III (WMS-III): Logical Memory-delayed subtest 
(LM2) and Visual Reproduction-delayed subtest (VR2) (Wechsler et al., 
1997b) 
 
Rationale/description:  These tests were chosen in order to measure delayed 
recall across verbal and visual domains. LM2 measures the ability to retain 
auditory information after a delay of 20 minutes. VR2 measures delayed 
memory for designs.  
 
Scoring: Raw scores were converted to scaled and percentile scores using the 
manual for this battery of tests (Wechsler et al., 1997b; Lichtenberger et al., 
2001).  
 
Norms: These tests have international highly robust norms (Wechsler et al., 
1997b). They are widely used in clinical practice as a measure of memory 
function. 
 
Comments: These tests’ scaled scores were used in study 1 to ensure that both 
patient groups were matched in terms of severity of amnesia. They were also 
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used to describe the sample’s level of memory functioning for acquired non-
autobiographical information.  
 
2.3.3. Background cognitive tests chosen to describe the sample 
 
Premorbid cognitive ability 
 
The Revised National Adult Reading Test (NART-R) (Nelson and Willison, 
1991) was used to estimate premorbid intellectual ability. Scoring was done 
according to the manual. Raw NART-R scores were converted to WAIS-III IQ 
scores using both tests’ manuals (Nelson and Willison, 1991; Tulsky et al., 
1997).  
 
Current cognitive ability 
 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI, (Wechsler, 1999) was 
used to calculate current level of intellectual ability across domains, i.e.: general 
verbal and non-verbal reasoning, and abstract thinking.  
 
Scoring: This was done following the manual. Raw scores of the 4 subtests 
were converted into a general IQ score accordingly (Wechsler, 1999).  
 
Norms: These tests have international highly robust norms (Wechsler, 1999). 
They are widely used in clinical practice as a measure of cognitive function. 
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Comments: In a small minority of cases IQ was derived from WAIS-III, because 
this had been administered for clinical purposes before patients were referred to 
the study, and administration of WASI would have resulted in inflated IQ scores 
due to practice effects (Wechsler et al., 1997a; D. Mockler pers.comm.). One 
confabulating participant was not able to carry out any of the above tests; his IQ 
was derived from the Raven Progressive Matrices – Colour version (Raven et 
al., 1984).  
 
The use of different measures to calculate IQ might have introduced a bias to 
the present data (Axelrod, 2002). As a precautionary measure an analysis of 
differences using only WASI IQs was carried out. Results did not differ from 
those reported in chapter 3 of this thesis. (for details see Appendix 2.3 
‘supplementary WASI analysis’). This indicated the present results had not been 
significantly altered by the use of different IQ measures on a small subsample. 
 
Speed of processing 
 
The Speed and Capacity of Language Processing (SCOLP) and the WAIS-III 
digit symbol subtest were used to measure verbal and non-verbal speed of 
processing respectively.  
 
Scoring: was done according to each test’s manual. Scaled and percentile 
scores were obtained from the manuals (Baddeley et al., 1992; Wechsler et al., 




Memory for personal information (Kopelman et al., 1990)  
 
The childhood, adult and recent episodic events sections of the 
Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI) were used to measure memory for 
personal autobiographic information. The content of participants’ answers to this 
interview was used in study 3 to evaluate affective content of true and false 
memories. 
 
Scoring: The manual’s guidelines were applied only to the information that was 
independently verified by participants’ relatives. Confabulated information did 
not attract any points (Kopelman et al., 1990).  
 
Memory for non-personal material (Wechsler et al., 1997b)  
 
The following subtests from the Wechsler Memory Scale III (WMSIII) were used 
to measure anterograde memory:  
 
- The Logical Memory subtests were used to measure: immediate recall (LM1), 
delayed recall (LM2) and recognition of verbal material respectively. 
- The Visual Reproduction subtests were used to measure: immediate recall 
(VR1), delayed recall (VR2) and recognition of non-verbal material respectively. 
 
Scoring: The manual’s instructions for scoring and obtaining raw, scaled and 




Memory for non-personal highly emotional material (Adolphs et al., 1997) 
 
Rationale: It has been argued that personal motivational biases influence 
confabulations and autobiographical memory retrieval in the context of poor 
memory (Fotopoulou, 2010; Metcalf et al., 2010). However it is not clear 
whether these biases are specific to confabulation or whether they reflect 
deficits processing emotional memories of any type, not just confabulations. 
Only two types of memory have been investigated in confabulators: a) personal 
highly emotional memories or b) memory for non-personal non-emotional 
material. In order to explore the possibility that affective biases found in 
confabulations may be related to anomalies in the affective processing not only 
of personal memories but also of non-personal memories, it seemed important 
to measure memory for non-personal material with high affective content. The 
Cahill task was used to measure: a) ability to detect emotional content in highly 
emotional material of a non- autobiographical nature, and b) recognition 
memory for highly emotional material of a non-personal nature. 
 
Procedure: 11 photographs and a narrative conveying an emotional story were 
presented to participants. The story revolved around a child who was taken by 
his mother to visit his father’s place of work. On the way they were involved in a 
road traffic accident and the child had to undergo surgery. The stimuli contained 
one highly emotional photograph embedded within ten relatively neutral 
photographs. This photograph has been described as ‘gruesome’ by some 
authors, as it depicts the legs of the child after surgery. At the end of the 
presentation participants were asked to rate how emotional they found the story 
and photographs. They were also administered a 76-item multiple choice 
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recognition test, which consisted of 5-9 questions per photograph. Items 
included questions about both the narrative and the pictures. 
 
Scoring: a) Emotionality ratings: these were self-reported ratings on how 
emotional participants found all the photographs and accompanying story on a 
scale of 1-10 (where 0= no emotional at all, and 10= extremely emotional). This 
score indicated whether the individual was able to detect emotional content in 
the stimuli presented. b) Emotional recognition score: this was the proportion of 
items correctly recognised from the questions relating to the critical (highly 
emotional) photograph. c) Recognition score for neutral material: this was the 
mean proportion of items correctly recognised across the ten neutral 
photographs. 
 
Norms: Although no norms exist for this task, it has been used with several 
populations, including: healthy, brain injured, amnesic participants, and with 
patients who have suffered Alzheimer’s disease, or amygdala damage. An 
advantage remembering emotional over non-emotional material has been 
reliably found with all these groups of participants except for patients with 
amygdala damage. All participants reported similar emotionality ratings (Cahill 
and McGaugh, 1995; Adolphs et al., 1997; Hamann et al., 1997; Kazui et al., 
2000). 
 




Table 2.6. Cahill Task. Emotional rating scores and recogniton scores (for emotional 
and neutral material) obtained by participants with varied pathology reported in several 
studies. 






Healthy 51-82 0.91,2 0.51,2 
Brain injury 51 0.81 0.51 
Bilateral amygdala 
damage 
61 0.41 0.51 
Amnesia  82 0.72 0.42 





A range of tests were used to measure this complex group of functions:  
 
The Cognitive Estimates Test (CET) was used to measure ability to make 
complex mental calculations and estimations. Raw errors and percentile scores 
were obtained following published guidelines (Hodges, 1994; Shallice and 
Evans, 1978). 
 
The Trail Making Test – part b (TMTb) was used to measure cognitive flexibility. 
Raw timing and percentile scores were obtained following guidelines published 
(Spreen and Strauss, 1998; Tombaugh, 2004).  
 
The Hayling Test was used to measure: a) ability to initiate a sequence of action 
(H1), b) impulsivity (Hb), and c) ability to inhibit irrelevant responses (Hb-errors) 
(Burgess and Shallice, 1997).  
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The Brixton Test was used to measure rule detection ability. The Hayling & 
Brixton Manual guidelines were followed for scoring and obtaining raw, scaled 




In addition to the tests and tasks described above the following equipment was 
used. 
 
In order to carry out Schnider’s TCC task a Mackintosh laptop computer with 
Operating System 9 was used. In addition, the software devised by Schnider for 
this purpose (‘Recory: the ultimate recognition memory experiment’, ©Schnider 
94-95) was used with the specifications mentioned in the TCC task section 
above. 
 
Windows Office software packages were used in order to store data. The 
statistical analysis software package ‘SPSS’ versions 15 – 18 was used to 
analyse the data. A personal computer (Fujitsu Siemens ‘Esprimo’) running 
Windows XP and Pentium 4HT was used to run the above mentioned software 
packages. 
 
2.5. PROCEDURES  
 
General procedures are presented here. Specific procedures are presented 
under each experimental chapter. 
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2.5.1. Consent and recruitment procedures 
 
This study was granted a favourable opinion by the London Multicentre Ethics 
Committee (MREC). Only two substantial amendments were requested: one to 
increase number of confabulating participants to be recruited at an early stage 
of the illness, and the other to ensure the project complied with the new Mental 
Capacity Act (2005). R&D approval was individually sought and granted by 
each participating site, and the investigator held substantive or honorary 
contracts with all recruitment sites involved. Where a participant moved to a 
location outside the NHS, the investigator successfully obtained clearance to 
follow up the participant as required by the individual organization. Annual 
reports were regularly submitted to the MREC and all R&D departments 
involved. In addition this study successfully passed an audit by Camden R&D 
department. Furthermore, the investigator carried out numerous presentations 
to staff at the various locations and liaised regularly with responsible clinicians 




In the first instance clinicians contacted the researcher if any of their patients 
displayed ‘observable’ confabulations. The researcher then checked with the 
clinician that the patient met criteria for the study and whether they were able to 
give informed consent. If appropriate, the clinician then provided the participant 
with information about the study and obtained permission for the investigator to 
approach the patient. If the patient lacked capacity to consent, their next of kin 
was also approached at this stage and given a dedicated information sheet 
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about the study. The investigator then scrutinised available evidence of 
confabulation in medical notes, and through interview. At this interview the 
participant’s queries were answered, formal consent was sought and, if 
appropriate, a first assessment commenced. The researcher then contacted the 
participant’s chosen informant and checked the veracity of the participant’s 
answers.  
 
Non-confabulating brain injured participants:  
Clinicians alerted the investigator to any of their non-confabulating patients with 
very poor memory (e.g. memory performance, as tested for clinical purposes, at 
or below the 5th percentile). Consent was obtained using the same procedure as 
above. The researcher then excluded participants if confabulations were 
observed during interview (e.g. 5 or more confabulations in response to 
interview questions). Participants were also excluded from the study if they 
were not matched to the experimental group on memory function (LM2 and 
VR2) or severity of cognitive impairment following brain injury (i.e. MMSE 
score). 
 
Healthy participants:  
The investigator approached relatives or carers of patients at BIRU out-patient 
clinic and gave them an information sheet. If the carer was agreeable, the 
investigator then answered any queries and interviewed the person briefly to 
check they met inclusion criteria. If they did, the investigator obtained formal 
consent and started study procedures. 
 
 81
2.5.2. Testing procedures 
 
Testing usually took place in a quiet room with a desk or table. Participants 
were given as much help to complete tasks as they required, as indicated by 
individual tests’ guidelines. Care was taken that tests did not interfere with each 
other during any one session. For example a delay between two parts of a 
visual memory task was filled with verbal tasks or questionnaires. A brief 
overview of procedures followed in each study is summarised below. 
 
Study 1 – Cross sectional investigations 
 
In study 1 potential associates of the presence of confabulation were 
investigated. Three groups of participants were compared on experimental 
measures. In addition, confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured 
amnesic patients were compared on background cognitive measures. General 
testing procedures followed for each group are presented below. 
 
All participants:  Experimental tasks (TCC and mood measures) were 
administered to individuals from all groups and were carried out in a single 
session. Within the same session healthy controls also completed a shortened 
confabulation interview (semantic, episodic, general knowledge, and orientation 
sections of the Dalla Barba interview (Dalla Barba, 1993a). 
 
Patients only: Background and group allocation measures were not repeated if 
they had already been administered for clinical purposes within 3 months of 
inclusion in the study. Background cognitive measures and 3 interviews: the 
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insight questionnaire, the Dalla Barba confabulation interview (Dalla Barba, 
1993a) and the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI, Kopelman et al., 
1990) were carried out in several sessions of up to one hour duration. Patients’ 
answers to the 3 interviews were verified against information from their medical 
records, the clinical team and their close relatives. 
 
The total testing time for healthy controls was approximately 45 minutes. The 
total testing time for patient groups ranged 3 to 5 hours depending on the 
person’s cognitive speed. 
 
Study 2 – longitudinal investigations  
 
In this study potential predictors of the clinical course of confabulations were 
examined. In order to do this 24 confabulating patients were followed up over 
approximately 9 months. Experimental and cognitive background measures 
were repeated 3 months after their initial assessment and again 6 months after 
that. 
 
Study 3 – Affective valence of confabulations 
 
In this study the affective content of true and false memories reported by 24 
confabulating brain injured participants was examined. In order to do this, 
patients’ answers to selected sections of the two autobiographical interviews: 
the Dalla Barba interview (Dalla Barba, 1993a) and the AMI (Kopelman et al., 
1990) were transcribed. Each answer was rated by independent judges on a 
scale of 1-7 according to their pleasantness. The affective content of 
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confabulations was examined in relation to: a) the ‘real’ events they had 




Study 1 – Cross sectional investigations 
 
In this study potential predictors1 (or concurrent associates) of confabulation 
were investigated. First ANOVA or t-tests, with group membership as the 
independent variable (confabulating patients, non-confabulating patients and 
healthy participants), were used in order to check for differences along 
confabulation, TCC, insight, mood and relevant background cognitive variables. 
Kruskall-Wallis chi square and Mann-Whitney U tests were used where 
parametric assumptions were not met. Where appropriate the Holm’s Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons was used (Walsh, 2004). This correction 
method was selected over others when it was unclear whether the multiple tests 
carried out were truly independent from each other. In this correction method 
significant comparisons are ordered according to their p values from the 
smallest to the largest. The critical alpha for the first comparison is: 0.05 divided 
by the total number of comparisons. Subsequent critical alphas are calculated in 
the same way, each time subtracting 1 from the number of comparisons used in 
the previous term.  
 
Next the value of TCC, mood, and insight as concurrent associates of the 
presence of confabulation was examined. In order to do this, first patients were 
                                                 
1
 Please note: throughout study 1 – cross-sectional investigations: the term ‘predictor’ is used in 
its statistical sense, usually in order to refer to concurrent associates. 
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classified as confabulating or not confabulating according to their score on the 
episodic section of the Dalla Barba confabulation battery. Then a backward 
stepwise binary logistic regression analysis was carried out with group 
membership (confabulating or not confabulating) as the dependent variable and 
TCC, mood and insight as covariates. 
 
Finally the sensitivity and specificity of the resulting model of predictors (or 
concurrent associates) of the presence of confabulation was examined.  For 
this, first the regression values of the predicting variables identified in the 
previous analysis were used to combine these predicting factors into one single 
variable. Then the ROC curve of this joint variable was drawn using SPSS and 
the area under the curve examined in order to determine sensitivity and 
specificity to predict the presence of confabulation. 
 
Study 2 – Longitudinal investigations 
 
In this study the predictors of change in confabulation were explored. In the first 
instance trend analyses were employed to explore changes in confabulation, 
TCC, insight and mood along the 3 follow-up assessments. Second, the relative 
contribution of initial TCC, insight and mood scores in predicting changes in 
confabulation was explored. For this analysis first, a linear regression was used 
to calculate the slope of change in confabulation over the 3 assessments for 
each patient. Then a linear regression analysis was carried out with slope of 
change in confabulation as dependent factor and initial scores of TCC, mood, 
and insight as predictors. Backward stepwise selection was used to reduce the 
model to just those factors making an independent contribution to the prediction 
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of change in confabulation. Two measures of confabulation were used: a) 
overall confabulation and b) episodic confabulation. 
 
Study 3 – Affective valence of confabulations 
 
In this study the affective content of confabulations was examined compared to 
a) the ‘real’ events that the confabulations had replaced, and b) true memories 
reported by participants. In order to do this, first independent judges rated true 
and false memories produced by the present experimental group according to 
their pleasantness. Next the relative proportions of confabulations rated as 
either pleasant, neutral or unpleasant - compared with the ‘real’ facts they had 
replaced - were examined using one-way repeated measures ANOVA. 
 
Second, related samples t-tests were used to compare a) the proportion of 
confabulations and true memories with affective content and b) the proportion of 
pleasant confabulations and true memories among memories with affective 
content. 
 
Third, the correlation between memories’ affective valence and mood state was 
examined using Kendall’s tau.  
 
Finally the effects that focal ventro-medial pathology may have had on affective 
biases of confabulations were explored. For this purpose the affective ratings of 
2 groups: (i) patients who had suffered focal ventro-medial frontal pathology 
(VMFC), and (ii) those without focal damage to this critical area were examined 
using a repeated measures ANOVA with lesion site (focal VMFC, or no focal 
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VMFC) as the between factor, type of memory (confabulation or true memory) 












The main aim of this study was to explore potential predictors1 (or concurrent 
associates) of the presence of confabulation. Two sets of measures were 
considered: a) a comprehensive battery of background cognitive tests and b) 
the following experimental variables: temporal context confusion (TCC), 
measures of depressed or elated mood, and a self-reported measure of insight 
 
As was discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis, the correlates and determinants of 
confabulation are still unclear. Most studies of confabulation have been carried 
out as single cases and have included comprehensive background cognitive 
information of participants. In this connection, comprehensive 
neuropsychological data was collected from the present sample. In addition,  
a number of theoretical models explain confabulations as a combination of 
memory and executive deficits (Moscovitch and Winocur, 2002; Burgess and 
Shallice, 1996; Kopelman, 1999; Gilboa, 2010). Therefore comprehensive 
information about participants’ memory and executive functioning was collected. 
 
                                                 
1
 Please note: throughout study 1 – cross-sectional investigations: the term ‘predictor’ is used in 
its statistical sense, usually in order to refer to concurrent associates. 
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As described in chapter 1, a series of elegant experiments by Schnider and 
colleagues compared spontaneous confabulators to amnesic controls (Schnider 
et al., 1996, 2000a; Schnider and Ptak, 1999; see (Schnider, 2001 & 2008 for 
reviews). They found only one feature distinguished the 2 groups: their 
performance on a continuous recognition task, making this measure potentially 
a prime diagnostic tool. Confabulating participants failed to determine the 
temporal source of some stimuli presented in this task. Therefore the authors 
concluded that the key cognitive mechanism underlying confabulation was 
‘temporal context confusion (TCC)’. TCC was described as a deficit ‘filtering’ 
incoming memories that pertain to ongoing reality; or more specifically, a deficit 
suppressing memories that no longer correspond to the present. This explained 
why confabulators appeared to ‘live in the past’, and were so convinced of their 
false memories that they acted upon them (Schnider, 2008).  
 
The above findings have been partially contested by Gilboa et al. (2006). They 
used the TCC task to compare a group of confabulators with patients who had 
suffered anterior communicating artery aneurysm (ACoA), amnesic patients 
with lesions in the medial temporal lobe and with healthy controls. Consistent 
with Schnider and colleagues’ results, confabulating patients’ performance on 
the TCC task was worse than that of healthy controls and amnesic patients. 
However the task did not discriminate between confabulating and non-
confabulating ACoA patients. Gilboa et al. (2006) concluded that whilst TCC 
may be sensitive to confabulation, it was not specific to this condition. 
 
In addition to the above controversial findings regarding TCC, Schnider and 
colleagues’ results have only been replicated with small samples. Therefore it 
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seemed important to include TCC in the present study in order to investigate 
whether TCC was associated with the presence of confabulation. 
 
To date explanatory models of confabulation have concentrated on cognitive 
factors. However there is mounting evidence that confabulations are to certain 
extent influenced by mood and emotion (Fotopoulou, 2008; Metcalf et al., 
2010). Moreover, several authors have found that confabulations may present 
the individual to others in a favourable or idealised light (Fotopoulou, 2010; 
Turnbull et al., 2004b). In this way confabulations may somehow help the 
individual cope with a rather depressing reality (e.g.: being in hospital, loss of 
job, status, etc). Indeed there is some indication that confabulations may be 
related to depressed mood, although further research on this topic is required 
(Fotopoulou et al., 2008b; Metcalf et al., 2010). Thus one of the aims of the 
present study was to explore whether depressed mood was associated with the 
presence of confabulation. 
 
On the other hand, clinical evidence suggests confabulators present with poor 
insight and mild elation. For example, Weinstein & Kahn found the majority of 
their confabulators were elated and lacked insight (Weinstein and Kahn, 1950). 
Tiling (1892) and Benon & LeHuche (1920) each described a patient who 
lacked insight into his condition and was highly elated (both cited in Schnider, 
2008). Lack of insight is also considered an integral characteristic of the 
syndrome of confabulation in some theoretical models of confabulation (e.g. 
(Burgess and Shallice, 1996). However level of elated mood and insight have 
not been formally measured in previous studies of confabulation. Therefore 
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another aim of this study was to explore whether limited insight was associated 
with the presence of confabulations. 
 
Moreover, evidence from studies with psychiatric populations suggests elated 
mood affects memory (Corwin et al., 1990; Gainotti and Marra, 1994). During a 
recognition memory task hypomanic patients gave many more false positives 
than controls, due to their liberal response bias. This reversed when their mood 
disorder was treated with beta-blockers (Corwin et al., 1990). Several authors 
have demonstrated the effects of beta-adrenergic activation on memory (Otto 
and Hanze, 1994; Cahill and Van Stegeren, 2003). Corwin et al. (1990) 
suggested that beta-adrenergic function may modulate recognition memory 
when items are not very strongly remembered and the individual is forced to 
guess. This explained why, when patients’ mood was elated individuals were 
more likely to endorse falsely recognised items. Whereas when levels of elated 
mood decreased, patients used a more conservative decision making bias to 
items for which they had no strong memory. Thus another aim of the present 
study was to explore whether elated mood was associated with the presence of 
confabulations. 
 
In summary, most authors view confabulation as a combination of deficits of 
control processes in memory recollection. Some evidence indicates 
confabulations may be modulated by personal goals, mood and emotion. In 
particular confabulations may be accompanied by elated mood and lack of 
insight. Elated mood in psychiatric patients leads to significant false recognition 
on memory tasks. However, levels of elated mood and insight have not been 
formally investigated in confabulating patients. Therefore the aims of this study 
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were to characterise confabulation along cognitive, insight and mood measures, 
and to investigate potential predictors (or concurrent associates) of the 
presence of confabulation, and in particular: 
1. to explore differences between confabulating and non-confabulating 
participants in temporal context confusion (TCC); 
2. to examine differences between confabulating and non-confabulating 
participants in level of insight; 
3. to investigate differences between confabulating and non-confabulating 
participants in elated and depressed mood; and  
4. to examine the relative contribution of TCC, insight, elated mood and 






Three groups of participants were recruited: (i) an experimental group of 24 
confabulating brain injured patients; (ii) a control group consisting of 11 non-
confabulating brain injured patients, and (iii) a second control group consisting 
of 6 healthy participants.  
 
Recruitment procedures have been described in detail in the method chapter; 
therefore only a summary of key facts is given here. In order to be included in 
the study patients had to have a primary diagnosis of acquired, non-congenital, 
non-progressive brain injury (please see Table 2.3 in the method chapter for 
details). In addition, confabulating patients were selected on the basis of 
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evidence of observed spontaneous confabulatory behaviour found both in 
clinical records and on interview. Non-confabulating patients were selected on 
the basis of evidence of absence of this behaviour from the same sources. 
Patients were excluded if an informant was not available to verify their 
autobiographical memories. 
 
As described in the method chapter, the non-confabulating group was matched 
to the experimental group primarily on memory ability (delayed WMS-III2 
subtests; (Schnider et al., 1996). In addition they were also matched on severity 
of cognitive deficits (MMSE2), age and time elapsed between diagnosis and 
recruitment to the study (please see tables 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5 in the method 
chapter for details). Healthy controls were matched to the experimental group 
on age and level of education (please see table 2.2 in the method chapter for 
details).  
 
3.2.2. Background assessments 
 
As described in the method chapter, the following background 
neuropsychological tests were carried out:  
- the revised National Adult Reading Test (NART-R) as a measure of 
premorbid IQ (Nelson and Willison, 1991); the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence (WASI) or the Wechsler Adult Scale of Intelligence – III 
(WAIS-III) as measures of current IQ (Wechsler, 1999; Wechsler et al., 
1997a);  
 
                                                 
2
 for details of specific measures please refer to the section on background cognitive measures 
in the method chapter 
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- the Speed and Capacity of Language Processing (SCOLP) and the WAIS-
III ‘digit symbol’ subtest as measures of processing speed (Baddeley et al., 
1992; Wechsler et al., 1997a);  
 
- the Trail Making Test (TMT) (Reitan, 1958), the Cognitive Estimates Test 
(CET) (Shallice and Evans, 1978), and the Hayling & Brixton Tests as 
measures of executive function (Burgess and Shallice, 1997). 
 
- the Wechsler Memory Scale–III as a measure of anterograde memory 
(Wechsler et al., 1997b); the childhood, adulthood and recent episodic 
events sections of the Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman et al., 
1990), as a measure of retrograde personal memory, the Cahill emotional 
story task (Adolphs et al., 1997) as a measure of memory for non-personal 
emotionally charged material (a comprehensive description of this task is 
provided in pg. 75 of this thesis). 
 
3.2.3. Experimental procedures 
 
These have been described in the method section and are only summarised 
here. 
 
Participants were administered the Dalla Barba (1993a) confabulation battery 
adapted for the UK. Their responses were recorded verbatim and verified 
against information provided by relatives or held in medical records. Healthy 
participants were given a shortened version of the confabulation battery 
(general semantic and orientation sections only). 
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Participants’ temporal context confusion (TCC) was measured using Schnider’s 
continuous recognition task (Schnider et al., 2000a). As previously described in 
the method chapter, (section 2.3.1: Experimental Measures), in the first part of 
this task, participants were shown drawings of common objects and animals on 
a computer. They had to discriminate between drawings they had seen only 
once, and those which were repeatedly presented. In the second part of this 
task participants had to discriminate between drawings that had repeated in the 
first part and those repeated in the second part of the task. In order to calculate 
TCC the following formula was used: TCC=(FP2/H2)-(FP1/H1) (FP=false 
positives in run 1 or 2; H=hits in run 1 or 2; (Schnider et al., 2000a). 
 
The Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (ASRM) –mania subscale (Altman et al., 
1997) and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond and 
Snaith, 1983) were used as measures of current mood state. In addition, a 
semi-structured interview was constructed and used specifically for this study, in 
order to measure awareness of mood and cognitive difficulties (appendix 2.2 




In order to characterise the cognitive correlates of confabulation, first 
confabulating participants’ neuropsychometric results were described in relation 
to those of non-confabulating participants. Potentially significant differences 
between groups were identified (via inspection of means and SD) and examined 
as appropriate using repeated measures ANOVA or independent samples t-
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tests with group membership as the grouping variable. In the interest of 
minimising the risk of type I errors (false significance), differences between 
groups were only analysed statistically if the mean scores for the 2 groups were 
not obviously similar. 
 
Second, the differences on the proportion of confabulations reported on 
interview by: a) confabulating, b) non-confabulating brain injured amnesic 
patients, and c) healthy controls were examined. For this, independent 
measures one-way ANOVA was used with group membership as the between 
subjects factor. Where only data for 2 groups was available, t-tests were used 
instead of ANOVA. P-values were corrected for multiple comparisons using the 
Holm’s Bonferroni method (Walsh, 2004).  
 
Third, differences between the 3 groups on experimental measures (TCC, 
insight, elated and depressed mood) were examined using ANOVA and Holm’s 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Where only data for 2 groups 
was available, t-tests were used instead of ANOVA. Kruskall-Wallis chi square 
and Mann-Whitney U tests were used where parametric assumptions were not 
met. 
 
Finally, potential predictors (or concurrent associates) of confabulation were 
investigated. For this analysis, first a binary logistic regression was employed. 
In this regression group membership (confabulating or non-confabulating) was 
entered as dependent variable, and TCC, insight, mania and depression were 
entered as covariates. Backward stepwise selection was used to reduce the 
model to just those variables making an independent contribution to the 
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prediction (in the statistical sense) of the presence of confabulation. Lastly, a 
ROC curve of the resulting optimal model of predictors (or concurrent 




3.3.1. Background measures 
 
In order to characterise confabulation in the context of brain injury, a 
comprehensive battery of neuropsychological tests was administered to 
confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured participants on recruitment to 
the study. These included measures of general reasoning, processing speed, 
dysexecutive and memory functioning. Results from these neuropsychological 
assessments and differences between the 2 groups on key background 
cognitive tests are reported below.  
 
General reasoning and processing speed 
 
Table 3.1 shows means, standard deviations, range, and percentile scores of 
confabulating and non-confabulating patients on background cognitive 
reasoning and processing measures. NART and WASI mean scores indicated 
that their general reasoning abilities had declined from a premorbid average to 
a borderline level of function at the time of inclusion in the study. SCOLP and 
Digit Symbol scores indicated reduced speed of processing (below the 5th 
percentile). Mean percentile and IQ scores indicated no substantial differences 
between groups on these measures. 
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Table 3.1. Background cognitive tests. Mean raw scores and percentiles of 
confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured participants on background cognitive 
tests. 
Test Group N Mean (SD) 
raw score  
Range %le 
General reasoning 










Non-confabulating 11 90.6 (7.75) 75-105 - 
  WASI current full scale IQ  confabulating 24 77.7 (12.70) 56-98 - 
Non-confabulating 11 76.1 (10.78) 55-94 - 
 
Speed of processing 









1st-5th   
Non-confabulating 11 27.3 (8.78) 18-42 1st-5th   
  WAIS-III - Digit Symbol confabulating 24 23.5 (13.82) 0-62 1st 
Non-confabulating 11 23.4 (13.91) 8-48 1st  
Executive function      
  Trail Making Test – B  confabulating 23 254.1 (115.6) 70-589 10th  
Non-confabulating 11 255.0 (130.9) 126-566 10th  
  Cognitive Estimates Test   confabulating 23 14.2 (5.5) 6-27 1st  
Non-confabulating 11 11.6 (5.7) 3-19 1st  
  Hayling Test – Part A 
timing score 
confabulating 24 36.5 (22.6) 3-82 5th  
Non-confabulating 11 30.4 (28.5) 5-103 5th  
  Hayling Test – Part B 
timing score   
confabulating 23 81.4 (47.5) 17-205 10th  
Non-confabulating 11 80.0 (43.0) 48-167 10th  
  Hayling Test – Part C type 
a & b errors 
confabulating 23 40.7 (23.6) 0-78 1st  
Non-confabulating 11 30.6 (23.3) 3-62 1st  
  Brixton Test confabulating 23 31.1 (10.8) 16-52 1st  
Non-confabulating 11 28.6 (11.1) 16-49 1st  
Anterograde memory 











Non-confabulating 11 15.3 (6.8) 6-25 1st  
  WMS-III – Delayed Logical 
Memory 
confabulating 22 3.1 (4.3) 0-14 1st  
Non-confabulating 11 4.6 (4.7) 0-13 1st  
  WMS-III – Recognition 
Logical Memory  
confabulating 22 18.6 (3.6) 11-25 - 
Non-confabulating 11 20.5 (2.2) 17-24 - 
  WMS-III - Immediate 
Visual Reproduction   
confabulating 21 41.0 (16.7) 4-78 1st  
Non-confabulating 11 49.1 (27.5) 8-83 1st  
  WMS-III - Delayed Visual 
Reproduction  
confabulating 21 6.8 (8.9) 0-36 2nd  
Non-confabulating 11 11.5 (13.6) 0-37 2nd  
  WMS-III - Recognition 
Visual Reproduction 
confabulating 20 34.6 (4.0) 23-39 5th  
Non-confabulating 11 34.7 (7.8) 17-44 5th  
Memory for emotional 
material: Cahill task 










Non-confabulating 11 6.5 (2.7) 0-10 - 
   proportion remembered for 
the critical slide 
confabulating 22 0.4 (0.3) 0.0-0.8 - 
Non-confabulating 11 0.6 (0.3) 0.2-1.0 - 
    mean proportion remembered 
for non-critical slides 
confabulating 22 0.4 (0.2) 0.0-0.7 - 
Non-confabulating 11 0.4 (0.1) 0.2-0.7 - 
   Difference scores confabulating 22 0.0 (0.2) -0.3-0.5 - 
Non-confabulating 11 0.2 (0.2) -0.1-0.5  
Autobiographical Memory 











Non-confabulating 11 6.0 (0.7) 2.0-9.0 - 
  AMI – episodic – young 
adulthood 
confabulating 23 4.9 (0.4) 1.0-8.0 - 
Non-confabulating 11 6.4 (0.7) 2.0-9.0 - 
  AMI – episodic – recent 
events 
confabulating 23 3.0 (0.5) 0.0-6.0 - 






Table 3.1 also shows means, standard deviations, range, and percentile scores 
of confabulating and non-confabulating patients on background tests of 
executive function. In general all patients’ scores showed they had significant 
difficulties across a range of executive functions; these included flexibility of 
thought (Trail Making Test), mental estimation (CET), initiating and inhibiting 
responses timely and adequately (Hayling A&B) and the ability to adapt their 
behaviour according to external feedback (Brixton). Moreover, they performed 
at the low average level of function on Hayling B timing score (10th percentile), 
with increased errors (1st percentile). This indicated difficulties with impulsivity. 
Mean percentile scores indicated no substantial differences between the 




Table 3.1 shows means, standard deviations, range, and percentile scores of 
confabulating and non-confabulating patients on background memory tests. 
Their scores on anterograde memory tests fell below the 5th percentile, 
indicating they had severe difficulties learning new information. Mean percentile 
scores indicated no substantial differences between groups on measures of 
anterograde memory. 
 
The 2 groups’ scores on tests of memory for autobiographical and non-personal 
emotional events (AMI and Cahill task respectively) were markedly different. 
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Given the nature of this study these were explored further and results are 
reported below.  
 
Figure 3.1. AMI. Mean AMI accuracy scores on recruitment to the study. The ‘Ribot’ 





Figure 3.1 shows mean accuracy scores of confabulating and non-confabulating 
participants on the AMI episodic schedule. Confabulating patients scored at 
‘borderline abnormal’ level on the childhood and young adulthood scales of the 
AMI and at ‘definitely abnormal’ level on the recent events section of this test. 
Non-confabulating participants performed at ‘acceptable’ level on the childhood 
scale, but they scored at ‘borderline abnormal’ on the young adult scale and at 
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‘definitely abnormal’ on the recent events section. The pattern of performance in 
both groups is consistent with a temporal (or ‘Ribot’) gradient (Kopelman et al., 
1990). 
 
In order to investigate differences in autobiographical memory function, 
repeated measures ANOVA with AMI subtest as a within factor (childhood, 
adulthood or recent) and group as the between factor (confabulating or non-
confabulating) was carried out on AMI accuracy scores. Maulchy’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(2)=0.735, 
p=0.008), therefore degrees of freedom were corrected. Since ε>0.75, Huynh-
Feldt estimates of sphericity were used to correct degrees of freedom on this 
occasion (ε=0.851). ANOVA results showed a main effect of subtest: 
F(1.70,54.44)=7.003, p=0.039, and a significant effect of group: F(2,32)=5.852, 
p=0.021, indicating that non-confabulating participants obtained higher 
accuracy scores on the AMI. There was no interaction between subtest and 
group: F(1.70,54.44)=1.30, p=0.277. Planned pairwise comparisons showed 
that recall of recent events was significantly less accurate than recall of 
childhood memories (mean difference=1.318, p=0.047) and of adulthood events 
(mean difference=1.478, p=0.006), after Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons. No significant differences were found between recall of childhood 
and adulthood events (mean difference=0.160, p=1.00). 
 
In order to study differences in memory for non-personal emotional material, 
first, the proportion of information correctly recalled within each Cahill slide was 
calculated. Second, the mean proportion of information remembered from the 
non-critical slides was calculated. Third, difference scores were obtained by 
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subtracting this mean from the proportion of information remembered from the 
Cahill critical slide (with high affective content). Fourth, parametric assumptions 
were considered and met; therefore independent groups t-tests were used to 
compare the 2 groups on Cahill difference scores.  
 
The means on Table 3.1 indicate that both groups showed virtually identical 
ability to detect emotional content across all the slides presented. However, the 
confabulating group remembered considerably less emotional non-
autobiographical material (as measured by Cahill difference scores) than the 
non-confabulating group (t(31)=3.426, p=0.002). This is a relatively rare pattern 
of performance, which has been found only in patients with amygdala damage. 
It has been associated to an inability to experience the internal emotions that 




The next set of analyses was used to compare confabulating and non-
confabulating patients with healthy controls on confabulation measures. 
Table 3.2a shows means, standard deviations and ranges of the overall 
proportion of items from the Dalla Barba confabulation battery to which the 3 
groups gave confabulatory answers. Proportions used in the analyses were 
consistent with a normal distribution of data. One-way ANOVA confirmed there 
were significant differences between the 3 groups on the proportion of 
confabulations reported in response to the Dalla Barba interview 
(F(2,38)=48.42; p<0.001). Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that overall the 
experimental group confabulated to a significantly greater proportion of items on 
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this interview than both control groups: non-confabulating brain injured 
participants (mean difference= 0.268; p<0.001), and healthy participants (mean 
difference = 0.310; p <0.001). 
 
 
Table 3.2a. Confabulations. Overall proportion of questions in the Dalla Barba 
interview to which participants gave confabulatory answers, and proportion of items 
within the episodic and personal semantic sections of this interview to which 
participants gave confabulatory answers respectively, as verified by informants and 
medical records 
Test Group N Mean (SD)  Range 
   Overall proportion of 
confabulations 
confabulating 24 0.4 (0.1) 0.2-0.6 
non-confabulating 11 0.1 (0.1) 0.0-0.2 
healthy 6 0.1 (0.1) 0.0-0.1 
   Episodic section: 
proportion of confabulations 
confabulating 24 0.6 (0.1) 0.3-0.8 
non-confabulating 11 0.1 (0.1) 0.0-0.3 
healthy - - - 
   Personal semantic section: 
proportion of confabulations 
confabulating 24 0.4 (0.1) 0.2-0.6 
non-confabulating 11 0.1 (0.1) 0.0-0.3 
healthy - - - 
 
 
The healthy control group were only administered a short form of the Dalla 
Barba confabulation battery; they did not answer the episodic nor the personal 
semantic questions. Consequently only the 2 patient groups were compared on 
these sections of the interview. Independent measures t-tests showed the 
experimental group confabulated to a significantly greater proportion of items 
within the personal semantic and episodic sections than the non-confabulating 
amnesic control group (p<0.001). Table 3.2b shows F or t values and adjusted 
p values for comparisons between groups on the 3 confabulation measures. All 
3 differences remained significant after Holm’s Bonferroni correction for multiple 





Table 3.2b. Adjusted p values. Adjusted p values for multiple comparisons using the 
Holm’s Bonferroni method (ie: p values are ordered from smallest to largest and critical 
alpha is calculated dividing 0.05 by a decreasing number of comparisons at each step) 
Null hypothesis tested Absolute value 
of F/t (df) 
P 
value 
Critical alpha Null 
hypothesis 
rejected? 
No differences on Dalla 











No differences on Dalla 











No differences on Dalla 












3.3.3. Experimental measures 
 
The next set of analyses was used to compare the 3 groups of participants: a) 
confabulating patients, b) non-confabulating brain injured controls, and c) 
healthy controls on experimental measures, in order to index differences due to 
confabulation on the one hand, and those due to brain injury on the other hand 




Table 3.3 shows means, standard deviations, and range of 3 participant groups 
on experimental measures. Parametric assumptions were met both for TCC and 
insight. Elated and depressed mood scores showed a somewhat skewed 
distribution towards milder severity of symptoms, therefore Kruskall-Wallis chi 
square tests were carried out. 
 
Table 3.3. Experimental tasks. Means, standard deviations and range of scores 
obtained by each group of participants on experimental measures 
Test Group N Mean (SD)  Range 
TCC confabulating 24 0.5 (0.4) -0.7-1.3 
Non-confabulating 11 0.3 (0.4) -0.4-0.8 
healthy 6 0.1 (0.1) -0.1-0.2 
Insight confabulating 23 8.3 (3.4) 1-14 
Non-confabulating 11 5.6 (2.5) 1-9 
healthy - - - 
Elated 
mood 
confabulating 23 4.0 (3.3) 0-10 
Non-confabulating 11 1.7 (2.3) 0-7 
healthy 6 3.2 (3.9) 0-10 
Depression confabulating 23 3.4 (2.8) 0-9 
Non-confabulating 11 3.5 (3.2) 0-10 
healthy 6 3.5 (3.5) 1-8 
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows how individual confabulating participants and non-
confabulating controls performed on the TCC task in the current study. The 
confabulating group and healthy controls performed on this task at similar levels 
to those reported by Schnider et al. (1996). This is, healthy controls scored 
below 0.28 on this task, and so did most of the non-confabulating brain injured 
controls, whereas most confabulating patients scored above this cut-off point. In 
this way, the current findings partially replicated Schnider et al’s (1996). 
 105
However, note that 7 confabulating participants failed to perform according to 
Schnider et al’s (1996) predictions and scored below the ‘healthy’ cut-off.  
 
Figure 3.2. TCC. Scatter distributions of TCC scores for 24 confabulating patients, 11 
non-confabulating brain injured amnesic patients, and 6 healthy controls. 
TCC=(FP2/hits2)-(FP1/hits1). The horizontal line shows the cut-off point reported for 
healthy controls (0.28) by Schnider et al. (1996) 
 
 
Moreover, 5 of the brain injured non-confabulating controls also partially 
contradicted Schnider’s results and scored above the cut-off; this was despite 
being matched to the experimental group on the same variables reported by 
these authors. The pattern of performance of this group was consistent with that 
of one of Gilboa et al’s (2006) control groups: non-confabulating patients who 
had suffered an anterior communicating artery aneurysm (ACoA), but not with 
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the other control group: amnesic participants with medial temporal lesions. This 
result may reflect the severity of executive dysfunction present both in the 
current brain injured controls and in Gilboa et al’s (2006) ACoA group.  
 
One-way ANOVA results showed that differences between the 3 groups of 
participants on performance of the TCC task just missed statistical significance 
(F(2,38)=3.111; p=0.056). Mean scores of the 3 groups on this measure 
indicated that while confabulators’ performance on this task was considerably 
worse than that of healthy controls, it was only mildly poorer than that of non-
confabulating amnesic controls.  
 
To summarise, in partial agreement with Schnider’s findings, TCC scores in the 
current study did discriminate between healthy and most confabulating 
participants (but not all). However, consistent with Gilboa’s findings (and 
partially contrary to Schnider’s) TCC scores did not discriminate between 
confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured participants. 
 
Insight was not applicable to the healthy control group. T-test results for the 
remaining participants showed the confabulating group had significantly less 
insight into their difficulties than the non-confabulating group (t(32)=2.260; 
p=0.031). However, after adjusting this p value for multiple comparisons, this 
difference merely approximated significance (critical alpha for 4 comparisons 
was 0.012). 
 
None of the current participants showed clinically abnormal levels of depressed 
or elated mood. No significant differences among the 3 groups were found on 
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depressed scale scores (χ2(2)=0.023, p=0.989). Mean scores indicated that all 
groups showed similar levels of low mood. No significant differences were found 
among the 3 groups on elated mood scores (χ2(2)=3.797, p=0.151). However, 
mean scores indicated the experimental group showed higher levels of elated 
mood than the non-confabulating group. This was investigated with a Mann-
Whitney test. Results indicated this difference approached significance (U=74.0, 
p=0.049; 2-tailed). This last analysis was carried out in the interest of providing 
background to the next analysis. 
 
3.3.4. Potential predictors of confabulation 
 
The next analyses were used to explore whether any of the experimental 
measures predicted (in the statistical sense) the presence of confabulation. For 
this, first a binary logistic regression was used to build a model of the best 
predictors of the presence of confabulation and second a ROC curve was 
constructed to examine sensitivity and specificity of the model of predictors (or 
concurrent associates).  
 
 Only the 2 patient groups were included in this analysis. For this analysis a 
binary logistic regression was carried out with group membership (confabulating 
versus non-confabulating) as the dependent variable and TCC, elated mood, 
depressed scale score and insight as the covariates. Backward stepwise 
selection was used to reduce the resulting model to just those variables making 
an independent contribution to the prediction of the presence of confabulation.  
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Depression was dropped as a predictor at step 1 (p=0.931), and TCC was 
dropped at step 2 (p=0.266).  
 
Table 3.4 shows the resulting model of predictors (or concurrent associates) of 
the presence of confabulation, which included level of insight and elated mood. 
According to this model for each 1 unit reduction in insight scores (or in other 
words an improvement in insight) there are 30% lower odds of confabulating; 
and for each 1 unit reduction in elated mood scores there are 33% lower odds 
of confabulating. However, conclusions based on these results should be 
interpreted with caution as data at the upper end of the 95% confidence interval 
is consistent with a true reduction in odds of as little as 4% for insight and as 
little as 1% for elated mood. 
 
Table 3.4. Predictive model. Final predictive model for the presence of confabulation 
(using backward stepwise binary logistic regression) 
 Odds Ratio 95% CI for OR p 
lower upper 
Insight  0.70 0.50 0.96 0.029 
Elated mood  0.67 0.46 0.99 0.042 
 
 
Next a ROC curve was drawn in order to examine the sensitivity and specificity 
of the above predictive model. For this a joint variable was manually calculated 
using values extracted from the previous regression analysis. In other words, 
the regression ‘B’ values from the best model of predictors: insight and elated 
mood were extracted (insight B=-0.361; elation B=-0.4; constant B=2.77). The 
following formula was constructed with these ‘B’ values and was applied to 
insight and elated mood scores in order to create a new joint variable: ‘fitted 
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values’= 2.770+(-0.361*insight1)+(-0.400*elation1). Figure 3.3 shows the ROC 
curve drawn using the joint variable of ‘fitted values’. 
 
The area under the ROC curve indicated that there was a 0.834 probability that 
a randomly chosen confabulator obtained a higher score on insight & elated 
mood compared to a randomly chosen non-confabulator (the 95% confidence 
interval for the area under the curve was 0.696-0.972). In other words, the 
greater the insight difficulties and elated mood, the greater the chances are of 
being a confabulator. 
 
The coordinates of the ROC curve indicated that with a cut of achieving 
specificity of 82%, sensitivity of this model of predictors (or concurrent 














Figure 3.3. ROC curve of fitted values of insight and elated mood at initial assessment 
(the butted line represents the fitted values of the joint variable (insight & elated mood) 


















What causes confabulation remains controversial. In particular the role insight 
and mood play on the appearance of confabulations has been seldom 
investigated until now. In this study 24 brain injured confabulating patients were 
compared to two matched control groups: 11 non-confabulating amnesic 
patients and 6 healthy participants on temporal context confusion (TCC), 
insight, mood (depression and elated mood), and background measures. 
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Current results indicated the two brain injured groups of participants showed 
very similar background cognitive levels of function. The experimental group 
differed from the non-confabulating amnesic control only in two specific areas: 
a) they remembered fewer personal events; b) they recalled significantly less 
non-autobiographic material with high affective content. This was somewhat 
surprising because brain injured and amnesic individuals and patients 
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease have shown a robust advantage recalling 
this type of information over emotionally neutral material (Adolphs et al., 1997; 
Hamann et al., 1997; Kazui et al., 2000). 
 
Overall the present experimental group confabulated significantly more than 
both control groups; this was true both for episodic and semantic personal 
information. This is consistent with previous studies where confabulations have 
been observed in semantic as well as in episodic memory (Kopelman et al., 
1997; Kan et al., 2010; La Corte et al., 2010). 
 
Regarding the first aim of this study, most confabulating patients (but not all) 
performed considerably worse than healthy participants on TCC, thereby 
partially replicating Schnider et al.’s (1996) results. However, in contrast with 
these authors’ findings, performance on TCC showed poor discrimination 
between confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured amnesic patients. 
Present results are consistent with those obtained by Gilboa (2006), in that 
these authors found that TCC did not discriminate between confabulating and 
other brain injured non-confabulating patients.  
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Regarding the second aim of this study, it was also found that the confabulating 
group had considerably less insight into their condition than the non-
confabulating brain injured amnesic group. 
 
Regarding the third aim of this study, the present 3 groups of participants were 
asymptomatic in terms of mood disorders. There were no differences among 
them on depression scale scores. Levels of elated mood were considerably 
higher in confabulating than in non-confabulating patients; however this 
difference merely approached statistical significance.  
  
More importantly, regarding the fourth aim of this study, current results showed 
that a combination of increased levels of elated mood and reduced levels of 
insight into difficulties and well-being predicted the presence of confabulation in 
the present sample. This model of concurrent associates was sensitive and 
specific to the presence of confabulation.  
 
In summary the present findings showed that: (i) TCC was sensitive to the 
presence of confabulation, but it did not predict it in the present sample, and 
showed poor discrimination between confabulating and other brain injured 
participants; (ii) a combination of elated mood and poor insight predicted the 
presence of confabulation in the present sample. 
 
Schnider argued that TCC discriminated confabulators not only from healthy 
individuals but also from a group of patients matched to confabulators for levels 
of amnesia. On the basis of this, Schnider concluded that a deficit in updating 
ongoing reality and suppressing irrelevant memories lay at the root of 
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confabulation. As Schnider found, the present data showed that confabulating 
participants performed considerably worse than healthy participants on this 
task. However, partially contrary to Schnider’s findings, current confabulators’ 
performance did not differ significantly from that of non-confabulating brain 
injured patients matched for levels of amnesia.  
 
Similarly Gilboa (2006) found that although TCC discriminated between 
confabulating and amnesic participants (with medial temporal lobe lesions), it 
did not discriminate between confabulating and non-confabulating ACoA 
patients (who had suffered ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage). The current 
results would support Gilboa’s (2006) conclusion that this task may be sensitive 
but not specific to confabulation. Gilboa (2010) distinguished between ‘core’ 
deficits, necessary and sufficient for the appearance of confabulations, and 
‘constitutional’ deficits, which are not unique to confabulation.  ‘Constitutional’ 
deficits may be necessary but they are not sufficient for the appearance of 
confabulation. The present findings would support Gilboa’s (2010) conclusion 
that TCC may belong to ‘constitutional’, rather than ‘core’ deficits in 
confabulation. 
 
A combination of elated mood and poor insight predicted the presence of 
confabulation in the present sample. These results are partially consistent with 
Corwin et al.’s (1990) findings with hypomanic patients. Corwin argued that 
elated mood resulted in an exaggerated willingness to report guesses when an 
individual was not sure of the answer. If replicated, the present results would 
suggest that elated mood may have a similar effect on executive processes that 
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are believed to be responsible for the appearance of confabulations (Gilboa, 
2010). These are reviewed next. 
 
According to Gilboa (2010) the breakdown of ‘Feeling Of Rightness’ monitoring 
processes leads to accepting false memories with high confidence. In the case 
of confabulations this may be because autobiographical memories are 
associated with a high level of confidence in their veracity due to their high 
significance and personal meaning for the individual. Hence, autobiographical 
knowledge may play a part in biasing decisions at a pre-conscious level and in 
guiding behaviour (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
 
Gilboa also hypothesised that control mechanisms allow a person to regulate 
the quantity and accuracy of memories reported. This means that irrespective of 
the conviction with which a memory is held, the individual decides whether to 
report it or not, depending on the anticipated consequences of their actions. The 
exaggerated willingness of confabulators to report erroneous memories may be 
due in part to faulty control processes. Although Gilboa provided a 
comprehensive explanation of cognitive mechanisms underlying confabulation, 
he has not considered the effects of mood on confabulation. 
 
If replicated, the present results would suggest that slightly elated mood may 
contribute to deficits in both ‘Feeling Of Rightness’ and control processes 
described by Gilboa (2010) in confabulations. On the one hand elevated mood 
may promote an exaggerated sense of confidence in false memories; on the 
other hand it may lower the criterion upon which the person may decide to go 
ahead and report a (false) memory. Unfortunately neither the present study, nor 
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Corwin et al.’s (1990) allow to determine at which of these two levels elated 
mood is likely to operate. To examine this, further investigations should include 
measures of participants’ confidence in their reported memories, and a free 
narrative task where the participants would have control over whether or not to 
report (false) memories. 
 
Related to this, Corwin et al. (1990) found that beta-blockers reversed the 
disproportionate willingness to guess in patients with hypomania. Cahill & van 
Stegeren (2003) found memory for emotional material was modulated by beta-
adrenergic blockade. Schnider (2008) found dopamine antagonists sometimes 
reduce confabulation. In future it may be interesting to find out whether beta-
blockers reduce confabulation in patients with elevated mood. 
 
In terms of insight, this was one of the concurrent associates of the presence of 
confabulation in the present sample. This is consistent with models of 
confabulation that include insight as a critical feature (Burgess and Shallice, 
1996). The effects of reduced insight on confabulation are still unclear. Some 
authors have referred to confabulation as a lack of integration between 
consciousness, identity, memory and perceptions from the environment 
(Feinberg and Roane, 1997). Other authors have linked confabulations to 
deficits matching external events to internal predictions (Turner et al., 2008b).  
 
Related to this, failure in the Cahill task has been associated to an inability to 
experience the internal emotions that may be elicited by external stimuli 
(associated with amygdala damage) (Adolphs et al., 1997; Tranel et al., 2006). 
The present confabulating sample remembered considerably less information 
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from highly emotional non-autobiographical material than the non-confabulating 
group. They had no difficulty quantifying the affective content of the stimuli; 
therefore their poor performance on this task could not have been caused by a 
general defect in processing affect. This would be consistent with Metcalf’s 
(Metcalf et al., 2010) proposal that confabulating participants do not suffer 
generalised emotional dysregulation. One possible explanation for 
confabulators’ pattern of performance on this task would be that memories 
which are not consistent with important goals and self-images may receive less 
activation than those that are (Conway, 2005). Whether this pattern of 
performance is related to specific lesions, or memory control mechanisms in 
confabulation, or a more general dysfunction of attention mechanisms that 
integrate internal and external cognition (Burgess et al., 2007b) are questions 
that may need to be addressed in future studies.   
 
In conclusion, the present findings partially replicated Schnider’s results and 
showed that TCC discriminated between most confabulating and healthy 
individuals.  However, TCC did not predict the presence of confabulations. 
Moreover, in partial refutation of Schnider’s findings, TCC discriminated poorly 
between confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured amnesic 
participants. This was consistent with results obtained by Gilboa with patients 
with frontal aneurysms. Therefore it is concluded here that whilst TCC may be 
sensitive to confabulation, it does not seem specific to this disorder. A 
combination of elated mood and poor insight predicted the presence of 
confabulation in the present sample with a high degree of sensitivity and 
specificity. Slightly elated mood in confabulating patients may result in 
increased confidence on false memories on the one hand, and increased 
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willingness to report them on the other hand. In this way mood may affect 
dysfunction within two core processes believed to underlie confabulation: the 
‘Feeling of Rightness’ and Control processes. In summary the present results 
suggest a previously unreported role of insight and mood on the appearance of 










The main aims of this study were to characterise the clinical course of 
confabulation along cognitive, insight and mood measures and to explore 
potential predictors of change in confabulation. Two sets of measures were 
considered: a) a comprehensive battery of background cognitive tests and b) 
the following experimental variables: temporal context confusion (TCC), 
measures of elated and of depressed mood, and a self-reported measure of 
insight. 
 
Very few longitudinal studies have examined the clinical course of 
confabulations. Most were single cases or had small samples. The nature of the 
follow-up of confabulations in these studies typically has been limited to 
behavioural observations (Mercer et al., 1977; Nahum et al., 2010; Mattioli et 
al., 1999). For this reason, comprehensive background neuropsychological data 
were collected longitudinally from the present sample. 
 
Two areas of cognition have been linked with the clinical course of 
confabulation: memory and executive function, although findings have been 
contradictory. For example improvements in executive function have been 
reported both in the context of and in absence of severe amnesia (Benson et 
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al., 1996; Kapur and Coughlan, 1980 respectively). Schnider et al. (2000a) 
found that memory and executive function remained unchanged or worsened in 
some patients who had stopped confabulating, and conversely, some patients 
who continued to confabulate experienced memory and executive function 
improvements. Box et al. (1999) also found that memory and executive deficits 
persisted beyond recovery from confabulation in a single case, and this patient 
went on to develop a misidentification delusion. Consequently several authors 
have argued that explanatory models of confabulation must include a ‘dynamic’ 
dimension to account for their clinical course (Box et al., 1999; Fotopoulou et 
al., 2004). For this reason a comprehensive assessment of memory and 
executive function was carried out as part of background cognitive testing in the 
current study. 
 
A previous investigation with the present sample (see chapter 3 in this thesis) 
identified significant differences between confabulating and non-confabulating 
participants on two background cognitive measures:  (i) autobiographical 
memory and (ii) memory for non-personal emotional material. Therefore 
changes over time in background cognitive measures were examined in the 
present study with particular attention to these two areas of function. 
 
Several models have attempted to identify the critical cognitive mechanisms 
underlying the appearance and course of confabulations. These have been 
comprehensively reviewed recently (DeLuca, 2009; Fotopoulou, 2010; 
Kopelman, 2010; Schnider, 2008). Of particular relevance to this study is a 
model that has attempted to explain not only the cause of behaviourally 
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spontaneous confabulations but also their clinical course (Schnider, 2008; 
Nahum et al., 2010). 
 
Schnider (2008) found that performance on the TCC task improved as patients 
recovered from confabulation. Since no other cognitive measure studied 
paralleled recovery from confabulation, TCC was put forward as a critical 
cognitive mechanism underlying confabulation (Schnider et al., 2000a; Nahum 
et al., 2010). However, these findings have not yet been replicated by 
investigators outside Schnider’s team. In this respect, results reported in the 
previous investigation (see chapter 3 in this thesis) provided partial support for 
Schnider’s hypothesis. They showed that TCC was indeed sensitive to the 
presence of confabulation in the current sample. In the present investigation, 
confabulating participants’ changes in TCC performance were charted over 
time, and the relative contribution of TCC in predicting changes in confabulation 
was examined. 
 
Most of the previous studies have not taken mood and insight into account, and 
none has measured them formally. However, there is evidence that emotion 
and/or insight modulates confabulation. Several authors have described 
confabulation in the context of lack of insight and elated mood or even 
hypomania (Weinstein and Kahn, 1950; Schnider, 2008). Furthermore evidence 
suggests that recovery from confabulation may be accompanied by increased 
awareness of amnesia and confabulation (Feinberg and Roane, 1997; Mercer 
et al., 1977; Nahum et al., 2010; DeLuca, 2000).  
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Related to this, elated mood has been found to modulate memory in psychiatric 
populations (Corwin et al., 1990; Gainotti and Marra, 1994). Elated mood has 
been linked to a liberal bias in patients’ responses to recognition memory tasks. 
More importantly this bias disappeared when patients recovered from the 
underlying mood disorder (Corwin et al., 1990). Taken together these studies 
would suggest that elated mood and/or level of insight may modulate the 
appearance and clinical course of confabulation. Furthermore, results from a 
previous study indicated that insight and elated mood were the best concurrent 
associates of the presence of confabulation (see chapter 3 in this thesis). 
Therefore, in the present investigation, confabulating participants’ changes in 
insight and elated mood were charted over time, and their relative contribution 
to the prediction of changes in confabulation was examined. 
 
In this connection, the content of confabulations has been found to be highly 
affective and often pleasant in nature (Burgess and McNeil, 1999; Fotopoulou, 
2010; Metcalf et al., 2010). This has been taken to indicate that affective or 
emotional mechanisms may modulate the content of confabulations 
(Fotopoulou, 2010; Metcalf et al., 2010; Gilboa, 2010). One hypothesis put 
forward was that emotion and personal goals exert an exaggerated bias on 
confabulators’ autobiographical memory retrieval; this would be caused by 
breakdown of memory and critical monitoring processes (Gilboa, 2010; Conway 
and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Fotopoulou, 2010). Moreover, several authors have 
found that confabulations may present the individual to others in a favourable or 
idealised light (Fotopoulou, 2010; Turnbull et al., 2004b). In this way 
confabulations may somehow help the individual cope with a rather depressing 
reality (e.g.: being in hospital, loss of job, status, etc). Indeed there is some 
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indication that confabulations may be related to depressed mood, although 
further research on this topic is required (Fotopoulou et al., 2008b; Metcalf et 
al., 2010). If this explanation were verified, then confabulating individuals might 
be expected to be suffering from low mood, which would likely lift as they 
recover. On the other hand, if confabulating participants had slightly elated 
mood and poor insight into their difficulties to start with (see chapter 3 in this 
thesis), one might expect that as they recover from confabulation and gain 
insight into their condition, their mood might be increasingly depressed (Nahum 
et al., 2010). In the present investigation, confabulating participants’ changes in 
depressed mood were charted over time, and the relative contribution of 
depressed mood in predicting changes in confabulation was examined. 
 
In summary, TCC has been put forward as the only cognitive mechanism that 
parallels the course of confabulation. However the findings leading to this 
conclusion lack replication. Moreover the clinical course of confabulation has 
been relatively poorly studied. The few studies that explored this have not used 
large samples and have seldom taken mood or insight into consideration. 
However there is evidence that mood and insight may modulate confabulations. 
Therefore the aim of this study was to follow up confabulating patients in order 
to characterise the clinical course of confabulation along cognitive, insight and 
mood changes, and to explore the relative value of TCC, insight and mood in 
predicting the clinical course of confabulation. In particular the study aimed: 
1. to explore changes over time in TCC performance in a group of 
confabulating participants; 
2. to investigate changes over time in level of insight into memory 
difficulties and general well-being in confabulating participants; 
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3. to explore changes over time in elated and depressed mood in 
confabulating participants; and 
4. to examine the relative contribution of initial TCC, insight, elated mood 






In this study the same group of 24 confabulating participants described in 
previous chapters were followed up (see chapters 2 and 3 in this thesis). For 
the purpose of this study they were assessed on 3 occasions: 1) on inclusion to 
the study, 2) 3 months later and 3) 9 months after the initial assessment 
approximately. 
 
Their characteristics have been described in the method chapter and will not be 
repeated here.  
 
4.2.2. Background assessments 
 
All participants underwent an initial comprehensive neuropsychological 
assessment on inclusion to the study. This was repeated 3 months later and 
again 9 months after the initial assessment. Background tests have been 
described in the method chapter and this information will not be reiterated here. 
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4.2.3. Experimental procedures 
 
The same experimental measures used in a previous investigation were 
employed in this study (see chapter 3 in this thesis). As before, participants’ 
confabulatory behaviour was measured with the Dalla Barba confabulation 
battery adapted for the UK (Dalla Barba, 1993a; Kopelman et al., 1997). 
Temporal context confusion (TCC) was measured using Schnider’s continuous 
recognition task (Schnider et al., 2000a). The same measures of mood and 
insight described in previous chapters of this thesis were used for this study.  
 
For the purpose of the current study the experimental procedures were carried 
out on inclusion to the study, and they were repeated 3 months later and again 




First the extent of recovery from confabulation was examined in the present 
sample over the 3 assessments. Two measures of confabulation were 
considered in turn: a) overall proportion of confabulatory answers to the Dalla 
Barba interview, and b) proportion of confabulatory answers to the episodic 
section of this interview. For each of these measures a trend analysis was 
carried out (i.e.: repeated measures one-way ANOVA linear contrast).  Time of 
assessment (initial, 3-month, and 9-month follow-up) was the repeated 




Second, in order to characterise the clinical course of confabulation along 
changes in cognitive function, first background cognitive measures were 
examined (via inspection of means and SD) at two points in time: initial and final 
assessment. Substantial changes were explored further using repeated 
measures ANOVA and trend analyses (i.e. ANOVA linear contrasts). 
 
Third, changes in experimental measures (TCC, insight, elated and depressed 
mood) across the 3 assessments were examined. For this trend analyses were 
carried out (i.e.: repeated measures one-way ANOVA linear contrast) with time 
of assessment as the repeated measures variable, and each experimental 
measure as the dependent factor. The Friedman test was employed when 
parametric assumptions were not met. As before, TCC was measured using the 
following formula: (FP2/H2) – (FP1/H1) where: FP1 or FP2 = number of falsely 
recognised stimuli (false positives) in run 1 or 2, and H1 or H2 = number of 
correctly recognised items (hits) in run 1 or 2 (Schnider et al., 2000a). 
 
Finally the relative contribution of experimental factors in predicting recovery 
from confabulation was investigated. Two potential measures of confabulation 
were used for this purpose: a) total number of confabulations across all sections 
of the Dalla Barba Confabulation Interview (overall confabulations maximum 
number= 80), and b) number of confabulations reported in the episodic memory 






Prediction of change in overall number of confabulations 
 
For this analysis as a first step, for each participant, a linear regression was 
carried out to calculate the slope of change in the number of confabulations 
reported across all sections of the Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery over the 3 
assessments; the individual slopes were then saved as a separate variable in 
order to be used in the next analysis. The following example illustrates how this 
variable was obtained. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the raw number of confabulations produced by one of the 
participants over the 3 assessment sessions. In the first instance a linear 
regression was carried out using number of confabulations as the dependent 
variable and assessment session as the independent variable. Then the slope 
of the change in number of confabulations over time was extracted and used in 
the next step. The slope of this particular curve is = -3.10, as indicated by the B 
coefficient from this person’s individual linear regression analysis. 
 
The process followed above with 13js was repeated for all 24 confabulating 
patients. The slope of change in number of confabulations was recorded for 
each patient and then saved as a separate variable ready to be used in the next 
step. Next a linear regression was carried out with the slopes of change over 
time in overall number of confabulations as the dependent variable and initial 
scores on temporal context confusion (TCC), insight, elated and depressed 
mood, as the predicting variables.  Backward stepwise selection was used to 
reduce the model to just those variables making an independent contribution to 
the prediction of change in confabulation. 
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Figure 4.1. Gradient of change on confabulation. Overall number of confabulations 
reported by 13js over the 3 assessment sessions at 0, 3 and 9 months respectively. 
The slope of this particular curve is = -3.10, as indicated by the B coefficient from this 




Prediction of change in episodic confabulations 
 
As in the previous analysis, first the gradient of change in number of 
confabulations was calculated for each person using a linear regression; except 
this time we used only the number of confabulations reported in the ‘episodic’ 
section of the Dalla Barba interview. Second the individual gradients (or B 
regression coefficients) were then saved as a separate variable in order to be 
used in the next analysis. Third a linear regression was carried out with gradient 
of change in episodic confabulation as the dependent variable and initial scores 
on TCC, insight, elated and depressed mood as the predicting variables. 
Backward stepwise selection was used to reduce the model to just those 
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The extent of recovery from confabulation was examined over the follow-up 
period. Two measures of confabulation were considered: a) overall proportion of 
confabulations and b) proportion of episodic confabulations. Table 4.1 shows 
the proportion of confabulations reported both across all sections of the Dalla 
Barba confabulation battery and in the episodic section specifically, over the 3 
assessments.  
 
Table 4.1. Confabulations over time. Means and standard deviations of proportion of 
confabulations reported by the experimental group over time on the Dalla Barba 
confabulation battery, as verified from informants and medical records 
 Initial assessment 3-month follow-up 9-month follow-up 









































          
 
 
Overall proportion of confabulations 
 
Between the first and the last assessment the mean proportion of 
confabulations reported across all sections of the Dalla Barba interview fell from 
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0.360 (SD 0.105) to 0.161 (SD 0.110). Parametric assumptions were met. 
Results of a repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
time on overall proportion of confabulations (F(2,44)= 52.366, p<0.001). A linear 
trend analysis was significant (F(1,22)= 85.589, p<0.001). This indicated that 
overall the proportion of confabulations reported decreased significantly over 
the 3 assessments, as shown in figure 4.2.   
 
Figure 4.2. Clinical course of confabulation and TCC over time. 1. Left axis: Mean 
proportion of confabulatory answers reported on the Dalla Barba interview a) across all 
sections, or b) on the episodic section alone; and 2. Right axis: Mean TCC scores of 24 








Table 4.1 shows that from the first to the last assessment, the average 
proportion of confabulatory answers reported in the episodic memory section of 
the confabulation battery fell from 0.575 (SD 0.136) to 0.240 (SD 0.164). 
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Parametric assumptions were met. Results of a repeated measures ANOVA 
showed a significant main effect of time on episodic confabulations 
(F(2,46)=39.856, p<0.001). A linear trend analysis was significant 
(F(1,23)=88.779, p<0.001). This indicated that the proportion of episodic 
confabulations decreased significantly over the 3 assessments, as shown in 
figure 4.2.  
 
4.3.2. Background measures 
 
As previously described (see chapter 3 in this thesis), at the point of inclusion to 
the study, participants’ brain injury had resulted in marked decline of general 
reasoning; this fell within the borderline between average and learning 
difficulties level of function. Participants also showed impaired memory (below 
the 5th percentile) and executive function (below the 10th percentile).  
 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show very little change in most background measures 
between the first and last assessment. At the last follow-up, after approximately 
9 months, participants had experienced at best moderate improvement in the 
following cognitive functions.  
 
General reasoning, processing speed and executive functions 
 
Table 4.2 shows that patients’ mean general reasoning ability had improved 
from a previous borderline level of function (x‾ =77.7; SD 12.7) to a low average 
range (x‾ =85.7; SD 16.3) at the last assessment. There were mild 
improvements in speed of processing, although this still fell below the 10th 
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percentile. Table 4.3 shows that executive function remained largely 
unchanged, except for a very mild improvement in rule attainment ability 
(Brixton test); performance on this test improved from the 1st to the 5th 
percentile.  
 
Table 4.2. Reasoning and speed of processing over time. Means, SD and 
percentiles of 24 confabulating participants on reasoning and processing speed 
measures obtained at initial assessment, 3-month, and 9-month follow-up. 
 
Test Initial assessment 3-month follow-up 9-month follow-up 
 Mean (SD) %le N Mean (SD) %le N Mean (SD) %le N 
Gral. reasoning 




















Process. speed          
   SCOLP 22.8(10.64) 1-5   23 27.1 (12.6) 5 24 28.8(15.3) 5-10 24 
   WAIS-III - Digit 
Symbol 
23.5(13.8) 1 24 27.3(18.1) 1 22 30.6(15.8) 2 24 
 
 
Table 4.3. Executive function over time. Mean raw scores (SD) and percentiles of 24 
confabulating patients on tests of executive function at initial assessment, 3-month, and 
9-month follow-up. 
 
Test Initial assessment 3-month follow-up 9-month follow-up 
 Mean (SD) %le N Mean (SD) %le N Mean (SD) %le N 
Trail Making 







































Hayling Test  




















   -Part B timing 
score   
81.4(47.5) 10 23 74.3(44.3) 10 22 77.8(49.2) 10 23 
   -Part C type a 
& b errors 
40.7(23.6) 1 23 36.5(24.2) 1 22 32.8(20.5) 1 23 





In terms of memory, minimal improvements were noted, but in general table 4.4 
shows that anterograde memory function remained at or below the 5th percentile 
at the last follow-up. Areas of change included immediate verbal memory, which 
had improved from an initial 1st percentile to a final 2nd percentile. Delayed 
verbal memory also improved from an initial 1st percentile to the 5th at the last 
follow-up. Delayed visual memory had fallen within the 2nd percentile on initial 
assessment; at the last assessment this lay within the 5th percentile. 
 
Figure 4.3 and table 4.4 show changes in autobiographical memory accuracy 
over time. Autobiographical memory for childhood events, which initially had 
fallen within the ‘borderline abnormal’ range, fell within the ‘acceptable range’ at 
the last follow-up. Memory for young adulthood remained virtually unchanged at 
the ‘borderline’ range. Memory for recent autobiographical events remained 
within the ‘definitely abnormal’ range, although mean scores on table 4.4 
indicated larger changes than in the other two modalities of autobiographical 
memory. For this reason, and given that in a previous investigation significant 
differences had been observed between confabulating and non-confabulating 








Table 4.4. Memory over time. Mean raw memory scores (SD) and percentiles of 24 
confabulating participants at initial assessment, 3-month, and 9-month follow-up. 
 
Test Initial assessment 3-month follow-up 9-month follow-up 
 Mean (SD) %le N Mean (SD) %le N Mean (SD) %le N 
Anterograde 
memory 
         
  WMS-III – 
Immediate Logical 
Memory (LM) 
12.3(8.2)  1 22 19.0(10.9) 2 21 18.6(10.9) 2 23 
  WMS-III – Delayed 
LM 
3.1(4.3) 1 22 6.1(6.5) 2 21 7.0(7.9) 5 23 
  WMS-III – 
Recognition LM 
18.6(3.6) - 22 20.9(3.9) - 21 20.6(4.5) - 23 
  WMS-III - 
Immediate Visual 
Reproduction (VR)  
41.0(16.7) 1 21 48.1(16.5) 1 21 47.7(22.7) 1 23 
  WMS-III - Delayed 
VR 
6.8(8.9) 2 21   9.3(11.9) 5 21 13.7(14.8) 5 23 
  WMS-III - 
Recognition VR 
34.6(4.0) 5 20 35.4(3.9) 5 21 35.5(3.4) 5 22 
Memory for 
emotional material 
         
  Cahill task - 
Emotional rating 


















  Cahill task - % 






















         
  AMI – episodic – 
childhood 
  5.0(0.5) - 23   4.7(2.0) - 24   5.5(2.1) - 21 
  AMI – episodic – 
young adulthood 
  4.9(0.4) - 23   5.1(2.1) - 24   5.0(2.1) - 21 
  AMI – episodic – 
recent events 




Figure 4.3. AMI over time. Changes over time in mean accuracy scores of 
autobiographical memory for childhood, adulthood and recent events for 20 















A repeated measures ANOVA with two within factors: AMI subtest (child, adult 
or recent) and time (initial assessment, 3-month follow-up or 9-month follow-up) 
was carried out. Maulchy’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated for the interaction term (χ2(2)=28.51, p=0.001), therefore degrees 
of freedom were corrected. Since ε<0.75, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity were used for this correction (ε =0.634). A main effect of AMI subtest 
(F(2,38)=5.998, p=0.005) showed that participants had recalled some AMI 
subtests significantly more accurately than others. No significant effect of time 
indicated that no significant changes had taken place over the 3 assessments 
on this measure (F(2,38)=1.112, p=0.339). No significant interaction was found 
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between AMI subtest and time (F(2.54,48.18)=1.568, p=0.214). Planned 
pairwise comparisons indicated that AMI accuracy for child events was 
significantly higher than for recent events (mean difference=1.267, p=0.015). No 
other significant differences were found between AMI subtests (mean 
difference=0.217, p>0.05; mean difference=1.050, p=0.099). 
 
In terms of memory for non-autobiographical material with high affective 
content, substantial differences had been found on the Cahill task between the 
experimental and control groups in a previous investigation (see chapter 3 in 
this thesis). Related to this, mean scores on table 4.5 show that at the last 
assessment, confabulating participants remembered approximately 50% more 
of the critical information on this task than they had recalled at the initial 
assessment.  
 
Table 4.5. Cahill Task over time. Mean proportion of information correctly 
remembered by 22 confabulating brain injured participants on the Cahill task for (a) the 
critical slide, (b) the rest of the slides, and (c) the difference between critical and non-
critical slides at initial assessment, 3-month, and 9-month follow-up. 
Cahill Task Initial assessment 3-month follow-up 9-month follow-up 
 Mean  SD N Mean  SD N Mean  SD N 
Critical slide 0.348 0.257 22 0.475 0.356 20 0.603 0.296 21 
Non-critical slides 0.345 0.146 22 0.360 0.147 20 0.399 0.159 21 
Difference score 0.004 0.184 22 0.115 0.262 20 0.204 0.197 21 
 
Changes over time in performance on this task were explored as follows. First, 
the mean proportion of information remembered from the non-critical slides (10 
slides in total) was calculated at 3 points in time: (i) initial assessment, (ii) 3-
month follow-up and at (iii) 9-month follow-up. Second, this mean was 
subtracted from the proportion of information remembered from the critical slide 
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at each assessment time. Third, a trend analysis was carried out with difference 
score as the dependent variable and time (initial, 3-month, and 9-month follow-
up) as the within subjects factor. Figure 4.4 shows mean proportion of 
information correctly remembered by the confabulating group for the critical 
slide and the rest of the slides at initial assessment, 3-month, and 9-month 
follow-up. 
 
Figure 4.4. Cahill task over time. Mean proportion of information correctly 
remembered by 22 confabulating brain injured participants for the Cahill task’s critical 




Parametric assumptions were met. Repeated measures ANOVA showed a 
main effect of time on difference scores failed to reach significance 
(F(2,32)=1.962, p=0.157; but note that SPSS would only include N=17 in this 
analysis). However, due to the relatively large mean differences mentioned 
above and following statistical advice, trends in this data were examined. A 
linear trend analysis was significant (F(1,16)= 5.224, p=0.036). This indicated 
that difference scores increased with time. In other words, the advantage in 
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terms of the proportion of information remembered from the critical (highly 
emotional) slide –compared with the rest of the slides – increased with time, as 
shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
4.3.3. Experimental measures 
 
Table 4.6. shows that between the first and the last assessment the mean TCC 
score fell from 0.486 (SD 0.444) to 0.169 (SD 0.768). Figure 4.2 shows changes 
in TCC scores over the 3 assessments. Maulchy’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(2)=12.89, p=0.002), therefore 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ε =0.686). Results of a repeated measures ANOVA showed no 
significant main effect of time on TCC (F(1.37,30.16)= 2.101, p=0.143). As 
before, trend analyses were considered. A linear trend analysis showed that 
although TCC decreased with time, this trend was not statistically significant in 
this sample (F(1,22)=3.368, p=0.080). 
 
Table 4.6. Experimental tasks over time. Means and standard deviations of 24 
confabulating brain injured participants on experimental measures 
 Initial assessment 3-month follow-up 9-month follow-up 





















Insight 8.261 3.441 23 5.826 3.762 23 5.125 3.518 24 
Elated mood 4.000 3.289 23 3.167 3.185 24 2.957 3.686 23 
Depressed mood 3.435 2.842 23 4.304 5.112 23 2.833 2.988 24 
          
 
Table 4.6 shows that mean self-reported insight scores improved from the initial 
assessment (x‾ =8.3; SD 3.4) to the last follow-up (x‾ =5.1; SD 3.5). The 
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sphericity assumption was met. Repeated measures ANOVA showed level of 
insight changed significantly over time (F(2,42)=11.093, p<0.001). A linear trend 
analysis was significant (F(1,21)=18.707, p<0.001). This indicated that insight 
scores decreased significantly over the follow-up period, as shown in Figure 
4.5, representing an improvement in insight. 
 
Figure 4.5. Experimental variables over time. Changes in self-reported insight, 
elated and depressed mood mean scores over 3 assessment times for 24 
confabulating brain injured individuals. Lower scores indicate less severe deficits in 




Fig 4.5 and table 4.6 also show that severity of self-reported levels of elated 
mood decreased over time from an initial mean score of x‾ =4.0(SD 3.3) to x‾ 
=3.0(SD 3.7) approximately 9 months later. Of note, these scores indicated that 
participants did not suffer clinically significant levels of elated mood, as they fell 
below the cut-off score (cut-off= 5). Distribution of initial scores was somewhat 
skewed. Therefore the Friedman test was carried out. Results showed that 
elated mood did not change significantly over time (χ2(2)= 2.696, p=0.263). 
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Figure 4.5 and table 4.6 show that self-reported levels of depressed mood also 
fell slightly between the first and the last assessment (x‾ =3.4(SD 2.8) to x‾ 
=2.8(SD 3.0) respectively). Of note, these scores indicated that participants did 
not suffer clinically significant levels of depressed mood, as they fell below the 
cut-off score (cut-off= 10). Distribution of initial scores was somewhat skewed. 
Therefore the Friedman test was carried out. Results showed that depressed 
mood did not change significantly over time (χ2(2)=0.338, p=0.860). 
 
4.3.4. Predictors of confabulation recovery 
 
The next analyses were used to investigate whether there were any predictors 
of recovery from confabulation among the experimental variables. Two 
measures of confabulation were used for this purpose: a) overall number of 
confabulations across all sections of the Dalla Barba Confabulation Interview 
(total confabulations), and b) number of confabulations reported in the episodic 
memory subscale of the same interview (episodic confabulations); the findings 
regarding each of these measures are reported in turn below. 
 
Predictors of change in overall number of confabulations 
 
As illustrated in the method section above, as a first step the slope of change in 
confabulation over the 3 assessments was calculated for each individual using 
linear regression. The slopes of change in confabulations for the 24 participants 
were recorded and saved as a separate variable, ready to be used in the next 
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step. The histogram of the resulting variable revealed a distribution consistent 
with a normal distribution of slopes in the population.  
 
Next a linear regression was carried out with the slopes of change over time in 
overall number of confabulations as the dependent variable and initial scores on 
insight, TCC, elated and depressed mood scores as the predicting variables.  
Backward stepwise selection was used to reduce the model to just those 
variables making an independent contribution to the prediction of confabulation. 
No significant results were found. Using this statistical procedure, elated mood 
was the last predictor to be dropped (p=0.143). There was a positive but non-
significant association between elated mood and change in overall number of 
confabulations in the current sample (rxy= 0.317, p= 0.070, 1-tailed).  
 
As the confabulating group was defined by exceeding a level of confabulation at 
baseline (as measured by the Dalla Barba confabulation interview score), 
regression to the mean on the independent factors was expected. This was 
accommodated by including the baseline measure (initial overall confabulation 
score) as an independent variable in the multivariable regression equation. In 
this way the effects of regression towards the mean could be separated from 
genuine effects due to the other independent factors (Bland and Altman, 1994). 
With this adjustment there was stronger evidence for an association between 
initial self-reported elated mood scores and gradient of change in overall 
number of confabulations (unstandardised coefficient B = 0.107; 95% 




Predictors of change in episodic confabulations 
 
As in the previous section, for each person the gradient of change in 
confabulations was calculated; except this time only answers to the ‘episodic’ 
section of the confabulation interview were used. These gradients were saved 
as a separate variable ready for the next step. Their distribution was consistent 
with a normal distribution of gradients in the population.  
 
Next a linear regression analysis was carried out with gradient of change in 
number of episodic confabulations as the dependent variable and initial scores 
on insight, TCC, elated and depressed mood scores as the potential predictors. 
No significant results were found. Similarly to the previous findings, there was a 
positive but non-significant association between elated mood and change in 
episodic confabulations (rxy= 0.317, p= 0.070, 1-tailed) and elated mood was 
the last predictor to be dropped (p=0.141).  
 
As in the previous section, the confabulating group was defined by exceeding a 
level of confabulation at baseline (as measured by the Dalla Barba 
confabulation interview), thus regression to the mean was expected. This was 
accommodated by including the baseline measure (initial episodic confabulation 
score) as an independent variable in the multivariable regression equation. In 
this way the effects of regression towards the mean could be separated from 
genuine effects due to the other independent factors (Bland and Altman, 1994). 
With this adjustment there was stronger evidence for a statistically significant 
association between elated mood scores and gradient of change in number of 
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episodic confabulations (unstandardised coefficient B = 0.033; 95% CI = 0.002 




What predicts recovery from confabulation has been relatively understudied and 
is poorly understood. In this study potential predictors of changes in 
confabulation were investigated over time. For this purpose, 24 confabulating 
participants were followed up. They were interviewed on 3 occasions over the 
course of 9 months using the Dalla Barba confabulation battery (Dalla Barba, 
1993a), the TCC task (Schnider et al., 2000a), and self-reported measures of 
insight into their difficulties and well-being, and of elated and depressed mood. 
In order to characterise the clinical course of confabulation, changes over time 
in TCC, insight and mood measures were explored. The relative value of initial 
scores on TCC, insight and mood measures in predicting changes observed on 
the confabulation interview was examined.  
 
Regarding the first aim of the current investigation, improvements on 
performance on the TCC task were noted over the follow up period. However, 
they failed to reach statistical significance.  
 
Regarding the second aim, results from this study showed that the proportion of 
confabulations reduced significantly and spontaneously over time in the present 
sample. At the same time participants’ level of insight into their difficulties 
improved significantly.  
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Regarding the third aim of this study, a reduction of elated mood was noted 
over time, as expected. However, these changes failed to reach statistical 
significance. Depressed mood scores did not show a definite pattern of change. 
This may indicate that the effects of depressed mood on confabulation are likely 
to be very subtle at best (Metcalf et al., 2010).  
 
Regarding the fourth aim, initial self-rated elated mood score was the best 
predictor of confabulation recovery. In particular, there was a significant 
association between elated mood scores and change in ‘episodic’ 
confabulations when regression to the mean was taken into account. 
 
In addition, a significant trend, indicating improvement, was also found in 
performance on the Cahill task over time. Improvements in recent 
autobiographical memory were also noted, although they failed to reach 
significance. These findings are consistent with results from the previous 
investigation (chapter 3 in this thesis), indicating these two measures may be 
more sensitive than other background measures to the presence and clinical 
course of confabulation. 
 
In summary the current investigations showed: (i) initial level of elated mood 
was the best predictor of changes in confabulation over time, and this 
association was stronger for episodic than for overall confabulations; (ii) self-
reported level of insight showed significant improvement over time in line with 
the clinical course of confabulations; and (iii) performance on the TCC task 




Very few longitudinal studies have examined the clinical course of 
confabulations. Virtually none has studied longitudinal changes within a large 
group of confabulators, nor have they taken mood and insight into account. In 
this study the relative value of TCC in predicting recovery from confabulation 
was investigated together with that of other potential predictors (insight, elated 
and depressed mood). 
 
Current results would be partially consistent with findings that indicate that 
elated mood modulates memory in psychiatric populations. In these studies, 
elated mood was linked to a liberal bias in patients’ responses to recognition 
memory tasks; this bias disappeared when patients recovered from the 
underlying mood disorder. Results from the previous investigation (see chapter 
3 in this thesis) indicated that elated mood was a concurrent associate of the 
presence of confabulation and that it discriminated between confabulating and 
non-confabulating amnesic participants. Results from the present investigation 
extended these findings and showed that initial levels of elated mood predicted 
the slope of confabulation recovery; in addition they showed that elated mood 
decreased over time in line with recovery from confabulation. Taken together 
these findings would support explanations that propose that mood and 
emotional mechanisms may modulate the appearance and clinical course of 
confabulations (Conway, 2005; Fotopoulou, 2010; Metcalf et al., 2010; Gilboa, 
2010). Whether mood affects the response bias of participants or whether it 
affects ‘core’ retrieval mechanisms, as has been suggested in the previous 




In addition, previous authors have seldom commented on recovery from 
confabulation (Schnider, 2008; Nahum et al., 2010). Schnider has found that 
dopamine antagonists sometimes reduce confabulation (Schnider, 2008). 
Corwin et al. found that beta-blockers reversed elated mood disorders and an 
associated excessive willingness to guess during memory recognition (Corwin 
et al., 1990). However, if the present findings were replicated, they may have 
clinical implications. For example it is possible that reducing initial levels of 
elated mood may accelerate the rate of recovery from confabulation. 
 
Other treatments that have successfully reduced confabulations have included 
awareness and self monitoring training, although authors failed to explain why 
they worked (DeLuca, 2009; Dayus and Van, 2000). In the current sample 
insight into difficulties improved significantly over the follow-up period in line 
with confabulation recovery. This result is consistent with clinical observations 
indicating that recovery from confabulation was accompanied by improved 
insight (Feinberg and Roane, 1997; Mercer et al., 1977). These authors have 
described confabulation as “an alteration in identity or in relatedness to the 
environment.” (Feinberg and Roane, 1997).  
 
Related to this, absence of enhanced retrieval for non-personal affective 
information (as measured by the Cahill task) has been attributed to lack of 
appropriate “experiencing” of emotion in external stimuli (Tranel et al., 2006; 
Adolphs et al., 1997). In a previous investigation it was found that this enhanced 
effect of affective material on memory was absent in the current group of 
confabulating participants, in contrast with non-confabulating amnesic 
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participants (see chapter 3 in this thesis). Current results indicated this effect 
returned over time in line with a reduction in confabulation.  
 
One possible explanation for these results would be that confabulation is 
accompanied by a disconnection from the external world, and as confabulation 
reduces, patients are better able to ‘relate’ to their environment (Feinberg and 
Roane, 1997). Another possible explanation for the present findings would be 
that confabulation is caused by deficits experiencing ongoing reality, and as 
these lift, patients recover from confabulation (Schnider, 2008; Dalla Barba and 
Boisse, 2010). A third explanation would be that awareness develops as the 
individual is better able to detect conflict between what are experienced as 
‘vivid’ memories against their implausibility (Johnson, 1991). A further 
explanation for these results would be that confabulation is accompanied by 
dysfunction in an attentional gateway (Burgess et al., 2007a). In the case of 
confabulators, this would result in disproportionate representation of internally 
generated thoughts without enough reference to external events. Once function 
in this attentional gateway is recovered, the individual would be able to switch 
attention between internally and externally generated information as required. 
This in turn would allow for appropriate verification of memories. In any case it 
is clear from the present findings that further study is required in order to 
determine the specific role that insight and mood play in the appearance and 
clinical course of confabulation.  
 
Finally, Schnider et al. have argued that TCC is a critical factor in the 
appearance of and recovery from spontaneous confabulation. Results from the 
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present study lend partial support to Schnider’s hypothesis. Improvements in 
TCC over time were indeed consistent with improvements in confabulation.  
 
However this trend just missed statistical significance in the present sample. 
Indeed, Schnider (2008, pg. 251) himself has described individual cases where 
TCC did not parallel confabulation recovery. Critics of Schnider’s hypotheses 
have proposed that TCC may be sensitive to confabulation, but it is not specific 
to this condition; for example TCC failed to discriminate between confabulating 
patients and non-confabulating patients who had suffered an anterior 
communicating artery aneurysm (Gilboa et al., 2006). Gilboa (2010) concluded 
that TCC may be necessary but it is not sufficient for the appearance of 
confabulation. Similarly the present results suggest that TCC may have played 
a part in the recovery from confabulation for some patients, but it was not critical 
for confabulation recovery in the present sample. 
 
In conclusion the present results indicated that elated mood at the onset was 
the best predictor of recovery from confabulation. This association was 
strongest for episodic confabulations. Significant improvements in levels of 
insight occurred in line with improvements in confabulatory behaviour. The 
present findings indicate mood and insight may play a role in the recovery of 









Previous investigations have indicated that insight and affect may play a role in 
the appearance and clinical course of confabulations. The present study aimed 
to explore affective biases in the content of confabulations themselves, 
compared with true memories. Several reviews of theoretical models of 
confabulation have recently been published (DeLuca, 2009; Fotopoulou, 2009; 
Kopelman, 2010; Schnider, 2008). Of particular relevance to the present 
investigation are explanations which place an emphasis on the contributions of 
personal identity and personal biases in the formation of confabulations. 
 
Although there is evidence linking confabulations to pathology in specific 
regions of the brain (namely, the ventro-medial and orbito-frontal cortex) and to 
particular memory and executive deficits (e.g. Gilboa et al., 2006; Schnider, 
2003; Toosy et al., 2008; Turner et al., 2008a), it remains unclear how the 
contents of confabulations are generated. Several authors have pointed to the 
role of self-identity and emotion in the formation of confabulations (Burgess and 
McNeil, 1999; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Johnson and Raye, 2000; 
Kopelman, 1999). Autobiographical memories have been described as a 
relatively faithful reconstruction of the past in the light of present goals and self-
images; memories are not generated in a vacuum (Conway and Pleydell-
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Pearce, 2000; Fotopoulou, 2008). The sense of personal identity relies on 
autobiographical memories, and these memories are constructed to reflect not 
only our past experiences, but also our notion of ‘self’ and any particular goals 
and emotions prevailing at the time of reconstruction (Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway and Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 2007a).  
 
One hypothesis is that confabulations arise as an exaggeration of the personal 
biases that affect healthy memory processes (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Fotopoulou et al., 2007a; Turnbull et al, 2004a). In the 
absence of specific retrieval cues, ‘generic representations’ consistent with 
personal wishes and goals are created (Burgess and McNeil, 1999; Metcalf et 
al., 2010). The concept of ‘self’ is one of the most salient and robust schema we 
hold; therefore, false autobiographical memories are likely to command an 
exaggerated sense of confidence in their veracity (Gilboa et al., 2006; compare 
Dalla Barba et al., 1997). Faulty monitoring mechanisms may lead to the 
confident acceptance of such biased memories as correct (Burgess and 
Shallice, 1996; Gilboa et al., 2006).  
 
Some authors have argued that personal biases in confabulation are not only 
self-referent but also self-serving (Fotopoulou et al., 2007b). Human beings 
have a natural tendency to present themselves in a pleasant light and, in the 
context of deficits in memory retrieval, motivational aspects play an increased 
role in determining memory recollection (Turnbull et al., 2004b; Walker et al., 
2003). The role of such motivational forces is two-fold: (i) they provide a sense 
of self-coherence (i.e.: consistency with the pre-injury self-image and reality); 
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and (ii) they facilitate a feeling of self-enhancement (i.e.: presenting oneself in a 
more pleasant light) (Fotopoulou, 2008, 2009).  
 
In a series of well-controlled experiments, Fotopoulou (2010) has found that 
independent raters consistently judged confabulations to be more pleasant than 
the ‘real’ facts the confabulations had replaced (see Fotopoulou, 2010,  for a 
review). Confabulating patients produced significantly more pleasant false 
memories than did healthy controls (Fotopoulou et al., 2004, 2008b); and the 
patients’ false memories were judged significantly more pleasant than were 
their true memories (Fotopoulou et al., 2007a , 2008b).  On the basis of such 
evidence, Turnbull et al. (2004a) and Fotopoulou et al. (2008b) have both 
argued that confabulations may provide a self-preserving function against a 
patient’s awareness of his/her adverse circumstances (Fotopoulou, 2008; 
Turnbull et al., 2004a). Consistent with this, some studies have found that 
(pleasant) confabulations are associated with low mood, a topic which requires 
further study (Fotopoulou, 2008); Fotopoulou et al., 2008b; Turnbull et al., 
2004a). 
 
More recently Metcalf et al. (2010) reported that this self-enhancing bias is not 
universal, because they found that it was present only in some confabulations; 
these were mainly confabulations relating to the most recent (postmorbid) time-
period, rather than earlier (premorbid) time-periods. Korsakoff himself had 
reported unpleasant confabulations, noting that funerals and deaths were 
common themes in his patients’ confabulations (cited in Schnider, 2008). 
Moreover, Metcalf et al. (2010) raised the possibility of a mood-congruent bias 
in the emotional content of confabulations; they found evidence of depression in 
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those patients with the least positive bias in their confabulations.  Several 
authors have found a high proportion of neutral (or ‘realistic’) confabulations in 
their patients (Dalla Barba and Boisse, 2010; Metcalf et al, 2010). Metcalf et al 
(2010) argued that the content of confabulations primarily reflects the tendency 
to retrieve generic memories when memory retrieval is faulty (compare Dalla 
Barba et al, 1997; Gilboa et al, 2006). However, Metcalf et al. (2010) also 
acknowledged that there can be a personal bias towards those memories 
(pleasant or unpleasant) which are consistent with the patient’s premorbid self-
image in an attempt to preserve a coherent self-identity in the face of changing 
reality. 
 
In summary, there is disagreement regarding the underlying basis of 
confabulation and, in particular, whether and to what extent emotional 
mechanisms determine the content of confabulations. However, many of the 
theoretical arguments have been postulated on the basis of well-controlled 
single case-studies or from small case-series, and there have been relatively 
few large group studies of confabulation to date (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a; 
Turner et al., 2008a). In the present investigation, a relatively large group of 
confabulating patients have been examined to look for affective bias in 
confabulations.  The aims of the present study were as follows:  
1. to investigate whether participants showed an enhanced proportion of 
pleasant content in their confabulations relative to the ‘real’ information 
they had replaced; 
2. to determine whether participants’ confabulations were rated as having 
higher levels of affective content, rather than neutral content, compared 
with their ‘true’ memories;  
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3. to investigate whether those confabulations containing affective 
content/material showed an enhanced proportion of pleasant content, as 
opposed to unpleasant content, compared with their true memories; 
4. to examine whether there was a correlation between each participant’s 
current mood state and the mean valence score of his/her confabulations 
and/or true memories; and 
5. to investigate whether there was any difference in the pattern of 
performance between those patients who had focal pathology in the 






24 patients were included in this investigation: all 24 manifested confabulation 
according to their medical records, at an initial assessment interview with A.B., 
and on Dalla Barba’s (1993a) Confabulation Battery.  
 
As described before, the cases were recruited because of the presence of 
‘spontaneous’ confabulation, rather than on the basis of a particular underlying 
aetiology (compare Dalla Barba & Boissé, 2010; Metcalf et al., 2010). Of the 24 
patients, 20 (83.3%) had been recorded as having acted upon their 
confabulations. For example, one patient (a school teacher) patrolled the 
corridors of the hospital at night believing he was inspecting the dormitories at a 
boarding school. Another patient, believing that he was still living at home rather 
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than in hospital, travelled 30 miles to his home on public transport (hitching a 
lift, and then taking two trains) despite not having any money.  
 
Clinical MRI or CT scans were obtained for 21 of our 24 participants. The scans 
showed that 10 participants had sustained focal lesions that involved the orbito-
frontal and/or ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMFC); 3 had focal pathology 
that did not involve the VMFC; and 8 had suffered some degree of generalised 
atrophy. 
 
5.2.2. Background assessments 
 
All the participants underwent background neuropsychological assessment as 
described in previous investigations (for details please see chapters 2-4 in this 
thesis). 
 
5.2.3. Experimental Procedures 
 
Patients were administered the personal semantic and the episodic memory 
sections of the Dalla Barba (1993a) confabulation interview, modified for use in 
the UK (Kopelman et al., 1997). They were also administered the childhood, 
young adult, and recent items from the autobiographical incidents (‘episodic’) 
schedule of the Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman et al., 1990).  
 
Patients’ responses on both these interviews were transcribed verbatim. Their 
relatives (usually the wife, husband, or partner) were then interviewed, and their 
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medical records were examined in order to determine the accuracy of their 
responses, and to identify which responses had been confabulated. 
 
Two methods have been employed to judge emotional valence of memories: 
the ‘comparison’ method and the ‘face value’ method. In the ‘comparison’ 
method, pleasantness/unpleasantness ratings are made relative to the ‘reality’ 
of an event, where a memory has been confabulated (Fotopoulou et al., 2004, 
2008b). The ‘comparison’ method was employed to investigate whether the 
confabulations obtained represented a specific improvement on the patient’s 
current or ‘real’ situation (Fotopoulou et al., 2004, 2008b). An advantage of this 
method is in evaluating the affective load of memories against their actual 
reality. A putative drawback of this method is that this ‘comparison’ evaluation 
can be applied only to confabulations. Consequently, in the current study, the 
‘face value’ method was also used; this allowed for direct comparisons between 
confabulations and ‘true memories’. In this method, raters are asked to evaluate 
memories on a 1 to 7 point scale for their (face value) 
pleasantness/unpleasantness (Metcalf, 2006). 
 
‘Comparison’ method  
 
For this analysis within the patients’ transcriptions the confabulated responses 
were indicated in boldface; the confabulated utterances were accompanied by a 
parenthesised statement in italics indicating the ‘real’ facts which the 
confabulations had replaced. Two raters (judges, 1 male, 1 female) were asked 
to evaluate these transcripts for pleasantness/unpleasantness.  
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The judges were told that the patients had recently suffered a severe brain 
disease or injury, and that the interviews had been carried out while they were 
in hospital. The raters were asked to score each ‘memory’ or statement in terms 
of its pleasantness on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 7 represented the most pleasant, 
4 neutral/could not decide, and 1 the most unpleasant memories). Only ratings 
made for the confabulated ‘memories’ were included in this first analysis. Where 
a memory was indicated by boldface to be a confabulation, the judges/raters 
were asked to give their pleasantness/unpleasantness judgement relative to the 
‘real’ information they had replaced, indicated on the transcript in parenthesised 
italics (compare Fotopoulou et al., 2004). The confabulated segments typically 
consisted of 1 to 3 brief sentences, and the parenthesised italics (the ‘true’ 
information) were of similar length.  
 
The mean of the two ratings was calculated for each item, and the resulting 
scores were coded. For this purpose, ratings above 4 were categorised as 
‘pleasant’; ratings of 4 were considered neutral; and ratings below 4 were 
classified as ‘unpleasant’.  
 
For example the following statement received a mean rating of 6.5 (i.e. 
pleasant): asked what he did for his birthday, one of the participants replied: “I 
went out to dinner with my wife.” (In reality he spent the day in hospital). The 
following statement received a mean rating of 2.5 (i.e. unpleasant): asked if he 
remembered the day he was admitted to hospital, a participant replied: 
“Everything was in chaos because a patient had ‘A.W.O.L.’, and most things 
weren’t working” (In reality this was an ordinary quiet day on the ward). 
 
 156
The current study’s first aim was to investigate whether patients showed an 
enhanced proportion of pleasant content within their confabulations when these 
were rated relative to the ‘real’ information they had replaced (‘comparison’ 
ratings). For this first the following calculations were carried out: a) the 
percentage of confabulations with pleasant content was calculated using the 
formula: [100*(pleasant confabulations)/number of confabulations]; b) the 
percentage of confabulations with neutral content was calculated with the 
formula: [100*(neutral confabulations)/number of confabulations]; and c) the 
percentage of confabulations with unpleasant content was calculated using the 
formula: [100*(unpleasant confabulations)/number of confabulations]. Second, 
in order to test the significance of differences between these proportions a 
repeated measures one-way ANOVA was carried out, with emotional valence 
(positive, neutral or negative) as the independent factor and proportion of 
confabulations as the dependent variable; this was followed by associated post-
hoc tests for multiple comparisons. 
 
The ‘face value’ method 
 
Two naive raters (2 female psychology undergraduates) were presented with 
the same transcripts of participants’ responses to the Dalla Barba and AMI 
interviews, containing a) items to which the participant had responded with a 
true memory and b) confabulated responses (according to the interview with the 
wife, husband or partner) as in the ‘comparison’ method, except that this time 
the transcripts did not contain the ‘real’ information which the confabulations 
had replaced. The raters were not told whether a response was true or false; 
they were given the following instructions: “Please rate the response to each of 
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the enclosed interview questions according to how pleasant or unpleasant you 
think the answer is. Please use the scale 1 -7, where 1 is very unpleasant (or 
negative) and 7 is very pleasant (or positive).” (Metcalf, 2006). 
 
The raters were given example ratings, taken from Metcalf (2006): 
i) “very pleasant (i.e. rating 7) “The day my daughter was born was the 
happiest day of my life. Just looking at her face for the first time 
brought tears of happiness to my eyes”;  
ii) neutral (i.e. rating 4) “My daughter is 6 years old”;  
iii) very unpleasant (i.e. rating 1) “I backed out of my driveway and I ran 
over my cat in front of my wife. We were both very upset and I was so 
angry at myself for not looking where I was going”.  
 
As before, the mean of the two judges’ ratings was calculated for each item, 
and the scores were coded. For this purpose, ratings above 4 were categorised 
as ‘pleasant’; ratings of 4 were considered neutral; and ratings below 4 were 
classified as ‘unpleasant’.  
 
The second aim of this study was to examine whether patients showed a bias to 
report confabulations with affective (rather than neutral) content, compared with 
their true memories. For this first the percentage of confabulations with affective 
content was calculated using the formula: [100*(pleasant + unpleasant 
confabulations)/(pleasant + unpleasant + neutral confabulations)], and for true 
memories the formula used was: [100*(pleasant + unpleasant true 
memories)/(pleasant + unpleasant + neutral true memories)]. In order to test the 
significance of differences between these proportions, a paired t-test was used.  
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The third aim was to investigate whether patients showed an enhanced 
proportion of pleasant content within their ‘affective’ confabulations (i.e. 
confabulations with a score > or < than 4), compared with the proportion of 
pleasant memories among their ‘affective’ true memories. For this analysis only 
memories that had an emotional load - either pleasant or unpleasant - were 
included. The percentage of confabulations with pleasant content was 
calculated using the formula: [100*pleasant confabulations/pleasant + 
unpleasant confabulations], and for true memories the following formula was 
used: [100*pleasant true memories/pleasant + unpleasant true memories]. 
These proportions were then compared using a paired t-test. 
 
The fourth aim of this investigation was to examine whether there was a 
correlation between each participant’s current mood state and the mean 
valence score of his/her confabulations and/or true memories. In order to 
investigate this, correlations between the mean pleasantness ratings and self-
ratings on a mood (depression) scale were examined (Zigmond and Snaith, 
1983). 
 
Finally the issue of whether patients with pathology involving the ventro-medial 
or orbito-frontal cortex (collectively labelled VMFC) differed from patients 
without obvious VMFC pathology in terms of affective content in confabulations 
was investigated. MRI or CT scan films and reports were available for 21 
patients; these were examined and classified in terms of: (i) focal damage 
affecting the VMFC (10 patients); (ii) focal damage not extending to the VMFC 
(3); or (iii) some degree of generalised atrophy only (8). Because the second 
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group consisted of only 3 patients, and the study focused on the effects of the 
VMFC on affective ratings, the last two groups were merged into one.  The 
following two groups were then compared: those with focal VMFC (N=10) and 
those without focal VMFC pathology (N=11), looking at the percentage of 
affective memories among the confabulations and true memories in each lesion 
group. For this analysis each participant’s percentage of affective memories 
among his/her confabulations and true memories was calculated using the 
same formulae as in the second analysis (i.e. the percentage of affective 
memories in each patient’s confabulations, and the percentage of affective 
memories among each person’s true memories). A repeated measures ANOVA 
was then carried out with lesion site (focal VMFC, other pathology) as the 
independent (between) factor, memory type (confabulation or true memory) as 





5.3.1. Background cognitive testing 
 
Table 3.1 (in chapter 3 in this thesis) shows background neuropsychological 
test scores.   
 
Table 5.1 shows the mean percentage of items to which participants gave 
confabulatory responses on the episodic and personal semantic sections of the 
Dalla Barba confabulation battery used in this investigation. On this scale, the 
patients gave confabulatory answers to a mean of 57% (SD 15) of items from 
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the episodic section and 36% (SD 13) from the personal semantic section. On 
the AMI, the patients gave confabulations to between 36% and 64% of the 
items across the different time-periods (overall mean 52.7%) with more 
confabulations on the ‘recent’ than the ‘childhood’ items. Table 3.1 in chapter 3 
of this thesis shows the accuracy and quality of the memories produced on the 
AMI, scored as in the original Manual (Kopelman et al., 1990). The patients’ 
mean scores on the ‘childhood’ and on the ‘young adulthood’ items from the 
AMI fell within the ‘borderline abnormal’ level of recall. The patients’ mean 
scores on the ‘recent’ items fell within the ‘definitely abnormal’ range. As 
mentioned before, this pattern is consistent with a temporal (or Ribot) gradient 
(Kopelman et al., 1990). 
 
 
Table 5.1. Confabulations.  Dalla Barba1 and AMI2 mean percentage of 
confabulations, as verified from informants and the medical records 
 
Test N Mean SD 
 















    
 
























1(Dalla Barba, 1993a) adapted for UK (Kopelman et al., 1997) 








Across the Dalla Barba battery and the AMI, 24 participants gave a total of 1056 
responses. Of these, 481 were ‘true’ memories, 83 were ‘don’t know’ or ‘can’t 
remember’ responses, and 492 were confabulations. The ‘don’t know’ and ‘can’t 
remember’ responses were eliminated from any further analysis. This left 973 
‘memories’ for analysis. 
 
5.3.3. Inter-rater reliability 
 
‘Comparison’ ratings for confabulations 
The inter-rater reliability between the two judges’ ‘comparison’ ratings for 
pleasant/neutral/unpleasant content across the 492 confabulations was kappa = 
0.499 (p< 0.001). This is classified as ‘moderate’ according to Landis & Koch 
(1977).  
 
‘Face value’ ratings for confabulated and ‘true’ memories 
The inter-rater reliability between the two judges’ ‘face value’ ratings for 
pleasant/neutral/unpleasant content across the 973 ‘memories’ was kappa = 






5.3.4. Emotional content of confabulations rated using the ‘comparison’ 
method 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the mean percent of confabulations evaluated as ‘pleasant’ 
(>4), ‘neutral’ (=4) or ‘unpleasant’ (<4) using the ‘comparison’ method (Metcalf 
et al., 2010). Figure 5.1 shows that overall the majority of participants’ 
confabulations attracted a neutral rating (i.e.: neither more pleasant nor more 
unpleasant than the ‘real’ facts they replaced), followed by pleasant and lastly 
unpleasant ratings. 
 
Figure. 5.1. ‘Comparison’ ratings. Mean percent of confabulations rated using the 
‘comparison’ method as ‘unpleasant’, ‘pleasant’, or ‘neutral’ by two judges on data from 




The first aim of this study was to examine whether patients showed a bias to 
report pleasant content in their confabulations relative to the ‘real’ information 
the false memories have replaced. Parametric assumptions were met. One-way 
ANOVA repeated measures with emotional valence (pleasant, neutral or 
 163
unpleasant) as the independent factor and percentage of confabulations as the 
dependent variable showed there was a significant difference between valence 
ratings given to confabulations using the comparison method (F(2,46)=16.850, 
p<0.001). Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons showed a significant 
minority of confabulations were evaluated as unpleasant, compared with those 
given either neutral or positive ratings (x‾ difference= 29.7, p<0.001; and x‾ 
difference= 17.5, p=0.007 respectively. No significant differences were found 
between proportions of pleasant and neutral ratings (x‾ difference= 12.1, 
p=0.158). In other words, the majority of confabulations examined in the current 
study were rated as being either neutral or pleasant when using the 
‘comparison’ method. 
 
5.3.5. Affective content of confabulations versus true memories 
 
‘Face value ratings’ were used for all remaining analyses in order to compare 
confabulated and ‘true’ memories. Figure 5.2 shows the mean percent of 
memories evaluated as ‘pleasant’ (>4), ‘neutral’ (=4) or ‘unpleasant’ (<4) 
separately for the ‘true’ memories and the confabulations. Figure 5.2 shows that 
overall the majority of participants’ memories attracted a neutral rating, followed 
by pleasant and lastly unpleasant ratings, irrespective of whether the memories 






Figure. 5.2. ‘Face value’ ratings. Mean percent of memories rated at ‘face value’ as 
‘unpleasant’, ‘pleasant’, or ‘neutral’ among the ‘true’ and confabulated memories by two 
judges on data from 24 confabulating brain injured memory-disordered patients. 
 
 
The second aim of this study was to investigate whether patients showed a bias 
to report affective (rather than neutral) content in confabulations, but not in true 
memories. For this analysis the percentage of affective confabulations (pleasant 
or unpleasant) was compared with that of true memories. All memories were 
included in this analysis (percentages of affective memories were calculated in 
relation to the number of neutral memories, as indicated by the formula shown 
in page 158 of this thesis). The mean percent of confabulations with affective 
content was 46.6 (SD 14.8) and the mean percent of true memories with 
affective content was 28.2 (SD 13.4). The variables were normally distributed. A 
paired t-test analysis indicated confabulations contained a significantly higher 
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percentage of statements with affective content than true memories (t(23)= 
5.195, p<0.001, 2-tailed). 
 
The third aim was to investigate whether patients showed an enhanced 
proportion of pleasant content in their confabulations, compared with their true 
memories. For this analysis only confabulations with affective content were 
selected, and the percentage of these which had pleasant content (x‾ = 54.1; SD 
22.5) was calculated; this procedure was repeated for true memories (x‾ = 47.7; 
SD 26.9). The variables were normally distributed. A paired t-test indicated 
there was no significant difference between the percentage of pleasant content 
among the ‘affective’ confabulations compared with the percentage of pleasant 
content among the ‘affective’ true memories (t(23)= 0.890, p= 0.383, 2-tailed). 
 
5.3.6. Correlations between affective valence of memories and 
participants’ mood-state  
 
The fourth aim of this study was to see whether there was a correlation between 
each participant’s current mood state (as self-reported on the HADS scale for 
depression) and the mean valence score of his/her confabulations. For this 
analysis, the mean valence of confabulations and the mean valence of true 
memories were calculated, respectively, for each patient. These were then 
correlated with each patient’s HADS-depression score. As the variables were 
not normally distributed, non-parametric correlations were calculated using 
Kendall’s tau. There was a weak negative correlation between the valences of 
both types of memories and depressed mood scores (Kendall= -0.277, p= 
0.074, and Kendall= -0.270, p= 0.083, 2-tailed respectively) i.e.: unpleasant 
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content was weakly associated with depressed mood in both confabulated and 
true memories.  
 
5.3.7. Comparison between lesion groups 
 
Figure 5.3a&b shows the percent of confabulations and ‘true’ memories 
evaluated as ‘pleasant’ (>4), ‘neutral’ (=4) or ‘unpleasant’ (<4) for patients with 
focal VMFC involvement (Fig. 5.3a) and for patients with either generalized 
atrophy or focal lesions not involving the VMFC (Fig. 5.3b). Figure 5.3a&b 
would suggest that participants with focal VMFC pathology reported 
comparatively more pleasant confabulations than those without focal VMFC 
involvement. A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with, lesion site as 
the independent (between) factor (VMF, other pathology), one within factor, 
which was memory type (confabulations or true memories), and the percentage 
of affective memories as the dependent variable. Parametric assumptions were 
met. The effect of lesion was not statistically significant (F(1,19)= 2.533, 
p=0.128), and, more particularly, there was no significant interaction between 
lesion site and memory type (F(1,19)= 0.450, p=0.510). In brief, there was no 
evidence of lesion type affecting the percentage of emotionally charged 
memories between confabulations and true memories. 
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Figure 5.3a&b. ‘face value’ ratings according to pathology. Mean percent of 
memories rated at ‘face value’ as ‘unpleasant’, ‘pleasant’, or ‘neutral’ among the ‘true’ 
and confabulated memories by two judges on data from 21 confabulating memory-
disordered patients: (a) those whose focal pathology involved the VMFC (N= 10); and 
(b) those with different pathologies: either generalized atrophy or focal lesions not 
involving the VMFC (N= 11). 
 





Figure 5.3b. Non-VMFC 
 
 
5.4. DISCUSSION  
 
The nature of confabulation remains a matter of much debate.  In particular, the 
question of whether there is a motivational bias in confabulation, such that 
confabulations tend to be pleasant and self-enhancing (relative to ‘real’ or ‘true’ 
memories), remains controversial.  In this investigation, 24 patients who had 
been spontaneously confabulating, 20 of whom had acted upon their 
confabulations, were studied.  Their responses to the ‘episodic’ and personal 
semantic sections of the Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery, and to the 
incidents/episodic schedule of the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI) 
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were examined. Two methods were used to evaluate the affective content of 
memories. The ‘comparison’ method was used to investigate affective biases of 
confabulations compared with the ‘real’ facts they had replaced. The ‘face 
value’ method was used to evaluate the affective content of confabulations 
compared with ‘true’ memories. 
 
Regarding the first aim of this study, participants showed an enhanced 
proportion of pleasant content in their confabulations when the ‘comparison’ 
method was used to rate them. 
 
Regarding the second aim, an enhanced proportion of affective content 
(irrespective of whether it was pleasant or unpleasant) was found in 
confabulations, but not in ‘true’ memories when the ‘face value’ method was 
used. 
 
Regarding the third aim, among the memories with affective content, similar 
proportions of pleasant and unpleasant content were found in both confabulated 
and ‘true’ memories. 
 
Regarding the fourth aim, unpleasant content in all memories (true and false) 
was weakly correlated with depressed mood scores. 
 
Regarding the fifth aim, the above affective memory biases were found on 
patients, irrespective of whether they had sustained focal damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMFC) or not. 
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Thus, overall, when type of memory was taken into account, an enhanced 
frequency of ‘memories’ with affective content among confabulations was found 
in participants, relative to their ‘true’ memories (Fig 5.2). This was the case 
whether the patients’ underlying pathology included focal involvement of the 
VMFC or not (Fig 5.3a&b).  Within memories with an affective load, the majority 
of confabulations were rated as more pleasant when the judges were allowed to 
contrast the content of these confabulations with the ‘real’ information they had 
replaced (Fig 5.1) (compare Fotopoulou, 2010; Fotopoulou et al, 2004, 2008b). 
When rated at ‘face value’, confabulations and genuinely remembered 
memories contained similar proportions of pleasant ratings. In other words, 
irrespective of method used, some confabulations were evaluated as 
‘unpleasant’ (compare Schnider, 2008; Metcalf et al, 2010), and a high 
proportion of confabulations were of ‘neutral’ valence.  
 
In summary present findings indicated: (i) an affective (but not necessarily 
positive) bias, which was significantly more pronounced among the 
confabulations; (ii) the same affective bias on memories irrespective of whether 
or not the participants’ MRI or CT brain scans revealed focal pathology involving 
the VMFC; and (iii) a high proportion of neutral or ‘generic’ memories. 
 
It has been suggested that confabulations preserve a positive self-image in the 
context of the patients’ unpleasant reality, which may include a depressed 
mood-state (Fotopoulou et al., 2008b; Turnbull et al., 2004a). The current 
study’s participants reported a significantly higher proportion of affective 
confabulations, relative to true memories but these affective confabulations 
were not necessarily pleasant. Similarly, Metcalf et al (2010) have recently 
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reported that the personal biases in confabulation are not universally pleasant. 
Instead they suggested these biases were specific to the individual and served 
the function of preserving adherence with past and present perceptions of self-
identity in the context of change (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Fotopoulou 
et al., 2008a; Metcalf et al., 2010).   Moreover, whereas Fotopoulou et al. 
(2008b) found a significant correlation between the pleasantness of the content 
of confabulations and the severity of depressed mood, in the present study a 
weak correlation in the opposite direction was obtained both for confabulated 
and true memories. If this finding were to be replicated, it would suggest that the 
presence of unpleasant content in confabulations tends to be associated with 
more severe depressed mood, consistent with the possibility that memories 
may be mood-congruent.  However, the present findings suggest that the 
contribution of depressed mood to the content of confabulation is likely to be 
only subtle and not necessarily specific to confabulations (compare Metcalf et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, previous findings have indicated a significant 
association between elated mood and both the appearance and the clinical 
course of confabulation (see chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis), and a significantly 
higher proportion of affective confabulations relative to true memories were 
reported by the present sample. Therefore, taken together these findings would 
indicate that affective state (perhaps irrespective of direction) may be an 
important factor in confabulation formation. 
 
Turner et al. (Turner et al., 2008b) have acknowledged that the precise 
relationship between dysfunction in the VMFC and confabulation remains 
unclear, but they suggested a couple of possibilities. One was that the VMFC is 
responsible for integrating cognitive processes with emotional markers that bias 
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decision-making at a pre-conscious level, and in particular the ‘feeling of 
rightness’ (Gilboa et al., 2006). The other was that this region is involved in 
matching events to internal predictions (Turner et al., 2008b). Similarly Schnider 
hypothesised that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) may function as a “generic 
outcome monitoring system” in the production of memories (Schnider, 2008). In 
the present investigation, patients showed spontaneous confabulations, and 
83.3% of the sample had acted upon their confabulations. However, of those 
with MRI or CT scans available, only 47.6% showed focal pathology within the 
VMFC, suggesting that this may not be necessary for the appearance of 
spontaneous confabulation. Moreover, there was no significant difference 
between the VMFC and non-VMFC subgroups in terms of the affective bias 
among the confabulations. 
 
Consistent with other studies, a high proportion of neutral confabulations was 
found in the current study (Dalla Barba & Boissé, 2010; Metcalf et al, 2010). 
Burgess and McNeil (1999) and Metcalf et al (2010) argued that faulty memory 
specification mechanisms result in ‘generic’ confabulations being produced. 
These represent the most salient elements from the person’s past experiences, 
emotions and goals. Dalla Barba & Boissé (2010; Dalla Barba et al., 1997) have 
argued confabulators draw on the most stable elements of their memories, 
which refer primarily to general habits or patterns of behaviour, rather than the 
less stable memories of specific events (Dalla Barba, 2009; Kopelman, 2010). 
Gilboa et al (2006) also proposed that schema about the self (or self-identity) 
are the most stable elements of autobiographical memory. Memories consistent 
with these are likely to be accepted as true with excessive confidence, and 
these generic memories can be nuanced by personal biases. Findings from the 
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present investigation are consistent with an interpretation of confabulations as 
preserving adherence with past and present perceptions of self-identity in the 
context of change (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Fotopoulou et al., 2008a; 
Metcalf et al., 2010).   
 
In conclusion, current results showed an enhanced proportion of ‘memories’ 
with affective content amongst confabulations, relative to ‘true’ memories. This 
affective bias occurred in patients irrespective of whether there was focal 
pathology within the VMFC. An enhanced effect of pleasant confabulations was 
found when they were contrasted with the ‘real’ information they had replaced; 
however it was not present when confabulations were rated at ‘face value’ and 
compared with genuinely remembered memories. Many confabulations had 
either neutral or unpleasant content and, in this respect, it was interesting that 
there was some evidence of mood congruency within the confabulations. Whilst 
there may be a fundamental deficit in trace specification or verification 
(Kopelman, 1999, 2010) which underlies confabulation, the present results 
indicate an affective influence on the content of confabulation, possibly nuanced 
by the person’s concept of self and his/her mood state at the time of the 








The present programme of studies sought to investigate mood, insight and the 
cognitive correlates of the presence and clinical course of confabulation. 
Related to this, affective biases in the content of confabulated and true 
memories were also examined. 
 
As part of the present programme of studies 24 confabulating brain injured 
amnesic patients, 11 non-confabulating brain injured amnesic controls and 6 
healthy participants were assessed in terms of confabulation, temporal context 
confusion (TCC), insight, mood and background cognitive measures. First, 
differences between the 3 groups of participants on measures of confabulation, 
TCC and mood were explored. Second, differences between the two brain 
injured groups on insight and background cognitive measures were 
investigated. Thirdly, concurrent associates of the presence of confabulation 
were examined. 
 
Confabulating participants were followed up over 9 months. They were re-
assessed 3 months after the initial assessment and also 6 months later. In the 
first instance, changes in participants’ performance on confabulation, TCC, 
insight, mood and cognitive measures over time were examined. Secondly, the 
relative value of TCC, mood and insight as predictors of the clinical course of 
confabulation was investigated. 
 
 175
In addition, the affective content of confabulating participants’ false and true 
memories was examined. Two independent judges rated participants’ 
responses to the Dalla Barba interview and the Autobiographical Memory 
Interview (AMI) – episodic schedule for pleasantness. First the proportion of 
answers with affective content (pleasant or unpleasant) among the confabulated 
and the true memories was examined. Second, the proportion of confabulations 
with pleasant content was examined in relation to: a) the ‘real’ facts they had 
replaced and b) ‘true’ memories correctly remembered. Third, the association 
between participants’ mood scores and the affective load of memories 
(confabulated and true) was investigated. Fourth, the effects of focal 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex pathology (VMFC) on confabulated and true 
memories’ affective biases were examined. 
 
6.1. Summary of results 
 
Participants were selected on the basis of presence or absence of spontaneous 
confabulation, and therefore their diagnoses were varied. Most patients had 
suffered either hypoxic or traumatic brain damage. Other diagnoses included: 
subarachnoid haemorrhage, Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome, cerebral infection 
and tumour. 10 confabulating participants had sustained focal ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex pathology (VMFC), and 11 sustained either generalised 
atrophy or focal pathology that did not involve the VMFC. Of the confabulating 
group, 20 out of 24 had been observed to act on their false memories. Non-
confabulating brain injured controls were matched to the experimental group in 
terms of memory function, severity of neurological deficits, age and time 
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elapsed since diagnosis. Healthy controls were matched to the experimental 
group on age and level of education.  
 
Background cognitive tests 
 
Both groups of brain injured participants performed within similar ranges of 
function on background cognitive tests; and for the confabulating group 
cognitive functioning remained relatively stable over the 9 months follow-up. At 
the point of inclusion to the study both groups had suffered a decline from a 
premorbid average to a borderline level of cognitive functioning. At the last 
follow-up confabulating patients’ general reasoning had improved, although it 
still fell within the low average range. Speed of processing also improved mildly 
between assessments, from an initial 5th to the 10th percentile at the last follow-
up. On the other hand, a range of executive functions remained below the 10th 
percentile over the 3 assessments. 
 
In terms of memory, anterograde memory function fell below the 5th percentile in 
both groups, and for the confabulating group it remained at that level over the 3 
assessments. Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI) scores showed that 
both groups recalled recent personal events significantly less accurately than 
either childhood or young adulthood events. However, these scores also 
showed a significant difference between the two groups, indicating that the 
confabulating group recalled autobiographical events with less accuracy than 
the non-confabulating group. Confabulating participants’ recall for recent and 
childhood memories on this test improved over time (albeit not significantly). 
These findings are consistent with accounts that propose confabulators draw on 
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the most stable elements of their memories, that refer to well established 
patterns of behaviour, rather than on the less stable memories of specific 
events (Dalla Barba et al., 1997; Dalla Barba, 2009; Dalla Barba and Boisse, 
2010; Kopelman, 2010). 
 
Only one other background measure showed significant differences between 
the two groups: the Cahill measure of memory for emotional non-personal 
material. Scores on this task indicated that confabulating participants recalled 
significantly less emotional non-autobiographical material than non-
confabulating participants. Both groups were equally able to quantify the 
affective content of the stimuli; therefore confabulators’ pattern of performance 
on this test could not be due to generalised emotional dysregulation (compare 
Metcalf et al., 2010). The pattern of performance shown by confabulating 
patients on this task is relatively rare, given that a robust enhanced effect of 
emotional material on memory has been found in patients diagnosed with 
amnesia, brain injury and even Alzheimer dementia (Adolphs et al., 1997; 
Hamann et al., 1997; Kazui et al., 2000). This enhanced effect of memory for 
emotional material has previously been found to be absent only in patients with 
bilateral amygdala damage. This has been interpreted as lack of appropriate 
“experiencing” of emotion in external stimuli (Adolphs et al., 1997). No previous 
longitudinal data exist on this task. However, the present confabulating group 
showed significant improvements over time, indicating that the enhanced effect 
of emotional material on memory was recovered over time in line with 






Regarding the rate of confabulations, the current results showed that the Dalla 
Barba confabulation interview confirmed the clinical classification of participants 
in the experimental group, who reported a significantly greater proportion of 
confabulations than both control groups. This was true both for episodic and 
personal semantic confabulations. It was also found that confabulations 
reported by the experimental group decreased significantly over time. This was 
true for proportion of confabulations overall, and for episodic confabulations in 
particular.  
 
Regarding the content of confabulations, most of the confabulations examined 
were judged to have an affective load (either pleasant or unpleasant), whereas 
this enhanced affective bias was absent in ‘true’ memories. This pattern of 
affective bias was present irrespective of whether participants had sustained 
focal VMFC pathology or not. Furthermore, among confabulations with an 
affective load, there was an enhanced frequency of pleasant content specifically 
when confabulations were contrasted with the ‘real’ facts they had replaced. 
However, when confabulations were rated at ‘face value’ and compared with 
‘true’ memories, similar proportions of pleasant content were found among the 




In terms of Temporal Context Confusion (TCC), most confabulating patients 
(but not all) performed considerably worse than healthy participants on TCC, 
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thereby partially replicating Schnider et al.’s (1996) results. However, in contrast 
with these authors’ findings, performance on TCC showed poor discrimination 
between confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured amnesic patients. 
Similarly in partial replication of the work by Schnider et al. (Schnider et al., 
2000a), the present longitudinal results showed that confabulating participants’ 
performance on this task did indeed improve in line with improvements on 
confabulatory behaviour (albeit not significantly in the current sample). 
 
The present confabulating group was also found to have significantly less 
insight into their condition and their general well-being than the non-
confabulating brain injured group. However, after correction for multiple 
comparisons this difference merely approximated significance. More 
importantly, level of insight was found to be one of the two concurrent 
associates that predicted the presence of confabulation with high sensitivity and 
specificity. Present results indicated that with a cut of achieving specificity of 
82%, sensitivity of the proposed model of predictors (i.e.: level of awareness 
and elated mood) would be 78%. In addition, self-reported levels of insight 
improved significantly over time in line with improvements on confabulation 
scores. 
 
Self-reported mood scores indicated that participants did not experience 
clinically significant levels of elated or depressed mood. Nevertheless, 
confabulating participants reported near-significant levels of elated mood 
relative to non-confabulating brain injured amnesic controls. More importantly, 
the level of self-reported elated mood was found to be one of the two concurrent 
associates (alongside awareness of difficulties) that predicted the presence of 
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confabulation with high sensitivity and specificity. Initial levels of elated mood 
predicted the clinical course of confabulation, and the predictive value of elated 
mood was strongest for the slope of change on episodic confabulation scores. 
The level of elated mood experienced by the confabulating group decreased 
over time (albeit not significantly).  
 
Self-reported depressed mood scores did not show significant differences 
between the 3 groups of participants; neither did they change significantly over 
time. A weak correlation between depressed mood scores and affective content 
of confabulated and true memories was found. If replicated, this finding would 
suggest that both types of memory tended to be mood congruent. 
 
In summary results from the current programme of studies showed (i) partial 
replication of Schnider’s findings regarding the role of TCC in the appearance 
and clinical course of confabulation; (ii) a previously unreported role of insight in 
the appearance and clinical course of confabulation; (iii) a previously unreported 
role of elated mood in the prediction of the presence and clinical course of 
confabulation; and (iv) that affect may be a contributory factor in confabulation 
formation. 
 
6.2. The role of TCC in the appearance and clinical course of 
confabulation 
 
Schnider and colleagues had claimed that TCC was the only correlate of both 
the presence and clinical course of confabulation (Schnider et al., 2000a). 
Temporal Context Confusion (TCC) is described as an inability to filter out 
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memories that do not belong to ongoing reality (Schnider, 2003). Results from 
the current study partially replicated the work by Schnider and colleagues. 71% 
of the present confabulators scored above the cut-off point that would index 
confabulation according to Schnider and colleagues, and all healthy controls 
scored below this point. In this way the present results constitute a partial 
replication of Schnider’s previous findings (Schnider et al., 1996).  
 
However, contrary to Schnider’s findings, 7 confabulating participants scored 
below the critical cut-off point. In addition, non-confabulating brain injured 
amnesic participants’ scores were evenly distributed across both sides of the 
critical cut-off point (figure 3.2). This indicated that performance on the TCC 
task did not always discriminate between confabulating and non-confabulating 
amnesic patients. Current non-confabulating brain injured participants’ 
performance on this task was similar to that of the anterior communicating 
artery aneurysm (ACoA) control group reported by Gilboa et al. (Gilboa et al., 
2006). This may have been due to the severity of executive dysfunction 
experienced by both control groups. In Gilboa et al.’s (2006) study, performance 
on executive and memory tests did not distinguish between confabulating and 
non-confabulating ACoA participants, most of whom performed below average. 
Equally, in the present study, confabulating and non-confabulating participants 
obtained similar scores on executive tests, and these fell below the 10th 
percentile. On the basis of their results, Gilboa et al. concluded that TCC may 
be sensitive to confabulation but it is not specific to this condition. The current 
results would support this conclusion. 
 
 182
Regarding the course of confabulation, very few longitudinal studies exist. 
Schnider et al. (2000a) measured memory, executive and TCC performance 
and found that TCC was the only measure that paralleled recovery from 
confabulation across participants. The present findings provide partial support 
for this claim. Confabulating participants’ performance on the TCC task did 
indeed improve over time in line with improvements on confabulation measures. 
However this improvement on TCC was not statistically significant, whereas 
recovery from confabulation was significant in the current sample. Related to 
this Schnider (2008, pg. 251) himself has described individual cases where 
TCC did not parallel confabulation recovery. Critics of Schnider’s hypotheses 
have argued that TCC may be necessary but it is not sufficient for the 
appearance of confabulation (Gilboa, 2010). Similarly the present results would 
suggest that TCC may have played a part in the recovery from confabulation for 
some patients, but it was not critical to the recovery of confabulation in the 
present sample.  
 
6.3. The role of insight in the appearance and clinical course of 
confabulation 
 
The role of insight in the appearance and clinical course of confabulation has 
not been formally studied previously. The present findings provide evidence that 
insight into memory difficulties and well-being may be an important factor in the 
appearance and clinical course of confabulation. Results from the current study 
showed that poor insight was a strong correlate of the presence of 
confabulation and also that it improved significantly in line with recovery from 
confabulation. These results are consistent with previous observations 
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indicating that recovery from confabulation is accompanied by improved 
awareness of deficits (Feinberg and Roane, 1997; Mercer et al., 1977). Indeed 
there is some evidence that clinical interventions aimed at improving awareness 
and self-monitoring have improved confabulation in clinical samples, although 
authors did not explain why the treatment worked (DeLuca, 2009; Dayus and 
Van, 2000). 
 
Although insight or awareness runs as an overarching theme throughout most 
explanatory models of confabulation, an explicit account of the nature of its 
relationship with confabulation has not been put forward. Several authors have 
argued that confabulation is caused by deficits experiencing ongoing reality, 
and as these lift, patients recover from confabulation (Schnider, 2008; Dalla 
Barba and Boisse, 2010). More specifically, Feinberg and Roane (1997) 
described confabulation as “an alteration in ] relatedness to the environment.” 
(Feinberg and Roane, 1997). Somewhat similarly, absence of enhanced 
retrieval for non-personal affective information (as measured by the Cahill task) 
has been attributed to a lack of appropriate “experiencing” of emotion in 
external stimuli (Tranel et al., 2006; Adolphs et al., 1997). Results from the 
current study showed that this effect was indeed absent in confabulating 
participants, but returned in line with improvements on confabulation. In other 
words, present results showed that over time awareness of difficulties improved 
significantly, and so did ability to experience emotion in external stimuli; at the 
same time confabulations decreased significantly in the current sample. In this 
way, present findings would be consistent with explanations that propose that 
confabulation is accompanied by a disconnection between internal and external 
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reality, although the precise nature of such disconnection and the direction of  
the causal relationship are yet unknown. 
 
One possible explanation for the results obtained in the current investigation is 
that the disconnection experienced by confabulating participants is caused by 
dysfunction in the amygdala (Tranel et al., 2006; Adolphs et al., 1997). Brain 
imaging information in the current sample did not allow determination of 
amygdala damage on confabulating patients’ performance on the Cahill and 
insight tasks, but would be necessary in order to verify this hypothesis. But why 
should confabulating patients have reduced ability for experiencing emotion 
from external stimuli? A simple explanation would be that dysfunction in a key 
attentional gateway could result in a ‘blindspot’ for externally generated 
information. This attentional gateway has been located in BA10, and when 
intact, it has been found to be responsible for switching attention between 
internally and externally generated stimuli as and when required (Burgess et al., 
2007a). In order to test this hypothesis, confabulating participants’ function in 
BA10 would need to be examined while considering internally versus externally 
generated information. Alternatively, Conway (Conway et al., 1996) proposed 
that during normal memory reconstruction personal importance and affect may 
be assigned to memories at the same time. In their study, recall of false 
memories was accompanied by a lack of integration between these processes. 
The present confabulating participants showed reduced insight, which has been 
interpreted by some authors in terms of a disconnection from the external world. 
Therefore, affect and personal importance may not be assigned in the usual 
way in confabulating participants. In this connection, one possibility is that in an 
effort to maintain self-coherence, (false) memories which support important 
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goals and self-concepts may have increased affective intensity and accessibility 
(Conway, 2005); in contrast, other memories less personally relevant for 
confabulating participants (e.g. those generated by the Cahill task) may be 
assigned less affective intensity and accessibility. In order to test this 
hypothesis, current results would need to be replicated taking care to measure 
recalled memories in terms of personal relevance and intensity of affect.  
 
In practical terms, if current results were to be replicated, the insight measure 
employed in this study would need to be validated. Moreover, further 
investigations into the effectiveness of interventions designed to improve 
awareness of difficulties, which are reported to have reduced confabulations 
would be extremely valuable for clinical practice; these would require larger 
samples and more stringent controlled conditions than those reported in the 
literature. 
 
Thus, results from the current study provide evidence that awareness of 
memory difficulties and general well-being may be an important factor in the 
appearance and clinical course of confabulations. However, further study would 
be required in order to determine the specific role that insight plays in the 
recovery from confabulation.  
 
6.4. The role of affect in the prediction of presence and clinical course of 
confabulation 
 
As discussed above, current findings indicated confabulating participants may 
experience deficits integrating internally generated thoughts and memories with 
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external feedback. In this context mood state may be an important factor in the 
appearance and clinical course of confabulation. Indeed self-reported elated 
mood predicted both the presence of confabulation and its clinical course. 
Current findings also showed that slightly elated mood decreased in line with a 
reduction of confabulation over time. 
 
Results from the current investigation would be partially consistent with findings 
that indicate that elated mood modulates memory in psychiatric populations 
(Corwin et al., 1990). In these studies, elated mood was linked to a liberal bias 
in patients’ responses to recognition memory tasks; this bias disappeared when 
patients recovered from the underlying mood disorder.  
 
The present findings support explanations that propose that mood and 
emotional mechanisms may modulate the appearance and clinical course of 
confabulations in the context of weak memory and monitoring mechanisms 
(Conway, 2005; Fotopoulou, 2010; Metcalf et al., 2010; Gilboa, 2010). However, 
the effects of mood on the cognitive mechanisms underlying confabulation has 
not been specified. In this connection two ‘core’ mechanisms have been 
proposed to be critical in the appearance of confabulation: (i) a ‘preconscious 
Feeling of Rightness (FOR)’, which refers to an early sense that the memory 
retrieved may be correct, and (ii) ‘Control’ mechanisms, which regulate the 
quantity and accuracy of memories reported (Gilboa, 2010). According to Gilboa 
(2010) breakdown of FOR monitoring processes may cause patients to 
erroneously accept confabulated memories with high confidence. On the other 
hand, confabulators’ exaggerated willingness to report false memories may be 
due in part to breakdown of Control mechanisms. Within this framework, one 
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possible explanation for the current findings is that elated mood may promote 
an exaggerated sense of confidence in confabulated memories. In order to 
investigate this hypothesis future studies would need to include a measure of 
patients’ confidence in their reported memories. Another possibility is that elated 
mood may exacerbate confabulators’ willingness to report (false) memories. In 
order to verify this hypothesis future investigations would need to include a free 
narrative task where the participants would have control over whether or not to 
report (false) memories. Thus, further experimentation would be needed in 
order to determine the effect of elated mood on the ‘core’ mechanisms 
underlying confabulation: FOR and Control processes.  
 
In addition, previous authors have seldom commented on recovery from 
confabulation (Schnider, 2008; Nahum et al., 2010). Schnider has found that 
dopamine antagonists sometimes reduce confabulation (Schnider, 2008). 
Corwin et al. found that beta-blockers reversed elated mood disorders and an 
associated excessive willingness to guess during memory recognition (Corwin 
et al., 1990). Therefore, if the present findings were replicated, they may have 
clinical implications. For example it is possible that reducing initial levels of 
elated mood may accelerate the rate of recovery from confabulation. 
Randomised controlled methods would be required in order to verify this 
hypothesis, and to examine the effectiveness of the suggested drug treatments 
on reduction of confabulation.   
 
In summary, the current results indicated that elated mood may have a 




6.5. The role of affect in confabulation formation 
 
As discussed above, mood state may have an important role in the appearance 
and clinical course of confabulations. Related to this several authors have 
shown that emotional factors influence confabulation formation. Identity and 
personal goals may determine the content of confabulations (Conway, 2005; 
Fotopoulou, 2010). Further to this, current findings provide evidence that affect 
may be an important factor in confabulation formation.  
 
Fotopoulou has found that independent raters consistently judged 
confabulations to be more pleasant than the ‘real’ facts they had replaced. She 
also found that pleasant confabulations were associated with depressed mood 
(Fotopoulou, 2010). In view of these findings several authors have proposed 
that personal identity and related goals may exert an exaggerated influence on 
the content of confabulation when memory and executive functions are 
disrupted (Conway, 2005; Fotopoulou, 2010). Therefore, the overwhelmingly 
pleasant content of confabulations in those studies was interpreted in terms of 
the influence on memory of a self-preserving tendency to maintain a positive 
image, in the context of patients’ unpleasant reality and associated depressed 
mood (Fotopoulou, 2010). This was partially supported by current findings. 
Among the memories with affective content, a significantly higher proportion of 
pleasant content was found on confabulations in the current study when judges 
were allowed to contrast them with the ‘real’ facts they had replaced.  
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However, in contrast with Fotopoulou’s findings, results from the current study 
showed there was an affective (but not necessarily positive) bias in the content 
of confabulations relative to that of true memories. Also in contrast with previous 
findings, current results indicated that all memories studied (both true and false) 
had a tendency to be mood congruent. Metcalf has argued that a pleasant or 
self-enhancing bias on confabulation is not universal (Metcalf et al., 2010). She 
found that only confabulations about recent events had a significant pleasant 
bias in content. Some confabulations had unpleasant content. In this 
connection, Fotopoulou has argued that negative affect in confabulations may 
be linked to islands of awareness of deficits or unpleasant past events 
(Fotopoulou, 2010). Also of note a large proportion of neutral confabulations 
and true memories were reported by the present sample. This is consistent with 
previous findings (Metcalf et al., 2010; Dalla Barba and Boisse, 2010). Relative 
to this, it has been proposed that ‘generic’ memories or ‘input templates’ are 
used as starting values when constructing memories. They appear to be 
influenced by affect and by premorbid concepts of self-identity, and perhaps 
help patients cope with a changing reality. Deficits in memory trace specification 
and verification would lead to these ‘generic’ memories being incorrectly 
reported in place of the required specific events (Metcalf et al., 2010; Burgess 
and Shallice, 1996). Observational evidence has indicated that these ‘habit’ 
confabulations may be nuanced by mood state (Metcalf et al., 2010); they are 
likely to be selected over others for several reasons. Firstly, being over-
rehearsed, their memory traces may simply be more resilient to amnesia than 
less stable traces of specific events (Dalla Barba and Boisse, 2010; Kopelman, 
2010). Second, memories that are highly consistent with self-identity are likely 
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to be a) more emotionally salient, and b) accepted as true with excessive 
confidence (Gilboa et al., 2006; Conway, 2005; Fotopoulou, 2010).  
 
In summary, the results from the current study indicated an affective influence in 
confabulation formation. The current findings support explanations of 
confabulation that propose that in the context of trace specification and 
verification deficits; confabulators draw on the more stable elements of memory, 
thereby reporting ‘generic’ or ‘habit’ confabulations. These appear to be 




In conclusion, the present programme of studies presented the first prospective 
longitudinal examination of the clinical course of confabulation in a relatively 
large sample. Several comprehensive models of confabulation attempt to 
explain the complex interaction between the various functional systems that 
underlie accurate autobiographical recollection: medial temporal memory 
formation structures, frontal attentional control processes, and awareness and 
emotion regulatory systems possibly linked to the amygdala (Kopelman, 2002, 
2010; Gilboa et al., 2006; Metcalf et al., 2010). The present study investigated 
some of these factors. Results overall supported the notion that 
autobiographical recall is supported by a diverse range of cognitive and 
emotional processes.  
 
Current findings partially replicated Schnider’s results indicating that TCC was 
sensitive to confabulation and paralleled the recovery from this condition. In 
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contrast, TCC was found be neither specific to nor predictive of the presence 
and clinical course of confabulation in the current sample. The current study 
indicated that elated mood state may have a contributory and previously 
unreported role on the appearance, clinical course and formation of 
confabulations. The present findings also indicated that awareness of memory 
difficulties and general well-being may also play a contributory and previously 
unreported part in the appearance and clinical course of confabulations. Further 
study would be required to determine the specific roles of these factors on 
confabulation. The present findings highlight the need for current explanatory 
models of confabulation to include a ‘dynamic’ dimension to account for the 
clinical course of this condition.  
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Dalla Barba confabulation battery 
 
(Dalla Barba et al. (1993); Kopelman, Ng & Van den Brouke (1997); M. Kopelman, pers. comm.) 
 
Code: GGGGGGG..    Date: GGGGGGGGG.. 
 





A) PERSONAL SEMANTIC MEMORY: 
 
1. what is your name? 
 
 
2. how old are you? 
 
 
3. what is your date of birth? 
 
 
4. where were you born? 
 
 
5. when were you admitted to the 
hospital? 
 
6. what is your present address? 
 
 
7. are your parents alive? 
 
 
8. why are you in hospital? 
 
 
9. are you married? 
 
 
10. do you have any children? 
 
 
11. how many children do you have? 
 
 
12. how old are your children? 
 
 
13. how old were you when you had your 
first child? 
 
14. what are your children’s first names? 
 
 
15. what are your children’s birth dates? 
 
 
16. what are your parents’ first names? 
 
 
17. what was your father’s job? 
 
 




19. what are your brothers’ first names? 
 
 




B) EPISODIC MEMORY: 
 
1. what did you eat for dinner yesterday? 
 
 
2. what did you do yesterday? 
 
 
3. who did you meet this morning? 
 
 
4. how did you spend last Christmas? 
 
 
5. what did you do for your last birthday? 
 
 
6. do you remember the last time you went to see a doctor? 
 
 
7. do you remember the last time you went to the cinema? 
 
 
8. do you remember the last time you went to the restaurant? 
 
 
9. do you remember the day of your admission to this hospital? 
 
 
10. what were you doing the day Princess Diana was killed? (31.8.97) 
 
 
11. do you remember your first day at junior school? 
 
 
12. do you remember your first child’s birth? 
 
 
13. do you remember your wedding? (or a wedding you attended) 
 
 
14. do you remember your last day at school? 
 
 




C) ORIENTATION IN TIME AND PLACE: 
 
1. what year are we? 
 
 
2. what season are we? 
 
 
3. what month are we? 
 
 
4. what is the date? 
 
 
5. what day of the week are we? 
 
 
6. what time is it?  
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7. what city are we in? 
 
 
8. where are we now? 
 
 
9. in which country are we now? 
 
 




D) GENERAL SEMANTIC MEMORY: 
 
1. when did World War I start? 
 
 
2. when did World War II start? 
 
 
3. what happened to President Kennedy? 
 
 
4. who is Montgomery? 
 
 
5. who is Dennis Compton? (cricketer) 
 
 
6. who is George Best (footballer)? 
 
 
7. who is Winston Churchill? 
 
 
8. who is Marilyn Monroe? 
 
 
9. who is the Prime Minister? 
 
 
10. what happened in Kuwait in 1989? 
 
 
11. what happened to Robert Maxwell? 
 
 
12. what happened to the Pope recently? 
 
 
13. what happened to Princess Grace of Monaco? 
 
 
14. what happened in Northern Ireland in 1969? 
 
 












E) I DON’T KNOW – SEMANTIC: 
 
1. Who won the football championship/league in 1982? 
 
 
2. Who won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1980? 
 
 
3. Who won gold medal in the men’s Epée competition for 
the last two Olympics? 
 
 
4. Who was Foreign Secretary in 1965? 
 
 
5. Who is president of Mexico? 
 
 
6. How many Renault cars were sold in 1985? 
 
 
7. Which team is world champion in fencing? 
 
 
8. Which state abolished the monarchy in 1973? 
 
 








F) I DON’T KNOW – EPISODIC: 
 
1. What did you do 13th March 1985? 
 
 




3. What did you do Christmas day 1957? 
 
 
4. What did you do on your 25th birthday? 
 
 
5. What were you doing last month? 
 
 
6. What were you doing last year? 
 
 
7. On your last visit to the bank, what was the clerk wearing? 
 
 




9. When you last took the bus, how was the person next to 
you dressed? 
 













a) Why are you here? 
b) Has anything happened to 




Score best answer: a) or b) 
 
0           1           2 
correct   DK   error 
a) Is there anything wrong with 
your head or brain? 
b) Is it true that XXX time ago you 
had a XXX that caused damage 
to your brain? 
 
 
Score best answer: a) or b) 
 
0                1                 2 
correct           DK        error 
Yes      so they tell me     no    





0           1           2 
correct   DK   error 
Does your memory let you down 
regularly? / is your memory particularly 




0           1           2 
correct   DK   error 
Is it true ]that you are perfectly fit to 




0           1           2 
correct   DK   error 





0           1           2 
correct   DK   error 




0           1           2 
correct   DK   error 
 
0 = a true representation of why the person is in hospital 
 
1 = answer that reflects doubt/uncertainty about what has happened or about 
current intellectual competency (eg: they tell me] but I don’t remember; I don’t 
know, can’t remember, not sure]) 
 
2 = answer that reflects contradiction in either the reason for hospitalisation or the degree of 




Supplementary WASI analysis 
 
As part of the clinical characterisation of our sample, we measured cognitive 
function was measured and IQ differences between confabulating and non-
confabulating brain injured participants were examined. For this purpose the 
WASI was employed in the majority of cases. However this was not possible for 
a minority of patients.  
 
One confabulating patient was not able to complete WASI tasks and was given 
the Rivermead Progressive Matrices – Colour version (Raven et al., 1984) 
instead.  
 
A further 8 participants had already been administered the WAIS-III for clinical 
purposes less than three months before they were included in this study. The 
WASI could not be administered to these patients because their scores would 
have been inflated due to practice effects. Instead their IQ was calculated in 
one of the following three ways: a) either from the full WAIS-III battery (2 
confabulators and 1 control), or b) from partial WAIS-III prorated scores (1 
confabulator), or c) from WAIS-III short form scores (3 confabulators and 1 
control). 
 
The data reported in study 1 (chapter 3 of this thesis) included IQ scores 
derived from all the above measures. No evidence of IQ differences was found 
between confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured participants. 
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In order to check whether the use of slightly different IQ measures had 
introduced any biases on our results only scores derived from WASI were 
selected for the present analysis. Differences in IQ between confabulating and 
non-confabulating participants in this subsample were then examined.  
 
A one-way ANOVA with group as the independent factor (confabulating or not 
confabulating), and IQ score as the dependent variable showed no significant 
IQ differences between the two patient groups (F(1,24)= 1.432, p= 0.243). 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of WASI-derived IQ scores for both groups. 
 
Table 1. Mean and standard deviation of WASI-derived IQ scores for confabulating and non-
confabulating brain injured participants 
 
Descriptives WASI-only cases 














BI control 9 74.33 10.665 3.555 66.14 82.53 55 94 
confabulator 17 80.18 12.391 3.005 73.81 86.55 59 98 
Total 26 78.15 11.946 2.343 73.33 82.98 55 98 
 
 
In conclusion, data from the current sample reported in chapter 3 of this study 
showed that confabulating and non-confabulating brain injured participants did 
not differ in cognitive ability at the time of inclusion to the study. However this 
data included slightly different IQ measures on a minority of the patients 
studied. Analysis of differences on the subsample whose IQ was derived 
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exclusively from the WASI showed the same results as the data presented in 
chapter 3. Therefore it was concluded that the use of different measures of IQ 
for a minority of participants had not introduced a significant bias in the results 
of the current study. 
 
